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AN ESSAY ON LIABILITY INSURANCE AND ACCIDENT 
COMPENSATION 
INTRODUCTION 
There is little academic literature on the subject of liability insurance or, to be more 
precise, there is little literature where liability insurance provides the main focus and 
is not just an ancillary issue. Material of latter sort is abundant. As one might expect, 
there are many references to the role of liability insurance in the large corpus of work 
that deals with tort law and accident compensation. In this literature the importance 
of liability insurance as a component of accident compensation systems is usually 
acknowledged. However, little attention has been paid to the way in which this form 
of insurance operates, the technical and other problems it presents for insurers and the 
dynamics of the market in which it is written. Again, whilst there are numerous 
`histories' of marine, fire and life insurance, and one or two that deal with accident 
insurance as a whole, none is devoted to liability insurance as such. 
The paucity of academic comment on liability insurance is rather surprising, given its 
importance. Liability insurance is viewed, almost universally, as an integral part of 
compensation systems that depend on tort liability. Indeed, one of the most respected 
judges of his generation described the liability insurer as the deus ex machina of the 
tort system, ' the hidden force that controls and regulates the development of this 
branch of the law. Unfortunately, however, regulatory mechanisms can sometimes 
fall short of divine perfection, and the mechanism of the tort/liability insurance 
system has sometimes become unbalanced, as in the North American `insurance 
crisis' of the mid-1980s, when a shortage of affordable liability insurance caused 
some dislocation of business activity. 2 On the few occasions when this has happened 
academic interest in the topic has become heightened and the device of liability 
insurance (and the enterprises that provide it) have come in for criticism along with 
the tort system itself. However, a shortage of liability insurance at any given time 
I 
ý 
Diplock, Rt. Hon. Lord Kenneth `Conventions and Morals', I JMLC 525 (1990). 
There was also a more specific `crisis' over the availability of product liability insurance in the 
US in the years 1975-6. 
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does not necessarily indicate that the whole system is flawed. It might equally be 
taken as salutary signal that an otherwise sound system needs some adjustment and, 
perhaps, that too quick an expansion of liability rules, or a general uncertainty about 
where the law is going, needs to be addressed. Nevertheless, much academic 
comment on the tort/liability insurance system has been critical. It is frequently 
argued that the mechanism is inefficient, expensive and potentially unreliable. 
Furthermore, insurers also regard liability insurance as unattractive in business terms. 
This is because most lines of liability insurance, in most markets, at most times, have 
been loss makers. In some cases the losses have been spectacular, as in the case of the 
huge deficits on liability insurance accounts in the United States that contributed more 
than anything else to the near collapse of Lloyd's in the late 1980s. A recent survey 
of all UK companies that write liability business, conducted by the author, reveals just 
how diffident insurers are where this form of insurance is concerned. The results of 
the survey, which are discussed in more detail in Part 6 of this essay, make one 
wonder how insurers came to write this class of insurance in the first place and why 
they do so still. Dealing with the first part of the question 
- 
the reasons for the 
evolution of liability insurance as a separate and highly problematic class of business 
- 
it is clear that the process was largely fortuitous. As we shall see, liability insurance 
was initially an incidental by-product of the first party `accident' insurance classes 
that emerged as a consequence of industrialisation in the nineteenth century. By a 
gradual and somewhat random process it developed into a class in its own right 
- 
and 
one that sometimes provided much wider cover than other forms of insurance. 
Indeed, it is most curious that insurers, through the medium of liability insurance, 
have assumed risks that were regarded, and are still regarded, as uninsurable as first 
party risks. There is no single answer to the second part of the question 
- 
why 
insurers should persist in writing perennially unprofitable liability business. 
However, the author's research suggests that most insurers continue to underwrite this 
line mainly for tactical reasons and, in particular, to support insurance business, such 
as property and life, that is more likely to be rewarding. 
The link between liability insurance and tort law has already been mentioned: clearly, 
the two are so closely related that they stand or fall together. However, they do not 
form a complete system. They are merely part of a yet wider scheme through which 
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society seeks to compensate the victims of misfortune. This wider scheme employs 
other devices to deliver compensation, including private first party insurance and a 
variety of social security benefits offered by the state. Compared with these, tort plus 
liability insurance can appear remarkably costly and inefficient. Yet, despite all its 
problems and deficiencies the tort/liability insurance system has continued to grow, 
develop and evolve. Almost without exception, efforts to abolish or replace it have 
failed. 3 Attempts to prune back one area have often simply stimulated new growth in 
another. For example, the world-wide adoption of workers' compensation schemes as 
a cost-effective and, perhaps, more equitable alternative to employers' liability has 
never entirely satisfied the demands of all those who are injured at work. The 
employers' liability risk continues to develop in many countries and, where it remains 
restricted, injured workers have simply sought alternative targets for liability claims. 
Typically, these include manufacturers and producers of hazardous machinery or 
dangerous substances found in the workplace and, to a lesser degrees, the directors 
and professional advisers of the firms concerned. The reason for this phenomenon, 
which might be called `claims displacement', is obvious. Restriction or abolition of 
liability rules in selected areas only (such as work injuries) create imbalances by 
treating groups of accident victims differently, encouraging those who are (or feel) 
discriminated against to seek alternative remedies. Again, no-fault alternatives to 
liability systems, whether they are general or selective schemes (such as workers' 
compensation), spread compensation more widely and, as an inevitable result, spread 
it more thinly. Thus, whilst all accident victims within such schemes receive 
compensation none is compensated in full. This `some for all, not all for some' 
approach may satisfy an accident victim if he himself, or nobody, is at fault. 
However, it is less likely to do so if another is to blame. Victims of negligence, or 
more egregious wrongdoing, often feel that they deserve more, and wish to 
distinguish themselves from those who have suffered by pure mischance. This desire 
for `full' compensation, and for the formal recognition of wrongdoing that an award 
of tort damages implies, creates a powerful incentive to probe channels of 
ý The New Zealand accident compensation scheme 
-a cause cdlebre for opponents of the tort 
system 
- 
is the most notable exception. Tort liability has also been replaced, or partly 
replaced, by no-fault workers' compensation and road accident schemes in some countries. 
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compensation where liability rules can still be exploited. 4 Furthermore, there is 
evidence of a markedly increased readiness to exploit tort remedies in many Western 
countries at the present time. This phenomenon, loosely described as the 
`compensation culture', is also explored later in this essay. Evidence suggests that the 
desire of potential defendants in tort cases to spread the risk through insurance is 
equally deep-rooted-5 As we shall see, efforts to curtail the use of liability insurance 
on grounds of public policy have been consistently outflanked by business people. 
The latter, driven by commercial necessity, have insisted on the right to insure. 
Equally, when the `moral hazard' that liability insurance presents has been weighed 
against the uncompensated harm that insolvent and uninsured tortfeasors are likely to 
inflict, on the roads and elsewhere, insurance has usually seemed the lesser of the two 
evils. 
The central issue for the tort/liability insurance system is one of stability: if it is to 
function effectively, a compensation system that depends on liability insurance, or 
uses liability insurance as a substantial component, must produce outcomes that are 
reasonably predictable for all concerned. Stability and predictability are necessary 
from the perspective of potential and actual claimants. If they are to plan their 
activities, and balance the risks of everyday life (such as taking a job, travelling in a 
car or aircraft or buying a product), they must have assurance that appropriate 
compensation will be available if they suffer loss or injury. It is also necessary for 
policyholders who, in choosing (or being obliged) to diversify risks through insurance 
markets, must know that insurance will be available at a reasonably stable price over 
the long term, and that such insurance will respond to losses and liabilities incurred in 
a predictable way. Failing this, budgeting becomes impossible. Finally, of course, it 
is necessary for insurers who, in order to attract the capital that is necessary to support 
their business, must be able to measure the production costs of insurance, price their 
policies accurately and give their shareholders an adequate return. Of course, there 
4 
5 
Of course, for an accident victim, the decision to sue is an entirely subjective one. Arguments 
about economic inefficiency, administrative inconvenience and fundamental flaws in fault- 
based liability systems, no matter how well founded, are unlikely to affect an individual 
accident victim's decision to pursue a tort remedy. 
For a discussion of liability insurance as a social good see Shavell, S. (2000) `On the social 
function and the regulation of liability insurance' The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 
Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 166-179. 
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are other stakeholders in the tort/liability insurance system, including consumers 
(since insurance cost and availability affects the cost and availability of most products 
and services) and governments which, increasingly, use liability insurance as a means 
of extending social security systems. 
Sources of instability provide a major focus for the exploration of liability insurance, 
and the tort/liability insurance system of which it is a part, that is carried out in this 
essay. Rapid expansion of tort law, steep rises in damages awards and inherent 
problems of moral hazard are some of the potentially destabilising factors that are 
considered. It will also become apparent that the path along which liability insurance 
has developed has led insurers to assume risks that generate the most intractable 
technical problems. Because these difficulties have not been addressed successfully, 
liability insurance has become a class of insurance that few general insurers wish to 
write in isolation from other, more profitable, insurance business and many do not 
wish to write at all. Recently, we have seen the collapse of the only major UK insurer 
that appeared to have found a formula for the successful exploitation of liability 
insurance in recent years 
- 
Independent Insurance. This has brought the problems of 
this class of insurance, and the fragility of some parts of the market, into sharp relief. 
This essay aims to provide an analysis of all the key issues surrounding the practice of 
liability insurance, including those mentioned above. It attempts to trace 
systematically the development of liability insurance, to evaluate its role, analyse the 
key problems that insurers face in writing this form of insurance and consider the 
impact of all this on accident compensation systems. In the course of the analysis the 
author draws upon, links and summarises the themes of five published papers on the 
subject of liability insurance. The essay expands upon a number of issues raised in 
these papers and presents some reasoned arguments in their support. 
The papers, which are included in Volume II, Appendices II-VI are: 
1 `Employers' liability insurance 
- 
how secure is the system? ' Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol. 28, No. 2, June 1999, pp. 109-132. 
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2 `Compensation and insurance for injuries at work: a European perspective', 
International Journal of Insurance Law, Part 3, July 1999, pp. 214-233. 
3 `Industrial injuries and employers' liability 
-a search for the cure', 
(Monograph) Chartered Insurance Institute, 1999. Awarded Morgan Owen 
medal and prize for best research work by a member of the CII. 
4 `Compensating psychiatric illness: issues of liability and insurance' Journal of 
Insurance Research and Practice, Vol. 16, Part 1, January 2001, pp. 14-26. 
5 Managerial liability, risk and insurance: an international view' International 
and Comparative Corporate Law Journal Vol. 3, Issue 1,2001, pp. 1-31. 
N. B. When reference is made to the papers in this essay they are cited in an 
abbreviated form, as follows: 1 `How Secure is the System?, 2 `European 
Perspective', 3 `The Cure, 4 `Psychiatric Illness' and 5 `Managerial 
Liability'. 
This essay is intended to be broad in scope. Therefore, inevitably, it touches on some 
issues which are not explored in detail in the articles listed above and which, for 
reasons of space, cannot be given the detailed attention they deserve here. There is 
much scope for further research. ' 
The essay is structured in six parts. Part 1 traces the historical development of 
liability insurance as an outgrowth of accident insurance, a broad miscellaneous class 
with its own origins in the revolutionary changes in industry, trade, and transport that 
began as the eighteenth century drew to a close. Part 2 analyses the problems that 
began to emerge once liability insurance became a class of insurance in its own right. 
This section shows, in particular, how liability insurers came to assume long-tail risks, 
6 For example, and in no particular order: moral hazard in the lawmaking process and in the 
placing and underwriting of liability insurance, risk segmentation and adverse selection in 
liability insurance, the nature and extent of the `compensation culture', alternative policy 
triggers for employers' liability insurance, the relationship between liability insurance and 
legal expenses insurance and between the markets that provide them. 
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exposures of a kind that were always regarded as uninsurable in the context of first- 
party insurance. Part 3 looks at how insurers have responded to these difficulties and 
examines the technical problems they face in attempting to design contracts that 
satisfy both the security requirements of policyholders and their own need to price 
liability risks accurately and reduce their uncertainties to manageable proportions. 
Part 4 examines behavioural aspects of liability insurance and the issue of moral 
hazard: the possibility that the granting of insurance cover might promote 
opportunistic behaviour or modify human actions in a way that adversely affects the 
interests of insurers, or society as whole, or both. It is argued that this phenomenon 
takes on extra dimensions in the context of liability insurance, creating additional 
layers of uncertainty for insurers and greater potential instability for liability insurance 
systems. Part 5 examines a connected issue: the relationship between liability 
insurance and liability rules, especially those of tort law. Here we consider the extent 
to which the existence or availability of insurance impacts upon judicial and 
legislative policy, and the extent to which it should properly do so. The essay 
concludes, in Part 6, with a summary of the issues explored and an assessment of 
possible future developments in liability insurance markets. As part of this 
assessment the perceptions of the major stakeholders in the systems that employ 
liability insurance are considered, including liability insurers, the Government, the 
general public and the lawmakers. It is observed that these perceptions 
- 
as to the 
proper role of liability insurance, and what can be achieved effectively through its use 
- 
differ widely. The author concludes that all would benefit from a better informed 
and, perhaps, more realistic assessment of what liability insurance can do, and what it 
cannot. If the system is to remain stable, there is a need for a greater understanding of 
the problems of liability insurance, and the limits of its effectiveness, amongst all 
stakeholders in the tort/liability insurance system, including the lawmakers, the 
Government, the public at large and insurers themselves. 
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1 ORIGINS: FROM ACCIDENT TO LIABILITY 
The class of insurance business now known as liability insurance has its roots in the 
early nineteenth century, or even a little before. Its growth was encouraged by rapid 
developments in industry, trade and transport around this time. Hitherto, only three 
forms of insurance were commonly available. They were marine insurance, life 
insurance and fire insurance, the regular practice of which, in Europe, dates 
(approximately) from the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries respectively. 
It is important to understand that what we, on this side of the Atlantic, now call 
liability insurance originally formed part of a broad and miscellaneous class known as 
`accident insurance'. This name was used to describe any form of insurance that was 
neither marine, life, nor fire and which covered losses arising from some sudden 
harmful event, unintended and unexpected by the insured, such as a burglary, 
explosion, or road or rail accident. These risks were assumed initially by specialist 
insurers, the `accident offices'. However, in the first quarter of the twentieth century 
many of these were bought up by the large fire insurance companies, which thus 
became `composite' insurers. Nowadays, the term `accident insurance' is almost 
obsolete, though the term `personal accident' is still used to describe policies that 
cover accidental bodily injury. 
An alternative term, `casualty insurance' (which seems to have originated in the 
United States), originally had a meaning that was roughly equivalent to that of 
accident insurance. However, it has now come to be associated with liability 
insurance in particular. Thus, general (non-life) insurances are now often classified as 
either `property' or `casualty'. Under this categorisation theft insurance, originally a 
form of accident insurance, now falls in the `property' class. 
Though the terminology can be confusing, it is clear that the early accident insurers 
did not regard the liability risk 
- 
financial loss arising from an obligation to pay 
7 The point has often been made that the rise of Britain as an industrial power in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries was partly attributable to the ready availability of marine and fire 
insurance in the London market. 
II 
damages 
- 
as different in quality from other losses that might arise from an accident, 
such as damage to the insured's own property. The essence of the matter was the 
accident itself, the sudden event that caused loss to the insured. Insurers were not 
concerned with losses that arose from gradual processes, such as pollution or 
gradually developing disease. Indeed, the early accident insurers can hardly have 
imagined that risks of this sort would eventually become the subject of insurance 
through the medium of liability insurance or that the latter would become a class in its 
own right, with its own principles and own peculiar problems. 
The origins of some branches of liability insurance are not well documented and 
hence rather obscure, but it is evident that this type of insurance developed in a rather 
fragmented way. The sections that follow trace the development of the main classes. 
1.1 MARINE LIABILITIES 
Marine insurers were the first to assume liability risks, although the precise date of 
their beginning to do so remains in doubt. The initial subject matter was the `running 
down' risk, that is, the obligation to pay compensation that arises as a consequence of 
a collision between two or more ships. The English law relating to collisions at sea 
has very ancient origins8 and included a rule, common to the whole maritime world 
for more than eight hundred years, that required the whole damage to be divided 
equally between the owners of two ships in cases where both were at fault. 9 In De 
Vaux v. Salvador, 10 where two vessels had collided in the Hoogly river, the 
application of this rule required the sailing ship La Valeur to pay a balance to the 
steamer Forbes, both being at fault and the latter having suffering greater damage 
than the former. Lord Denman, in the Court of King's Bench, held that this sum was 
not recoverable from the marine insurers of La Valeur. The issue was seen primarily 
8 
9 
to 
The original principles are contained in the Black Book of the Admiralty (circa 1350). This 
itself is a compilation of earlier medieval codes, including the Rolls of Oleron (circa 1160). 
Article XIV of the Rolls of Oleron provides that, in the event of a collision: `the whole 
damage shall be in common and be equally divided 
... 
and the master and mariners of the 
vessel that struck or grappled with the other, shall be bound to swear on the Holy Evangelists, 
that they did it not willingly or wilfully. The reason why this judgement was first given being, 
that an old decayed vessel might not purposely be put in the way of a better, which will the 
rather be prevented when they know that the damage must be divided. ' (1836) 4 A. & E. 420. 
12 
as one of causation. According to the judge, the obligation to pay the owners of the 
other ship was `neither a necessary nor a proximate effect of the perils of the sea' but 
a consequence of the Admiralty rule: `an arbitrary provision in the law of nations 
from views of general expediency, not as dictated by natural justice, nor (possibly) 
quite consistent with it'. This judgement effectively drew the limits of the ordinary 
marine insurance contracts of the time, confining their scope to first-party losses: 
payments to third parties, due as a consequence of the operation of the general law 
had to be specially insured. 11 Following De Vaux v. Salvador London market insurers 
began to introduce cover for collision liabilities under what was then known as the 
Running Down Clause (RDC). 12 However, there were examples of collision liability 
coverage well before that date, a London insurance company (the Indemnity Mutual 
Marine Insurance Co. ) having drawn up a similar clause when it commenced business 
in 1824.13 Furthermore, there is evidence that some of the mutual `Hull Clubs', the 
forerunners of the Protecting and Indemnity (P&I) Clubs, covered liability for 
collisions at an earlier date Still. 14 This is apparent from Delanoy v. Robson (1814). 15 
This case is discussed in more detail in Section 4.2. However, we can note here that 
the court in Delanoy addressed itself, amongst other things, to the legality of 
insurance against damages that a ship owner had to pay as a consequence of his vessel 
colliding with another, providing an early discussion of the particular moral hazard 
associated with liability insurance. It seems that Lloyd's underwriters shared these 
concerns. Economic and technological change (including the advent of steam 
navigation) brought increases in the size, complexity and value of vessels as the 
century progressed and this, in turn, raised the demand for `running down' cover, 
0 
II 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Around the same time as De Vaux v. Salvador the Supreme Court of Massachusetts ruled to 
opposite effect in Peters v. Warren Insurance Co. (1840) 39U. S. 99. A later judgement, 
General Mutual v. Sherwood (1852) 55U. S. 352, followed De Vaux v. Salvador and brought 
American law into line with English law. 
Now knows as the Collision Liability Clause. 
See O'May, D. (1993) O'May on Marine Insurance, p. 213. 
A coal factor who gave evidence to the 1810 Select Committee on Marine Insurance (BPP 
(226) 1810 IV 247) suggested that there were two such clubs in London and around twenty in 
the northern ports, including Scarborough, Whitby, Sunderland, Shields, and Newcastle. The 
clubs in the north apparently refused membership to owners of `bad ships', obliging the latter 
to buy dearer insurance at Lloyd's coffee house or from one of the two chartered companies 
then in existence. Apart from the cost, this was a great inconvenience, because the distance 
from London made it impossible for ship owners to question underwriters personally in order 
to establish their soundness and integrity. This remoteness necessitated the use of insurance 
brokers, whose own probity was sometimes doubted at the time. (1814) 5 Taunt. 605. 
13 
which was added to the old S. G. form of marine policy. Some Lloyd's underwriters 
thought that this form of insurance might make the masters of ships less careful, and 
petitioned the Government in 1850 and again in 1854 to procure legislation restricting 
the granting of collision cover. As O'May notes: `The Government declined to 
intervene but these moves were indicative of the general antipathy of underwriters to 
such insurances, and the doubt as to their legality'. As we shall see, the fears 
concerning liability risks of these nineteenth century Lloyd's underwriters were fully 
realised in the late twentieth century, when colossal losses on US liability business 
delivered harsh lessons to their less cautious successors, bringing the 300 year old 
insurance market to its knees. In the event, and in the absence of Government 
intervention, marine insurers of the time attempted to deal with the problem by 
agreeing amongst themselves to restrict cover to three-quarters of the collision 
liability, thinking that this would encourage careful navigation. 16 However, any 
beneficial effect on the quality of seamanship that such a restriction might have 
achieved was quickly negated, because ship owners responded simply by insuring the 
remaining one-quarter of the risk with the Protecting and Indemnity Clubs mentioned 
above. Indeed, as the potential liability of ship owners increased in the nineteenth 
century, 17 the P&I clubs assumed an increasingly important role as marine liability 
insurers. In addition to the uncovered one-quarter of collision expenses and any 
excess liabilities above the value of the vessel18 they eventually came to insure many 
other third-party risks, including those arising from damage to fixed and floating 
objects, injury to passengers and crew, 19 damage to cargo and pollution. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
O'May op cit note 13 p. 215. See also the discussion in the Insurance Institute of London, 
Historic Records Committee Report H. R. 3 p. 2. 
Apart from rising ship values, and general legislation such as The Fatal Accidents Act 1846 
and Employers' Liability Act 1880, there were measures that affected ship owners specifically, 
including the Harbours, Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847. This allowed harbour authorities 
to recover for damage to port works even in the absence of negligence on the part of the ship 
owner. 
The Marine Insurance Act 1745 prohibited owners from insuring against their liabilities for 
sums in excess of the value of their ships. A statute of 1854 set a limit of liability that was based on tonnage, but assumed that all vessels were worth £15 per ton, whereas many were 
worth much less. Thus, ship owners often faced claims for amounts greater than the value of 
their own vessels. 
Taylor v. Dewar (1864) 5 B. & S. 58 established that insurance against collision did not cover liability for loss of life, which had to be insured separately. 
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Apart from anything else, the growth of the P&I Clubs in the nineteenth century is 
part of a recurring theme in the history of liability insurance, in which moves to 
restrict or suppress the device on grounds of moral hazard, or for other reasons, have 
been regularly outflanked 
- 
on the one hand by persons who remained anxious to 
protect themselves from liabilities that might devolve upon them and, on the other, by 
victims who insisted on the right to sue. We will return to the issue of moral hazard, 
and the general relationship between liability insurance and liability rules in Parts 4 
and 5 of this essay. 
1.2 FIRE RISKS 
As we have seen, some of the earliest liability insurance covers grew out of an 
existing class, marine insurance. It would not be surprising to find this pattern of 
development repeated in the case of fire insurance, the other main form of general 
insurance at the time. For example, a parallel development might have occurred as a 
consequence of claims for spreading fires. Such fires were very common at the time 
and, if a property owner incurred liability as a consequence of fire spreading from his 
premises, he might well have looked to his fire insurers for an indemnity. He would 
argue, of course, that the liability to compensate his neighbour was proximately 
caused by the fire against which he was insured. In fact, there appears to be no case 
where this precise issue was raised. However, an analogous situation arose in Re 
Wright and Pole20 where an innkeeper failed to recover from his fire insurers for loss 
of custom and the cost of hiring other premises whilst his inn was under repair. The 
court held that the object of a fire policy was to indemnify the insured against loss of 
the subject matter of insurance and a loss such as this, which was merely 
consequential on the loss of the subject matter, was not within its scope. Following 
this case, and that of De Vaux v. Salvador, 21 decided two years later, any attempt to 
extend fire insurance to include liability risks was probably doomed to fail. In any 
event, damages claims for spreading fires were probably quite rare, because liability 
20 
21 
(1834) 1 Ad. & El. 621. 
Note 10. 
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would generally depend on proof of negligence, a branch of the law that was 
undeveloped at the time. 22 
In fact, the next line of liability insurance to emerge 
- 
the forerunner of motor 
insurance 
- 
developed quite independently of any existing class. 
1.3 DRIVERS' POLICIES 
- 
`CHEVAL ET VOITURE' 
Whilst British insurers are generally recognised to have been the innovators in the 
commercial development of fire23 and life insurance, `accident' insurance, including 
the insurance of non-marine liability risks, was practised first in France, fifty years 
earlier than in England. This fact is hardly acknowledged in British insurance 
literature. 24 The initial impetus was provided by an ordinance of the Paris Pre, fet de 
Police on 23 August 1821 which required the cochers of Paris to pay the sum of 
twenty centimes per day into a central fund, for the compensation of third-party 
victims of driving accidents. This inspired the formation of a company, 
L'Automedon, which offered, from 1825 onwards, policies covering the third-party 
liability of horse and carriage drivers. Other insurers quickly offered to cover the 
same risk. 25 Predictably, many people denounced this form of insurance on grounds 
of public policy, and their opposition slowed its development. One of the early 
companies, La Parisienne, struggled regularly from 1829 onwards with attempts to 
suppress its issuing of policies 'chevaux et voitures' and only in 1845 were such 
22 
23 
24 
25 
The Fires Prevention (Metropolis) Act of 1774 excluded liability for fires that were accidental 
in origin. The fact that the defendant brought highly inflammable things onto his land made no 
difference, until Rylands and Fletcher (1865) LR 3 HL introduced a rule of strict liability that 
was extended to such situations (see Jones v. Festiniog Ry. (1866) LR I Ex 265, Powell v. 
Fall (1880) 5 QBD 597 and Musgrove v. Pandelis [1919] 2 KB 43). 
Although it is unlikely that fire insurance was a British invention: for example, a German fire 
insurance mutual was established by farmers in the Süderuerdorf as early as 1537, long before 
the first British fire insurance companies were formed. See also note 58 (Michel Albert's view 
about the Alps as the `cradle' of non-marine insurance and Trennery's research on fire 
insurance amongst the medieval guilds of Flanders). 
`... tandis que nos premiers assureurs Incendie et Vie n'avaient etd que les bons dleves des 
assureurs britanniques, les pionniers francais de I'assurance Accidents ete vdritablement des 
initiateurs. La France a devancd ä cet egard les pays voisins' (Richard, P. J. (1956) Histoire 
des Institutions D'Assurance en France p. 68). 
Including La Prevoyance, La Seine and La Parisienne, all of which issued policies from 
around 1830. See Richard, op cit note 24 at p. 68. 
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insurances declared to be legally valid by a senior tribunal. 26 Despite their being 
aware of developments in France, and increasing congestion of horse-drawn vehicles 
in London and other big cities, British insurers did not offer similar policies until 
1875. Once they had begun to do so, one early insurer, 27 perhaps conscious of the 
debate about moral hazard, introduced a novel `Coachman's Good Conduct Bonus'. 
Under this scheme a sum was to be set aside each year for distribution to drivers who 
held certificates of good conduct `as an encouragement for good servants and careful 
driving'. However, it appears that the main aim of this early version of the familiar 
`No Claims Bonus' was to save the carriage owner's valuable horses from injury. 28 
Of course, before the turn of the century motor cars began to appear on the roads of 
Europe and drivers' policies were quickly adapted to the risks, including liability 
exposures, associated with this new form of transport. In the course of the twentieth 
century motor insurance would grow to become the biggest class of general insurance 
by far. 29 
1.4 STEAM POWER AND THE RAILWAYS 
Steam carriages appeared occasionally in the 1830s, but it was on the railways rather 
than the roads that steam was fully exploited as a cheap and speedy means of 
transport. In the early years the accidents that occurred, though rather less frequent 
than many imagine, 30 often took many lives at once, and were widely publicised. This 
alarming new risk, or at least the public perception of it, led insurers to offer 
protection. However, whilst the railways gave birth to personal accident insurance 
- 
first-party fixed benefits cover for death and bodily injury 
- 
their contribution to the 
development of liability insurance was much less significant. The pioneer in the field, 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
A decision of the Tribunal de Commerce de la Seine declared drivers' policies void, as 
contrary to public order, on 21 August 1844. However, a group of eminent jurists effectively 
overturned this judgement in a declaration of the Cour de Paris a year later, on 1 July 1845. 
See Richard, op cit note 24 at p. 69 and Dinsdale, W. A. (1954) History of Accident Insurance 
in Great Britain p. 178. 
The London and Provincial Horse and Carriage. 
See Dinsdale op cit note 26 p. 180. 
Motor insurance now accounts for about 40% of world non-life premium income. 
In the five years 1852-56 there were 2,400 railway fatalities, an average of 480 per year. 
However, during this period there were, on average, 4,157 deaths each year due to mechanical 
injuries, 3,826 deaths from drowning, 3,046 from chemical injuries, 1,107 killed by horses or 
horse conveyances and 985 coal mining fatalities. (Cornelius Walford (1871) The Insurance 
Cyclopaedia). 
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and one of very few companies to flourish, was the Railway Passengers, established 
by private Act of Parliament in 1849. The Act provided for passengers to be insured 
against fatal accidents for fixed amounts of £200 for third-class passengers, £500 for 
second-class and £1,000 for first-class, only the latter having the luxury and relative 
safety of a covered carriage in which to travel. In the case of non-fatal injury, a sum 
was to be paid (not exceeding the fatal benefit) `as shall be deemed a reasonable and 
liberal Compensation for such Injury, as well as for the Pain of Mind and Body and 
the Loss of Time and Money consequent thereon'. 31 With the agreement of the 
Railway Clearing House cover was provided by means of specially printed `insurance 
tickets'. These were issued by booking clerks who were rewarded by means of 
commission. To encourage their support station masters were allowed to take up to 
ten shares in the company. However, a few railway companies were reluctant to join 
the scheme, fearing that offers of insurance might alarm their passengers rather than 
make them feel secure. It is interesting to note that the Railway Passengers attempted 
to counter this argument by suggesting that, if they were insured, injured passengers 
would be less likely to sue for damages, and claims by dependants of those who were 
killed (under the recently-introduced Fatal Accidents Act 1846) might also be less 
frequent. However, Parliament clearly anticipated this argument and effectively 
weakened it: Section 36 of the act that established the Railway Passengers providing 
that compensation paid by the Company was in no case to be taken in diminution of 
damages otherwise recoverable at Common Law or under Statute. Since they could 
not shift the cost of these claims back onto their customers, the railway companies 
themselves raised the possibility of liability insurance, suggesting in the course of 
negotiations about insurance tickets that the Railway Passengers might also 
indemnify them against claims under the 1846 Act. However, the insurer declined to 
do so, having been advised by its Parliamentary agents that there would be objections 
to such insurance, as being contrary to public policy. This view was then strongly 
held by the Board of Trade, and the fact that Sir William Huskisson, a past President 
of the Board, had been killed in a railway accident in 1830 may have helped to 
dissuade the Railway Passengers from challenging it. 32 Attitudes to liability 
31 
32 
See Dinsdale op cit note 26 p. 54. 
Huskisson achieved the dubious distinction of becoming the first ever railway fatality. Whilst 
talking to the Duke of Wellington, at the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, he 
stumbled beneath the wheels of carriages drawn by Stephenson's Rocket. 
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insurance may have started to change by 1855, because the Railway Passengers did in 
fact offer one railway company such insurance in that year. It is also recorded that 
one of its competitors, the lugubriously styled Accidental Death Insurance Company, 
insured the Scottish Railway Companies against liability risks (including injury to 
employees) for a period of time, before abandoning the business as unprofitable. 33 
The coming of the railways thus had only a limited effect on the development of 
liability insurance. However, during the railway era, steam power was increasingly 
used for other purposes and, especially, to power the machinery of manufacturers. 
Limited technical knowledge and the virtual absence of appropriate safety legislation 
meant that the explosion of steam boilers was quite common, especially in the 
industrial North. Many lives were lost in these explosions, 34 and criticism of safety 
standards, often attached to coroner's verdicts, forced industrialists to act. A group of 
them met in Manchester on 15 August 1854 with a view to improving safety and, ten 
days before a second meeting on 19 September 1854, the need for action was brought 
home, when a boiler explosion at a weaving shed in nearby Rochdale killed ten 
people. No doubt this expedited the group's decision to form an association of steam 
users with the object of preventing such accidents, consistent with the economical use 
of steam power. The Manchester Steam Users' Association (MSUA) was formally 
established with these aims on 23 January 1855. Its first line of attack was to arrange 
for the regular inspection of steam boilers by competent persons, something that 
eventually became a legal requirement. 35 The possibility of insurance, as an adjunct 
to inspection, was often raised in the Association and was at first bitterly opposed on 
the familiar grounds of public policy. 36 However, the Chief Inspector of the MSUA, a 
strong supporter of insurance, resigned on account of this opposition in 1858 to found 
a specialist company, the Steam Boiler Assurance Co. This company offered both 
insurance and an inspection service, the granting of the former being dependent on the 
33 
34 
35 
36 
See Dinsdale, op cit note 26 p. 177. 
A memorandum presented to the Home Secretary in 1869 states that boiler explosions were 
then running at about 50 per year, killing 60 to 70 persons, compared with only about 20 
railway passenger fatalities. 
The Boiler Explosion Act 1882 provided for compulsory reporting of explosions and the 
Factory and Workshop Act 1891 introduced mandatory inspection. 
`The committee are of the opinion that there is neither expediency not utility in boiler 
assurance; on the contrary, they are of the opinion that such a course would tend to increase 
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taking up of the latter. Several companies of this type were set up in the second half 
of the century. Eventually the combination of insurance and safety inspection came to 
be the norm, most objections to the former being overcome by its being combined 
with inspection 
- 
an example of what we would now describe as active risk 
management by the insurer. However, is worth noting that opposition to insurers and 
their surveyor-engineers came not just from those who thought that the insurance 
element of the contract might lower safety standards. Sometimes it came from 
employees also. Although they themselves were at risk from explosions, they 
nevertheless resented the meddling by outsiders that the inspection element entailed. 37 
This is consistent with a phenomenon observed by liability insurers and scholars 
alike: the tendency of some workers to oppose safety measures that dent their 
(especially masculine) pride in taking risks or threaten to drive wages down. Liability 
insurers often express concern at the `macho' risk-taking culture on construction sites 
and elsewhere and, evidently, the phenomenon is an old one. For example, Engels, 
writing in 1844-5, records the observations of a physician who examined many of the 
2,500 grinders working in Sheffield in the 1830s. The doctor reported that the 
hazards of their work left some 
- 
the `dry' grinders 
- 
with a life expectancy of only 
about 30 years. Nevertheless, after covered grinding stones and dust extractors were 
installed they sometimes destroyed these safety devices to stop more workers coming 
and keeping wages down. As Engels observed `they are for a short life and a merry 
one. '38 
By the last quarter of the century most boiler policies covered the liability risk in 
respect of damage to surrounding property and, in some cases, liability for injury to 
third parties. The business of insuring boilers eventually evolved into the large 
modern class of engineering insurance. In the course of this evolution third-party 
risks other than those associated with boiler explosions also came to be insured. For 
example, towards the end of the century policies were issued that covered liability 
towards persons injured in accidents involving passenger lifts, which became 
37 
38 
rather than diminish accidents, as it would induce a carelessness which the committee think 
should be punished rather than rewarded. ' (MSUA Jubilee Book, p. 27). See Dinsdale op cit note 26 p. 40. 
Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England 1844, Panther, p. 231. 
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increasingly common as new building techniques led to the construction of taller 
public buildings. 39 
1.5 EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
Work-place risk is a key area of accident compensation, largely because in every 
country the work-place is one of the most common sources of accidents and ill-health, 
if not the most common. For scholars, this risk provides a focal point for debates on 
accident compensation. Academic interest is enhanced by the fact that, whilst 
efficient industrial injuries' compensation is a social priority for nearly all 
governments, no two countries have adopted precisely the same means of achieving it. 
The result is an extraordinary diversity of schemes, differing widely in their legal 
bases, methods of financing, operation and security systems. They include fault-based 
liability systems, pure no-fault schemes and almost every variation in between, 
backed by varying combinations of first and third party insurance. Insurance itself is 
offered by a wide range of providers, including private insurers, self-insurers and state 
social security departments. There are also many variations in terms of benefit 
structure, treatment of different sorts of injury and relationship with other 
compensation sources. Among all this variety, the English system is particularly 
unusual by the reason of the prominent role that it gives to liability insurance. In no 
other country is private employers' liability insurance such an important part of the 
system and in no other country is this line of insurance business so highly developed. 
The evolution of employers' liability insurance and its no-fault alternative, workers' 
compensation insurance, is now considered briefly. 
Compensation systems for work injuries began to emerge in the nineteenth century. 
A number of factors contributed to their development. The most obvious was 
growing industrialisation in Europe and elsewhere. This was followed, in due course, 
by a mounting concern about the human cost, in accidents and illness, of the `factory 
system' to which industrialisation had given birth and associated developments in the 
39 The Employers' Liability Insurance Corporation issued a policy covering liability in respect of 
a lift in 1888 (Cockerell, H. & Green, E. (1994) The British insurance business 
-a guide to its history and records, 2 od edition, p. 89. ) 
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use of mechanical power, including steam. Pressure generated by social reformers 
and the increasingly powerful and well-organised labour unions moved governments 
to act, persuading them to introduce systems that gave priority to injuries that were 
inflicted in the work-place. Of course, whether systems that provide special 
compensation to people who are injured in the course of their employment can be 
ao justified on economic or moral grounds is a moot point. 
Historically, there are three main phases in the early development of work injury 
compensation systems. However, one phase or another has been omitted in some 
countries and there are many variations in matters of detail. The three phases are: 
1A `Common Law' period, when work injury compensation, to the extent that 
was available at all, was governed by the ordinary principles of tort law. 
2A period of employers' liability law, when the Common Law was modified or 
replaced by more specific tort-based rules imposing liability upon the 
employer. 
3A period of workers' compensation law, either in addition to or in substitution 
for employer' liability law. As we shall see, this workers' compensation law 
was also, in some cases, effectively an insurance law. 
During the first, `Common Law' period, the chance of an injured worker actually 
obtaining compensation was often, in reality, almost non-existent. The lack of 
adequate remedies was a consequence of the undeveloped state of tort law in many 
jurisdictions, and the availability in some countries of defences that an employer 
could use easily to defeat the claims of injured workers. 
In the second phase, legislatures typically aimed to mitigate the harshness of the 
Common Law by introducing specific rules of employer liability or, at least, 
weakening the effect of the defences mentioned above. The Employers' Liability Act 
of 1880, discussed in more detail below, achieved this in England. However, England 
40 See The Cure pp. 8-9. 
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was not the first country to enact such a law, somewhat similar legislation having 
been introduced earlier in Germany (1871) and Switzerland (1877). 
Rules based on employers' liability, whether those of the Common Law or based on 
specific legislation, proved inadequate in every case. Workers remained restive and 
pressure for compensation systems that did not depend on fault or negligence 
persisted. Thus, before long, a third phase of development began 
- 
that of workers' 
compensation. In swift succession, workers' compensation laws were passed in 
Germany (1884), Austria (1887), Norway (1895), Denmark and England (1897), 
Finland and Italy (1898), and France, Spain and Switzerland (all 1899). The United 
States, which at this time tended to follow European practices (and, in legal matters, 
the Common Law of England) were remarkably slow to follow. The first employers' 
liability statute of any kind was adopted by Alabama in 1885, followed by 
Massachusetts in 1887, and in later years by many other States, but no single State 
adopted a workers' compensation law until long after every major European country 
had such a law in full operation. Only from 1911 onwards did workers' compensation 
begin to replace employers' liability in the United States. 
1.5.1 Insurance of work-place risk 
In England and France, initially, the employer was required to make workers' 
compensation payments and was given the privilege to insure against this liability or 
not, as he saw fit. On the other hand, insurance was compulsory in most other 
countries, so workers compensation laws were, in effect, insurance laws. However, 
the very first insurances of work-place risk date from well before the phase of 
workers' compensation. The earliest developments were again in France. There, in 
1861, a mutual society, La Preservatrice, was created by one Hippolyte Marestaing, 
who devised a combined policy that would provide fixed benefits to injured workers 
- 
effectively a collective form of personal accident insurance 
- 
combined with liability 
cover in favour of the employer. This latter element was designed to indemnify the 
employer in cases where an injured worker refused to forfeit his right to sue in 
exchange for fixed compensation and sought full compensation from the employer, on 
grounds of fault. La Preservatrice appears to have experienced difficulties in the 
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early years, but another society, La Securite Generale, formed with similar objects in 
1865, seemed to have achieved some success in offering both individual and 
collective policies for accidents of any sort, including those at work. At a later date it 
also offered to cover the civil liability of employers for work accidents. In France, as 
in many European countries, initiatives of this sort were eventually curtailed by the 
introduction of state workers' compensation programmes. This trend which, as 
mentioned above, began with Bismarck's pioneering workers' compensation scheme 
of 1894, left private insurers in many countries with only a limited role in the field of 
industrial injuries. 
However, in England the pattern of development was somewhat different from most 
of Continental Europe. When the French societies, mentioned above, were founded 
personal accident insurance in England was largely confined to railway passengers. 
Broader covers eventually became available, including policies that covered 
disablement through sickness, 41 but the early (and hopelessly optimistic) dream of 
selling this sort of insurance to industrial workers, individually or collectively, never 
materialised. Instead, insurers began to aim their products at the professions and the 
middle classes, whose members remain the principal buyers of personal accident, 
sickness and, indeed, `health' insurance covers of all sorts. In the event, British 
insurers became involved with industrial injuries not through first-party accident 
insurance but through employers' liability insurance. 
This class of business developed quite late, even though the Industrial Revolution 
-a 
period beginning around 1770 in England 
- 
quickly brought a heavy burden of 
accidents and occupational diseases in the mines and factories, on the railways and 
elsewhere. 42 At first, employers saw no need for insurance because the defences 
available to them, mentioned earlier, meant that an injured worker had little legal 
protection and few rights to compensation. 43 Pressure for reform grew from the 
41 
42 
43 
See Raynes, H. E. (1964) A history of British insurance, pp. 278-9. 
See note 30. 
In particular, the Common Law supposed that in contracting with his employer the worker had 
freely accepted the risks inherent in his job. Thus, a claim in tort could often be defeated by a 
plea of volenti non fit injuria (see Bartonshill Coal Company v. Reid, McGuire (1858) 3 Macq 
266 & 300) or contributory negligence, the latter being a complete defence until 1945. In fact 
the efficacy of volenti in the context of employment injuries was weakened considerably by 
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middle of the century, eventually resulting in the Employers' Liability Act 1880, also 
mentioned above. Although the Act introduced no new principle of liability it did 
weaken some of the defences previously available to the employer. 44 Compensation 
was linked to earnings, the maximum that could be awarded by a County Court being 
an amount equivalent to three years' pay. In the same year the Employers' Liability 
Assurance Corporation was formed to cover this new liability. The first policy was 
issued in 1881, covering liability under the Act only. In the years that followed 
policies covering Common Law liability also were issued. 
The 1880 Act was not a great success. Negligence was difficult to prove, and 
although the Act gave rise to much litigation, which absorbed a large portion of the 
premium for those who insured, the amounts recovered in damages through the courts 
were small. 45 As a result, pressure grew for legislation that would allow a workman 
to recover compensation for employment injuries as of right; that is, for any accident 
which was not caused by his own gross and wilful default. In 1897 the Workmen's 
Compensation Act was passed. The Act, largely the work of Joseph Chamberlain, 
allowed claims by employees without proof of negligence. 46 Compensation went 
according to fixed scales and the amount for death, for instance, was based on three 
years' earnings, with a maximum of £300 and a minimum of £150. Half-earnings 
were payable during disablement up to £1 per week. Many companies were formed to 
provide employers with insurance cover around this time, including 51 new 
44 
45 
46 
Smith v. Baker [1891] AC 325 where it was held that a decision on the part of an employee to 
remain in a job when he had knowledge of the risks involved was not in itself sufficient to 
establish the consent necessary for the defence to succeed. Where an employee was injured by 
a fellow worker the employer bore no responsibility, since the principle of vicarious liability 
did not extend to two employees who were in `common employment'. See Priestley v. Fowler (1837) 3M&W. The defence of common employment is sometimes known as the `fellow 
servant' rule. The Fatal Accident Acts of 1846 and 1864 allowed claims to be brought on 
behalf of certain dependants of a deceased workman, but they otherwise created no new rights 
against an employer. 
In effect, the employee could now sue for an injury caused by a defect in the employer's 
premises or plant provided such defect, or the failure to discover and remedy it, arose from the 
negligence of the employer or of a fellow employee who had been entrusted with the duty of 
properly maintaining it. 
In 1893, for instance, less than £8,000 was awarded. Cases were often settled out of court, but 
a large portion of the proceeds went into the pockets of the solicitors who vigorously 
encouraged their clients' actions. The decision in Griffiths v. Earl of Dudley (1882) 9 QBD 
357 weakened the Act further. The case established that an employee might contract out of its 
provisions, a facility that was often abused by employers. 
The Act applied initially to the more hazardous occupations only (e. g. railways, factories, 
mines and quarries) but was extended to include agricultural workers in 1900. 
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companies in the year 1898 alone. The Workmen's Compensation Act 1906 extended 
benefits to workmen generally (including most non-manual workers) and, for the first 
time, compensation benefits applied to certain specified industrial diseases. 
Eventually, 25 such illnesses were included. The scope of the Acts was extended over 
the next thirty years or so47 and they were eventually consolidated in the Workmen's 
Compensation Act 1925. Although the majority of employers insured their liability 
under the Act, or joined mutual schemes, insurance was not generally compulsory at 
this time. However, mining was a particularly hazardous trade and, to avoid hardship 
to those miners whose employers had become insolvent and were therefore unable to 
meet their obligations under the 1925 Act, the Workmen's Compensation (Coal 
Mines) Act 1934 was introduced. Insurance (or, alternatively, a special trust fund 
supplemented by insurance) was thereby made compulsory for colliery businesses. 
The heavy risk led insurers, in turn, to arrange reinsurance through a special Colliery 
Pool. 
Whereas the compensation available under the Workmen's Compensation Acts 
remained relatively small (despite periodic increases), claimants who sought damages 
at Common Law were beginning to secure substantial damages, and the number of 
such claims increased in the 1930s. 48 However, at the end of this period a major 
restructuring of the whole system was signalled by the Beveridge Report (1942). 
Beveridge recommended that compensation for industrial injuries should be added to 
existing social insurance schemes (which covered pensions, health and 
unemployment) as part of a new unified scheme of social insurance. Benefits would 
be drawn from a central fund maintained by contributions paid by employers, 
47 
48 
Weekly rates of compensation were raised in 1917 and 1919 to reflect the general increase in 
wages. The 1914-18 war also saw an increase in the number of accidents, since women and 
young boys, unfamiliar with the work, were often employed in the place of men who had gone 
to fight. Because of the heavy liabilities imposed on employers by the new legislation 
Parliament acted to prevent, as far as possible, the failure of insurance companies which 
underwrote them. The Assurance Companies Act 1909 required a deposit of £20,000 to be 
lodged by insurers, revenue accounts of employers' liability business to be submitted and 
adequate reserves to be maintained. The benefits of the 1906 Act were again extended in 
1923. An enhanced death benefit was now payable where the deceased had children under the 
age of 15, although weekly benefits were actually reduced. 
This process was accelerated by legislation: the Factories Acts 1937-48 extended the scope for 
claims for breach of statutory duty and, following the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) 
Act 1945, contributory negligence no longer provided a complete defence in tort. The old 
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employees and the state and the scheme was to be administered by a Ministry of 
Social Security. Accordingly, the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act 1946 
was enacted, becoming operative on 5 July 1948. From that date the Employers' 
Liability Act 1880 and the Workmen's Compensation Acts were abolished. The 
liability to pay compensation under these acts was effectively lifted from the employer 
and transferred to the state under a system of National Insurance. At the same time, 
and as a result, a major class of commercial insurance ceased to exist. However, it 
was decided49 that employers should remained liable in damages at Common Law for 
accidents to employees arising out of and in the course of their employment. This 
turned out to be a fateful decision, the retention of the `alternative remedy' of a tort 
claim against the employer separating Britain from those countries that chose 
`exclusive remedy' workers' compensations schemes. Demand therefore still existed 
for commercial insurance, which now reverted to its old name 
- 
employers' liability. 
The potential value of a claim against the employer at Common Law was already 
growing in the 1930s and the transfer of workmen's compensation business to a state 
scheme after Beveridge did not reverse this process. The number and size of 
employers' liability claims has continued to increase to the present day and, as a 
result, this line of insurance has now assumed an importance that is greater than in 
any other country. Nowadays, a person who is injured in the course of his 
employment can often expect to recover far more in an action for damages against his 
employer than he is likely receive under the state compensation scheme. Thus, if an 
employer lacks the financial means to satisfy a claim by an injured employee the latter 
risks losing his major source of compensation. For this reason Parliament extended 
the requirement for compulsory insurance (which already existed in respect of the coal 
mines) to virtually all employers via the Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) 
Act 1969.50 The development of employers' liability insurance is a subject to which 
we will return in Section 2.1, where we trace the emergence of `long-tail' risks. 
49 
50 
doctrine of common employment was also finally abolished by the Law Reform (Personal 
Injuries) Act 1948. 
Following the recommendations of the Monckton Committee. These are discussed in more 
detail in Section 2.1. 
See How Secure is the System? pp. 110-112 for further background to the 1969 Act. 
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1.6 PUBLIC (GENERAL) AND PRODUCT LIABILITY INSURANCE 
Nowadays, public (or general) liability insurance is a broad residual class, intended to 
cover liabilities not insured by more specific types of contract. As Dinsdale 
suggests, 51 public liability insurance in the UK grew up in a rather piece-meal way, 
only emerging as a distinct class towards the end of the nineteenth century. As we 
have seen, liability insurance was initially provided only for specific risks, such as 
railway or driving accidents or the explosion of steam boilers. In the UK, the first 
public liability insurances for general trade risks were written towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, following the enactment of the Employers' Liability Act 1880. 
This Act not only gave birth to employers' liability insurance but simultaneously 
created a demand for wider cover, since accidents in the workplace could cause injury 
to persons other than employees, such as visitors or passers-by. The success of 
claimants who were injured at work also encouraged people to seek compensation for 
non-work accidents. 52 Initially employers' liability policies were simply amended to 
cover liability for injury to persons not in the employment of the insured and the cover 
was known as `outside risk' insurance. Because of the obvious dangers that their 
activities present to the public, builders and contractors were among the first to make 
use of the cover. Special policies were still devised from time to time to cover the 
liabilities associated with particular trades or activities, such as property owners' 
indemnities, scholars' indemnities (covering liability for injury to school pupils) and 
special policies for innkeepers, farmers and the like. However, there was a growing 
tendency for insurers to issue contracts that could be adapted to cover almost any sort 
of business or occupation. The public liability contracts in use today have thus 
developed through cover, which was originally requested in respect of particular risks 
only, gradually becoming more general in scope. 
This pattern of development was repeated in relation to the class of business known as 
product liability insurance where, in the early years, calls for cover arose periodically 
in connection with particular risks. For example, in 1900 there was a poison beer 
51 
52 
Op cit note 26 pp. 175-198. 
The publicity surrounding the damages awarded to road accident victims probably had a 
similar effect. Improving standards of education, and the legal facilities provided by the 
emerging Trade Union movement also played their part. 
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scare, prompting the Ocean to offer special policies to indemnify brewers against 
liability arising from arsenic in their beer, and in 1908-9 insurers offered to cover 
grocers and others against claims for ptomaine food poisoning, following a spate of 
such incidents. Demand for liability cover in respect of dermatitis arose in 1924, 
when a number of furriers, who sold rabbit skins imported from China as `coney seal' 
or under some other exotic name, were sued for damages by customers affected by the 
irritant dyes with which the skins were treated. Again, cases of typhoid fever from 
infected milk led some insurers to offer dairy farmers cover against contamination in 
the 1930s. Of course, legal developments, in the form of statute law or court 
decisions that create new duties, can stimulate demand for liability insurance. In the 
case of product liability, the famous case of Donoghue v. Stevenson, 53 which 
established that a manufacturer might owe a duty of care to the ultimate consumer of 
its goods, undoubtedly encouraged the spread of liability insurance from the retail to 
the manufacturing sector. All this led insurers to devise broad product liability 
covers, which could insure almost any type of business and any party in the 
distribution chain, from the producer of raw material through to the retailer. 
Nowadays, insurers usually combine the `product' and `public' liability covers in one 
contract, but the risks are priced and underwritten separately, and the two are 
generally regarded as separate lines of business. 
1.7 `PROFESSIONAL' LIABILITIES 
The term `professional liabilities' is a convenient expression to describe the subject 
matter of several forms of liability insurance that developed (mainly) in the twentieth 
century. They include professional indemnity (PI) insurance, directors' and officers' 
(D&O) liability insurance and a number of associated classes. At this point, it can be 
argued, liability insurance began to take on a new form, now having little or no 
connection with `accidents' or the old category of accident insurance. In these new 
classes the risk insured did not arise directly from the making or selling of things, or 
the physical movement of people or goods, but rather from the provision of advice 
and the organisation of business activity. At the same time, losses were more likely to 
arise from negligent words than negligent acts. They were also likely to come in the 
53 (1932) A. C. 562. 
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form of compensation claims for financial loss, rather than for bodily injury or 
damage to material property. With the growth of the `service economy' in wealthy 
nations, in which an increasing percentage of the working population is engaged in 
intellectual tasks associated with the design, development and financing of goods and 
services, and a diminishing number are involved in their physical production and 
delivery, liability insurance of this type has become increasingly important. Thus, 
professional indemnity insurance, discussed briefly below, is now a major class of 
insurance business rather than a specialty line. The same is true of directors' and 
officers' liability insurance though, perhaps, to a lesser degree. As we shall see, the 
nature of the risks covered by these forms of insurance, and the nature of the losses 
typically incurred, have brought new problems for liability insurers in the design of 
contracts and the pricing of the risks insured. 
1.7.1 Professional indemnity insurance 
Turning first to professional indemnity insurance, it seems that doctors were the first 
among the professional classes to seek insurance in the UK, though the first scheme 
was a mutual one. Thus, following a number of actions against members of the 
profession, the Medical Defence Union was founded in 1885 to establish and 
administer a mutual indemnity scheme, which is still in operation. The first 
commercial insurance scheme was developed in 1896 when the Northern Accident 
devised a druggists' indemnity scheme and solicitors' indemnities were offered early 
in the 20th century. Architects' indemnities were underwritten at Lloyd's from 1922 
onwards and cover is now available for the `established' professions in all fields, 
including, medicine, law, finance, property and engineering. 
Recent years have seen the emergence of many `new' professions in the fields of the 
media, information technology and telecommunications, leading to a major expansion 
in this line of insurance. Growth in the demand for professional indemnity insurance 
has also been stimulated by an expansion of liability in the twentieth century, 
54 especially in the field of tort law, a general erosion of the various immunities and 
54 Most notably in the line of cases leading from Hedley Byrne v. Heller and Partners [ 1964] AC 
465. 
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defences that some professions once enjoyed" and the growth of a culture in which 
legal action against a professional person is no longer viewed as an extreme measure. 
As a consequence, professional indemnity cover is now mandatory in all the major 
professions. 
1.7.2 Directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O) 
D&O insurance was the last major line of liability insurance to develop. Its invention 
has been attributed to the British insurance broker Minet, which introduced the idea to 
the London insurance market following the Wall Street crash of 1929, an event that 
prompted legal action against directors of a number of firms that failed. A few D&O 
policies covering US risks were written in the London market during the 1930s but 
this form of insurance was rare, even in the United States, until the late 1960s and 
virtually unknown outside the US until ten years later. However, the `D&O system' 
(managerial liability supported by D&O insurance) is now firmly established in all the 
world's major economies. The rapid spread in the use of D&O insurance calls for 
some comment. 56 Even in the 1960s there was much scepticism about D&O 
insurance. Directors were expected to take risks on behalf of shareholders and the 
latter were assumed to understand the fundamental laws of investment, whereby 
levels of risk and expected rates of return on capital are linked. Investors who 
shouldered these business risks could diversify them by constructing well-varied 
portfolios. As a corollary, directors 
- 
undiversified risk bearers 
- 
expected to be 
forgiven for those business decisions that ultimately proved erroneous and to face 
liability only in the case of positive wrongdoing, such as fraud or dishonesty. To put 
it simply, mere negligence was rarely enough to fix a director with liability. In a 
world such as this there was little place for liability insurance, because the ground 
between the beginnings of liability and the beginnings of uninsurability (fraud, 
criminality etc. ) was so small. 57 However, since the 1960s that territory has 
undoubtedly expanded, in the US and elsewhere. In the US an expansion of directors' 
55 
56 
57 
For example, as a consequence of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
See, generally, Managerial Liability for a full analysis. 
See, for example, Bishop's seminal academic paper on D&O insurance: Bishop Jr., J. W. 
`Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors 
and Officers' (1968) Yale Law Journal 1078. 
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personal liability has occurred on several fronts, including liability to shareholders, 
employees and other third parties. Equity shareholdings comprise much of the 
country's wealth and are a major vehicle for personal savings. In a country such as 
the US, where social security is limited, personal security and corporate security are 
closely linked, leading to a culture that promotes fierce protection of investors' 
interests. At the same time a growing realisation of the power wielded by large 
corporate enterprises, and of their influence on almost every aspect of human life, 
including health and environmental issues, has led to calls for greater transparency on 
the part of big corporations and greater accountability of their human agents, not just 
to stockholders, but to employees and to society as a whole. The development of 
D&O insurance in the US can be seen as a response to these trends. Its growth 
outside the US is attributable to a number of factors. These include relentless 
`globalisation' of business activity, which has effectively exposed directors of firms in 
Europe and elsewhere to the US legal environment, the economic downturn suffered 
by a number countries from the 1990s onwards and privatisation trends worldwide. 
These trends have fuelled the growth in demand for D&O coverage as the directors of 
what were previously state-owned enterprises now contemplate personal liabilities 
which their predecessors rarely had to face. In short, the world-wide adoption of 
D&O insurance reflects the triumph of capitalism and the market economy. More 
particularly, it reflects the apparent triumph of Anglo-Saxon style capitalism over that 
of the Rhine valley and, in terms of insurance philosophy, the Maritime over the 
Alpine model. 58 In the last ten years there has been a further surge of world-wide 
interest in issues of corporate governance, leading to calls for even greater 
accountability on the part of those charged with the stewardship of business 
58 The distinction between the `Alpine' and `Maritime' insurance model is expounded by Michel 
Albert in Capitalism against Capitalism (1991, English translation 1993), Chapter 5. Albert 
sees two cradles of insurance, the upper Alpine valleys and the sea. The Alpine model is 
characterised by conservatism, stability, tight regulation, mutuality, the promotion of social 
solidarity and risk spreading without fine segmentation. Its modem spiritual home is the 
triangle formed by Munich (Munich Re., Alliantz etc. ), Zurich (Swiss Re., Zurich et al) and 
Trieste (Generale). Lloyd's and the London market are the living symbols of the Maritime 
model, which is aggressive, entrepreneurial, flexible, (short-term) profit oriented, litigious, 
lightly regulated and given to extreme segmentation of risk. Not surprisingly (in view of his 
Presidency of Assurance Generates de France (AGF)) Albert holds out French insurance as an 
ideal synthesis of these models. We should also note that a leading authority on the early 
history of insurance suggests that the medieval guilds of Flanders 
- 
hardly maritime and 
definitely non-Alpine 
- 
were amongst the earliest exponents of insurance techniques. (See 
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enterprises. As a consequence, there is a strong general legislative trend in Europe, 
and most other jurisdictions, towards greater shareholder rights, with more rigorous 
standards of corporate governance, accounting and financial disclosure. 59 All of this 
has enhanced the potential for legal action against directors and encouraged a more 
widespread adoption of D&O insurance. 
1.8 OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The twentieth century has seen the development of a number of specialist lines of 
liability insurance including, in no particular order, pension trustee liability insurance 
(PTL), employment practices liability insurance (EPL) environmental impairment 
liability insurance (EIL) and various others. They call for no particular comment as 
most are simply extensions and developments of existing lines or hybrid products that 
combine existing covers in a novel way. 
59 
Trennery, C. F. (1926) The origin and early history of insurance, including the contract of 
bottomry Chapter xxiii). 
The introduction of the Euro is likely, in itself, bring about increased transparency in the 
reporting of company affairs. 
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2 THE LIMITS OF LIABILITY: SOME CONTEMPORARY 
PROBLEMS 
We have seen in the first part of this essay that liability insurance developed as an 
offshoot of a broad first-party class known as accident insurance, which was intended 
to cover the costs that resulted from sudden loss-causing events other than fires or 
marine casualties. However, as already intimated, the nature of liability insurance 
began to change during the twentieth century. Gradually the defining quality that 
preserved its link with accident insurance 
- 
the sudden and unexpected event that 
caused loss to the policyholder 
- 
began to be lost, and the subject matter of the 
contract increasingly came to be seen not as accidents but as legal liability. At this 
point liability insurance began to emerge as a class in its own right. However, as part 
of this process insurers began to assume responsibility for losses that were not 
attributable to accidents in any real sense at all. These included risks of injury and 
damage that arose from continuous industrial processes where the harm caused was 
not sudden but gradual. Again, it was not always patent, but sometimes latent. 
Liability for pollution and environmental damage, and for gradually developing 
industrial disease provide examples that sometimes exhibit both characteristics. Also, 
as we have seen, liability insurance was being extended to cover non-industrial 
activities where, by definition, accidents were rare but gradually accumulating 
financial loss arising from the negligent provision of professional services was 
common. The scene was now set for the emergence of `long tail' risks; that is, risks 
where there is a long time period between the underwriter's assessment and pricing of 
the risk and the final settlement of claims that arise from the period of insurance in 
question. 
In the next section we will consider in more detail the problems posed by long-tail 
risks, and possible solutions to them. However, we can note at this stage that long-tail 
risks present severe problems of pricing and also of moral hazard. The protracted 
time span over which claims develop can make their ultimate cost almost impossible 
to quantify in advance. Furthermore, the nature of some losses (such as gradual 
pollution) makes it hard to draw a clear distinction between that which is fortuitous 
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and that which is not, and very difficult to design policies that include the former 
whilst excluding the latter. 
We must note at this point a curious fact. Underwriters of first party risks 
- 
in effect, 
property insurers 
- 
have always regarded long-tail risks as uninsurable, for the reasons 
briefly set out above. They have eliminated these risks from their portfolios in two 
ways. They have either framed their policies so that coverage is limited to specified 
perils that, by definition, cannot operate gradually (e. g. fire, explosion, storm, theft, 
impact etc. ) or, alternatively, when writing cover on an `all risks' basis, they have 
excluded loss or damage from gradually operating causes. 60 
This raises a very basic question. How, in the first place, did liability insurers come 
to assume risks that property insurers have traditionally regarded as uninsurable? 
This question 
- 
the divergence in practice between property and liability insurers 
- 
is 
an intriguing one, not least because the two branches of the general insurance industry 
have been closely linked, almost from the beginning. 61 For insurers the assumption of 
these risks seems to make no sense at all, given the uncertainties involved. The toils 
and reverses at Lloyd's over the last 15 years, which we will touch upon shortly, make 
this point forcibly. Moreover, and quite apart from the intractable problems that long- 
tail exposures present for insurers, funding these risks by a system of tort-based 
liability backed by insurance seems to make little sense for society as a whole. As a 
consequence of very high transaction costs, injured victims and the public at large 
have in fact secured only limited collateral benefit from the huge losses suffered by 
insurers on these risks. Routine liability business generates an expense ratio of 
around 50%, 62 which is bad enough, but for long-tail classes the expense ratio is 
60 
61 
62 
The exclusions used on commercial `all risks' insurances are far too long and complex to 
quote in full here. However, a common UK commercial `All Risks' form excludes, amongst 
many other things: `inherent vice, latent defect, gradual deterioration, wear and tear 
... 
faulty 
or defective design or materials 
... 
corrosion, rust, wet or dry rot, shrinkage, evaporation, loss 
of weight, dampness, dryness 
... 
change in temperature, colour, flavour, texture, or finish 
... loss or damage caused by pollution or contamination... ' 
The specialist `accident offices' that first wrote liability insurance contracts were quickly 
bought up the large fire insurance companies, leading to the formation of the familiar British 
composite insurer. Separate `fire' and `accident' departments were maintained for some time, 
but most companies eventually combined these to create divisions that dealt with particular 
types of customer, e. g. public authorities, commercial firms or private buyers of insurance. 
For example, the Holman Gregory Report (1920) found an expense ratio of 52% for 
Workmen's Compensation insurers (albeit with a large profit element to the insurer), and 
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likely to be even higher. For example, according to some estimates, only about 30% 
of Lloyd's insurance payments in respect of asbestos-related disease have reached the 
victims concerned63 and only about 20% of US `Superfund' payments made by 
insurers have actually been used to clean up polluted land. 64 In short, the assumption 
of long-tail risks into the tort/liability insurance system has resulted in a massive 
waste of resources. There have no substantial gains except, perhaps, to a small body 
of specialists drawn from the law and a few other professions. 
In general, it is clear that insurers assumed long-tail liability risks inadvertently rather 
than by design. It should be emphasised, again, that this was part of a process 
whereby the `liability' or `third-party' risk gradually became detached from `accident 
business' 
- 
i. e. insurance that covered the financial consequences of accidents. It 
became a distinct form of insurance that covered, or was at least intended by insurers 
to cover, liability for loss, injury or damage that was simply accidental. The former, 
original, concept of liability insurance is explained by Baker Welford, writing in 1932 
about the general principles of liability insurance: 
`The liability insured against is, from the nature of the insurance, a liability 
arising out of accident; but the insurance is not, in practice, a general insurance, 
conferring a universal protection against liability for all kinds of accidents. It is 
an indemnity against the liabilities arising out of particular kinds of accident; 
and, therefore, a description of the particular kinds of accident contemplated 
forms an essential part of the description of the subject matter of insurance. 965 
63 
64 
65 
Beveridge (1942), Ison (1967) and the Pearson Commission (1978) reported figures of 46.5%, 
49% and 45% respectively for liability insurance generally. 
See Gunn, C. Nightmare on Lime Street Smith Gryphon 1993 p. 51. Wikeley, in the course of 
a wide-ranging review of compensation for latent (and especially asbestos-related) disease, is a 
little more sanguine. He concludes that asbestos litigation in the US is inefficient in the sense 
that it carries even higher transaction costs than other forms of tort litigation and is slow and 
costly in terms of judicial administration. However, he found that the US system was more 
successful in mobilising potential claims. By contrast, the British system was rather less 
inefficient, slow and costly than the US system, but also less successful in the advancement of 
claims (Wikeley, N. J. (1993), Compensation for industrial disease, p. 55). 
Acton, J. P. and Dixon, L. S. analysed the payments made by four major insurers in respect of 
'Superfund' liabilities in Superfund and transaction costs 
- 
the experience of insurers and 
very large industrial firms (1992) Rand/Institute for Civil Justice (USA). They found that, on 
average, transaction costs accounted for 88% of insurers' total expenditure, with a range 
between 80% and 96% and an average figure of 69% for closed claims. Of this 88%, 
approximately 42% arose from coverage disputes and 39% from the cost of defending 
policyholders. 
Baker Welford, A. W. The law relating to accident insurance, second edition, Butterworth, 
1932, p. 443. 
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The general thrust is clear. However, the absence of an indefinite article in `arising 
out of accident' creates a slight ambiguity. This, perhaps, reflects developments that 
had already taken place in the field of employers' liability and workers' compensation 
insurance. Today, employers' liability insurance is the most important line of liability 
insurance in the UK, accounting for approximately 50% of UK premium income for 
the class as a whole. It is also a major source of long-tail claims 
- 
specifically, for 
gradually developing diseases. We now return, briefly, to the evolution of employers' 
liability insurance in order to show how these risks were assumed. 
2.1 LONG-TAIL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY RISKS 
As explained earlier, the origins of employers' liability insurance can be found in the 
Employers' Liability Act of 1880. This act weakened the defences available to 
employers at Common Law and, in limited circumstance, made them liable for 
accidents to employees caused by negligence. As we have seen, insurance companies 
were quickly formed to cover liability under the new act. 66 However, potential 
liability for claims in respect of disease did not arise until the passing of the 
Workmen's Compensation Acts, which ran from 1987 to 1925. These Acts applied 
only to injuries `caused by accident', but a disease attributable to a particular accident 
fell within this definition67 and, from 1906 onwards, certain specified diseases due to 
the nature of employment were added. These diseases were deemed to be personal 
injuries by 'accident', 68 without any need to prove that a particular accident had 
caused them. Insurers that covered liability under the Workmen's Compensation Acts 
were thus exposed, for the first time, to claims for diseases that could develop 
gradually. However, there was no real long-tail risk, because the Acts required the 
disease to have been contracted within the twelve months prior to the date of the 
66 
67 
68 
See Section 1.5.1. 
See, for example, Brintons Ltd. V. Turvey [1905] A. C. 230 where the House of Lords held that 
a wool-sorter who contracted anthrax had suffered `injury by accident' following the entry of 
the anthrax bacillus into his body, probably through the eye. Other examples include Ismay, 
Imrie and Co. v. Williamson [1908] A. C. 437, where a stoker on board a steamer died of 
heatstroke, Sheering v. Clayton [ 1910] 2 I. R. 105, C. A. where a workman contracted a chill 
whilst working in water, leading to an inflammation of the kidneys, and Scott v. Pearson (1916), 9 B. W. C. C. 229, C. A. where a servant employed to feed calves was infected with 
cattle ringworm: all were held to have suffered an `accident'. 
Workmen's Compensation Act 1925 s. 43. (1) 
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disablement of the worker, as confirmed by the certifying surgeon for the district, 69 or 
his suspension from work 
'70 or his death . 
71 The person liable to pay compensation 
was the employer who last employed the workman in the activity giving rise to the 
disease or, where the disease had been contracted by a gradual process, all employers 
who had employed the workman during the preceding twelve months. For insurers 
the `tail' of liability was thus, at most, one year. Furthermore, the law gave them 
powerful weapons to repudiate claims by workers who failed to tell their employers, 
on entering employment, about an existing disease that afterwards incapacitated 
them. 72 Besides their liability under the Workmen's Compensation Acts, employers 
also faced potentially liability under the Fatal Accidents Act 1846, the Employers' 
Liability Act 1880, and at Common Law. Insurers covered these liabilities also. 
Thus, in theory, insurers could face claims for disease made against the employer at 
Common Law, if not under the 1880 Act. 73 However, such claims were extremely 
rare, for a number of reasons. First, the introduction of the Workmen's Compensation 
Acts had dramatically reduced the incidence of Common Law claims generally, and it 
was only towards the end of the 1930s that a marked increase in such claims began. 
Second, the doctrine of election prevented an employer from claiming damages at 
Common Law in addition to statutory compensation and, third, cover was restricted to 
diseases contained in the schedules of the Workmen's Compensation Acts, even if 
made at Common Law: there was no coverage for `non-scheduled' diseases. 
In practice, the potential for significant numbers of long-tail claims arose only after 
the post-war `Beveridge' reforms and the consequent restructuring of the industrial 
injuries compensation system. As stated earlier, the Workmen's Compensation Acts 
and Employers' Liability Act 1880 were abolished74 as part of this process and 
replaced by a state workers' compensation system (the Industrial Injuries Scheme). 
For private insurers, workers' compensation and employers' liability insurance had 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
Workmen's Compensation Act 1925 s. 43. (1)(i) 
Workmen's Compensation Act 1925 s. 43. (1)(ii) 
Workmen's Compensation Act 1925 s. 43. (1)(iii) 
Workmen's Compensation Act 1925 s. 43. (1)(b); Scott v. Summerlee Iron Co. [ 1931 ] AC 37. 
In practice, the Employers' Liability Act 1880 limited claims to accidents, since liability 
attached only in respect of injuries sustained by a workman in consequence of a defect in the 
condition of the ways, works, machinery or plant connected with or used in the business of the 
employer (s. 1 (1)). 
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been very profitable. 75 Having lost the first (workers' compensation) element to the 
state, insurers were anxious not to lose the latter. Thus they campaigned, along with 
the TUC and others, for retention of the `alternative remedy' of a Common Law claim 
for damages; which would, of course, support the continuation of employers' liability 
insurance. This was secured following the recommendations of the Monckton 
Committee. In its final report, 76 the Committee rejected both the arguments for an 
`exclusive remedy' state workers' compensation system and those for a form of 
compromise, adopted in many European countries, 77 whereby tort actions would be 
retained only in the case of intent or gross negligence on the part of the employer. 
Instead the Committee recommended that the employee's right to claim at Common 
Law on the basis of ordinary negligence should be retained. Amongst other things, it 
also recommended that civil liability for breach of statutory duty should never be 
strict, and that employers should be excused in every case where it was not reasonably 
practicable to avoid or prevent the breach. The first recommendation was adopted in 
legislation but the second was not. This has led to the present, rather absurd, 
combination of a state no-fault workers' compensation scheme supplemented by tort 
liability that is itself often strict, with obvious implications for the stability of the 
system should the former component contract and the latter expand as a consequence. 
In retrospect, and in the light of the massive losses made by employers' liability 
insurers in recent years, their enthusiasm for the retention of tort liability looks 
misplaced. However, decisions made in the drafting of the new policies that were 
now required would prove equally fateful. First, a decision was make to break the 
link with workers' compensation insurance and cover liability in respect of any form 
of injury or illness and, hence, any disease 
- 
not just those diseases scheduled under 
74 
75 
76 
77 
By the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act 1946 (which became operative on 5 July 
1948). 
According to the report of a Departmental Committee appointed in 1919 to inquire into the 
workmen's compensation system private insurers made an average underwriting profit of 
15.2% in the 1911-1918 period (Holman Gregory Report (1920) p. 13). Subsequently the 
Accident Offices Association entered into an agreement with the Home Office to cap their 
profits by issuing rebates to policyholders when the loss ration fell below 60% (later 70%). 
Monckton, Sir Walter, Final Report of the Departmental Committee on Alternative Remedies (the `Monckton Report') (1946) Cmd. 6860. 
Including France and Italy. See European Perspective 221. 
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the new Industrial Injuries Scheme. Second, cover was granted without limit 78 
(perhaps, in this case, because liability under the old Workmen's Compensation Acts 
was unlimited) and, third, a `causation' trigger79 was introduced. Thus all the 
conditions were now in place for the emergence of long-tail risks, from the 1960s 
onwards. It was propelled by additional factors. These included a relative decline in 
the value of state benefits under the Industrial Injuries Scheme, which made tort 
claims increasingly attractive; 80 advances in medicine that enhanced our 
understanding of the aetiology of several diseases, facilitating tort claims; 81 and, more 
recently, perhaps the beginnings of a US-style compensation culture. As a 
consequence of all this, employers' liability insurers now find themselves in a curious 
bind. They are well aware that the basis on which they do business is unsatisfactory, 
but face substantial obstacles in trying to change it. These obstacles are discussed 
later. 
2.2 PUBLIC (GENERAL) LIABILITY AND ASSOCIATED CLASSES 
As we have seen, public liability insurance developed in a piece-meal way in the UK, 
emerging as a separate class towards the end of the nineteenth century. Again, we 
should remind ourselves that early underwriters viewed this cover merely as a form of 
accident insurance. This was reflected in the wording of early policies which, 
typically, indemnified the insured only against liability for accidents of a defined type, 
or accidents that were caused in a particular way. These might include the exploding 
of a boiler, the failure of a mechanical passenger lift or an accident caused through the 
use of a vehicle. Cover was usually limited to an amount `in respect of any one 
accident'. Used as a noun, the word `accident' appears to have a clear temporal 
quality 
- 
to refer only to events that happen at a particular point in time. With 
wordings of this sort there would seem to be little chance of an insurer having to 
indemnify a policyholder in respect of an injury that was latent, or which had been 
sustained gradually. However, it soon became clear that where the amount of cover 
78 
79 
80 
Until 1994, when pressure from reinsures in the wake of the Piper Alpha disaster forced 
primary employers' liability insurers to cap their coverage. 
This form of wording, and policy triggers generally, are discussed in Part 3. 
See The Cure pp. 17-18. 
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granted, as well as the indemnity itself, hinged on the happening of an accident, there 
could be accumulation of risk, because each injury that resulted from a mishap could 
be regarded as a separate `accident'. Thus, for example, in South Staffordshire 
Tramways Co. v. Sickness and Accident Assurance Association, 82 where a tram 
operated by the insured overturned, injuring 40 passengers, the court held that each 
passenger had suffered an accident. Since the policy gave cover of £250 in respect of 
any one accident, the insurer's maximum potential liability for the crash thus became 
£10,000,53 rather than the maximum of £250 that was doubtless intended. 
Furthermore, this case shows that there was already a tendency on the part of the 
judiciary to strip the word `accident' of its temporal quality. 84 Decisions of this sort 
may have influenced liability underwriters in their decisions to move the focus of 
coverage away from accidents as such, towards the injuries that resulted from them. 
The triggering event now became the injury sustained by the victim of the insured's 
wrongdoing rather than the accident itself. However, in order to limit moral hazard 
and preserve the element of fortuity that insurance required, policies typically 
provided that the injury should be accidental. Of course, in substituting accidental 
for accident 
- 
adjective for noun 
- 
the temporal quality of the triggering event is lost, 
or at least blurred still further. It was at this time that insurers began to make use of 
the word occurrence, or it its adjectival form occurring, as a substitute for accident 
when designing their policies. 
The meaning of the words `occurrence' and `occurring' in the context of insurance 
policies have been litigated intensively up to the present day, and their unguarded use 
has certainly cost the insurance industry dearly. The possible permutations of the 
words `injury', `damage', `accident', `accidental', `occurrence' and `occurring' and 
their synonyms in the insuring clause of a liability policy are huge, and there is not 
91 
82 
83 
84 
For example the establishment of a clear link between exposure to high noise levels and 
hearing loss, and between exposure to asbestos fibres and mesothelioma. 
[ 1891) 1 QB 402. 
In fact the policy was subject to an additional limit of £1,500 for payments in any one year. 
See, for example the words of Bowen L. J. (at 407): `When we look to the policy, it limits the 
words of the proposal by adding the words "in respect of accidents. " The question is, What is 
the meaning of those words? 
... 
I should not think any one would suppose, having regard to 
the proposal, otherwise than that the word "accident" was there used in the sense of injury 
accidentally caused to the person. ' See, also, Fry, L. J at 408: `It seems to me plain that 
"accidents caused by vehicles" there means "injuries accidentally caused by vehicles to 
person or property". (emphasis added by author). 
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space here to provide an exhaustive analysis of so-called `occurrence' wordings and 
their effects. However, it can be said that that by the 1930s the transition from 
specific accident insurance that, incidentally, covered third party liabilities to 
occurrence-based liability insurance covering general risks was almost complete. 
Thus a standard form of public liability insurance, in use by the early 1930s, 
indemnified the insured against all sums which he became liable to pay: 
`as damages 
... 
as compensation for (a) Accidental bodily injury to any person 
... 
; (b) Accidental damage to property not belonging to the insured 
... 
which 
happens within Great Britain or Ireland during the period (of insurance) set 
forth in the (policy) schedule 
... 
'85 
Once wordings of this sort were in common use, and their scope had been broadened 
to include liability for products supplied by insured firms, all the necessary conditions 
were present for the entry into general, and especially product liability insurance 
portfolios, of long-tail risks. These risks began to emerge from the 1950s onwards, 
most notoriously in the form of claims for asbestos-related illness and other gradually 
developing diseases, pollution and environmental damage and injury caused by 
pharmaceutical products. Of course other changes, besides those in insurance 
wordings, were necessary to bring this about. These included the scientific advances, 
mentioned earlier, that enabled links between cause and effect to be made more easily 
in cases of latent or gradually-occurring injury or damage, legal developments, 
especially in the field of tort law, and changes in society that demanded greater 
accountability on the part of large and powerful corporations. 86 
2.3 THE LLOYD'S EXPERIENCE 
Lloyd's recent disastrous loss experience provides the most dramatic illustration of 
the potential impact of long-tail liability risks on insurance markets. This episode in 
85 
86 
Taken from the Appendix of Forms in Baker Welford, A. W. The law relating to accident 
insurance, second edition, Butterworth, 1932, p. 601. 
For example, the rise of the `consumer protection' movement post-Nader, and of `Green' 
politics in response to public concern over prominent environmental disasters, including the 
Minamata Bay mercury poisoning (Japan, 1956), the Torrey Canyon and Santa Barbara oil 
spills (1967 and 1969), release of toxins from chemical plants at Seveso (Italy, 1976) and 
Bhopal (India, 1984), the Chernobyl nuclear reactor fire (Ukraine, 1986) and the Exxon 
Valdez disaster (Alaska 1989). 
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Lloyd's history has been well documented, but a brief description is included here to 
show the central role that liability insurance played in the process and to demonstrate 
how the trends described in the previous section led to such a catastrophic 
denouement. 
In order to understand the nature of the problem that the underwriting of liability 
insurance created at Lloyd's, it is necessary to understand the nature of Lloyd's itself, 
including something of its history. As is well known, after 1689 the London 
insurance market began to develop at Lloyd's Coffee House, which attracted a 
clientele connected with the sea. Marine insurers began to congregate there, accepting 
personal responsibility for the insurance they transacted and spreading large risks by 
dividing them amongst a number of individual underwriters. Marine insurance was 
believed to be highly profitable and companies began to be formed in order to transact 
it. In consideration of a large payment made by their promoters to the king, the 
Bubble Act 1720 conferred on two such companies, the Royal Exchange Assurance 
and the London Assurance, an exclusive right to transact marine insurance as 
companies. However, this was without prejudice to the right of individuals to act as 
insurers and, since these two new companies insured only small amounts, individual 
underwriters continued to prosper. It was not until 1824 that other companies were 
allowed to compete for marine business. 87 By this time Lloyd's had developed, in 
size and sophistication, to such an extent that its position as the premier world 
insurance market looked impregnable. However, towards the end of the nineteenth 
century competition from insurance companies, both British and overseas, was 
intensifying, threatening to reduce Lloyd's to no more than `a venerable institution 
inhabited by elderly gentlemen with distant memories of tea clippers'. 88 Lloyd's 
found a saviour in Cuthbert Heath, the `father of Lloyd's' who single-handedly 
introduced non-marine insurance to the market, including a number of new risks 
which had never before been made the subject of insurance. Thereafter, Lloyd's 
nurtured its reputation for innovation in the tradition of Heath. It would insure risks 
that could not be placed elsewhere, including the unique, the unconventional and the 
87 
88 
The object of the 1810 Select Committee on Marine Insurance mentioned earlier (note 14) was 
to establish whether the oligopolistic nature of the marine market was restricting the ready 
supply of insurance. 
Brown, A `Hazard Unlimited' 1987 LLP, p. 49. 
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ultra-hazardous. In this way Lloyd's preserved its status as a world leader in 
insurance, despite its antiquated apparatus for raising capital and placing risks and 
despite its reliance on a web of brokers to bring business to the market, which had no 
branch network to support its operations. Indeed, these apparent drawbacks were 
turned to advantage, because in a pre-electronic age, they gave Lloyd's a flexibility 
and economy of operation that could not be matched by the big insurance companies, 
British or international. However, by the 1930s the rest of the world was catching up 
and the pre-eminence of Lloyd's was under threat again. The US had been a lucrative 
source of business ever since America `discovered' Lloyd's in the aftermath of the 
San Francisco Earthquake of 1906. To American eyes Lloyd's presented an appealing 
combination of innovation, individual enterprise and security 
- 
the latter having been 
established after the 1906 earthquake when London insurers, unlike many of their 
American and European Continental rivals, paid on the nail. However, by the 1930s 
America's own insurers were making large inroads into Lloyd's business. 
Liability insurance provided a useful weapon with which Lloyd's could retaliate, 
because it was still a relatively new product with much scope for innovation. 89 
Lloyd's was now prepared to offer its American customers liability insurance on the 
broadest of bases. This, in turn, reflected the traditions of the Lloyd's market, which 
was accustomed to writing on an all risk, all perils basis 
- 
perhaps as a consequence 
of its long experience with marine contracts, which provided indemnity against all 
perils of the sea. 90 Thus, from the early 1930s Lloyd's wrote, on a direct basis, 
catastrophe policies covering the general liability risks of large industrial corporations 
that were otherwise self-insured, including utilities, oil companies and railway 
operators. 9' In the domestic market of the US, by contrast, the development of 
liability insurance coverage had been restricted by the conservatism of insurance 
regulators and insurance underwriters in the form of the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters 
89 
90 
91 
One example, already mentioned, was the invention by Lloyd's broker Minet of an entirely 
new class, Directors' and Officers' Liability insurance. 
This approach was also exemplified in the Jewellers' Block policy which Lloyd's successfully 
marketed to American customers. 
These policies were a natural development of the excess of loss reinsurance contracts 
pioneered by Guy Carpenter in the 1920s. Of course, the companies insured were also of a 
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(NBCU) respectively. Their preference was to develop separate policies for 
individual types of accident or hazard 
- 
essentially the approach of British insurers in 
the nineteenth century. By 1941, however, the Americans had developed their own 
broad liability policy in the form of the Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) 
policy launched in January 1941. The policy covered liability for all hazards not 
specifically excluded but, in spite of its wide in coverage, was subject to a number of 
restrictions. In particular, cover was restricted to bodily injury (rather than personal 
injury, which might include damage to reputation, hurt feelings and the like) and the 
damage in question had to be `caused by accident'. In order to compete Lloyd's had, 
in effect, to go one better, by offering cover on a broader basis still. 
This trend reached its zenith in the Umbrella92 liability policies that Lloyd's offered to 
its US customers from 1949 onwards. In the post-World War II era Lloyd's (and the 
London market companies) could, in effect, only sell insurance to American 
companies that American insurers could not or would not provide. Under the Surplus 
Lines Law, Lloyd's, as a non-admitted insurer, was restricted to new or unusual risks, 
risks for which there was insufficient local capacity and those that were undesirable or 
unacceptable to local insurers. The Umbrella liability policy satisfied this 
requirement by providing excess legal liability for American industry. It was the 
product of a broker alliance between the American firm Marsh & McLennan, 93 the 
British firm Price Forbes94 and a French-Canadian broker Guy de Repentigny. The 
Umbrella has been described as a `marketing weapon deployed by this broker alliance 
to gain lucrative American accounts. '95 The Umbrella was designed to sit above and 
supplement the primary liability insurance coverage afforded by US domestic 
insurers, typically via policies such as the CGL form described above. The breadth 
and extent of coverage under some early policies was truly staggering. Liability cover 
was provided on an `all risks' basis in respect of damage to property (not always 
92 
93 
94 
95 
type most likely to generate long-tail claims for pollution, gradually-developing disease and 
the like. 
`Umbrella' is a rough acronym for the full name for the policy: `Broad Form Excess Comprehensive Liability. ' Apart from its useful symbolic quality `Umbrella' also met the 
requirement for brevity necessitated by cable traffic. 
Now part of Marsh Inc. 
Subsequently part of the Sedgwick group and, now, Marsh Inc. 
The Underwriting of Unlimited Risk: The London Market Umbrella Liability Policy 1950- 
1970. Unpublished paper by Randolph M. Fields. 
45 
restricted to material property) and personal (not bodily) injury. The term 
`occurrence' was substituted for the expression `caused by accident'. In the early 
years the policy was often silent on what precise aspect of this `occurrence' had to 
take place in the period of insurance for the policy to respond. This opened up the 
possibility of claims for injury or damage that was intentional in nature96 and, even 
more worryingly, for claims whose origin or reporting fell outside the policy period. 97 
There was no exclusion relating to seepage or pollution. 98 Again, there was no 
aggregate limit of indemnity, so it was possible for an insured to have one hundred 
loss `occurrences' in one policy year arising from, say, one hundred individual waste 
sites, thereby multiplying $10 million coverage into £1 billion. Finally, the policy had 
a unique `drop down' characteristic whereby it became primary coverage (subject, 
say, to a self-insured retention of $25,000) in the event of the exhaustion or non- 
existence of underlying coverage. Since, as we have seen, the underlying coverage 
was typically narrower that the Umbrella, the Umbrella effectively filled in gaps in the 
primary coverage and, in any case, it responded if for any reason the primary insurers 
were not able to pay. 
The first Umbrella was written for Gulf Oil in June 1949 and demand accelerated 
rapidly from 1952, when many American writers of excess liability business withdrew 
from the market. However, as early as 1954 losses were beginning to mount at an 
alarming rate, with claim payments and reserves already exceeding premium income 
and many noted claims with no reserves established. Brokers put this down to poor 
claims handling, freak conditions and the like. Most underwriters accepted their 
assurances, tempted by the large chunks of premium that were generated by Umbrella 
business, which was now being written on a three-year basis. As Fields notes 
`Underwriters were now faced with the classic offer of bread today, jam tomorrow 
... 
What underwriters would cut and run now? The answer was that few did, perhaps 
preferring to believe the blandishment of brokers that mistakes had been learned from 
and it was now time to make money'. 99 Attempts were made to limit the scope of 
96 
97 
98 
99 
But subject, of course, to the general insurance law on losses caused deliberately. 
Leading to potential `stacking' of limits, for which see note 114 and accompanying text. 
Pollution exclusions were not introduced generally by Lloyd's until 1970, when NMA clauses 
1683,1684,1685 and 1686 were deployed. 
Fields op cit note 95 p. 19. 
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Umbrella coverage in 1960 when some restrictions were introduced, but pressure 
from brokers (who threatened to take the business to allegedly eager American 
insurers) meant that cover remained broad until 1970. The effects of this, of course, 
are still being felt in Lloyd's today, with losses still being generated by forty year old 
policies. The `Umbrella' was certainly not the only source of Lloyd's losses, but it 
contributed a significant part and its genesis illustrates how Lloyd's, through the 
medium of liability insurance and the dynamics of its own peculiar position in the 
insurance market, was led down such a dangerous road. We will return to the subject 
of Lloyd's and the London market, and, in particular, the behavioural aspects of 
liability underwriting, in Section 4.4, which deals with moral hazard in this context. 
In this part of the essay we have seen how liability insurers began to face serious 
difficulties in the second half of the twentieth century. The response of insurers, and 
their attempts to solve to these problems by changes in underwriting practice and 
contract design are considered next. 
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3 REACTION AND RESPONSE 
How have insurers responded to the problems outlined in Part 2, above? Before we 
can answer this question it is necessary to consider some of the issues already raised 
in rather more depth. To do this we must explore some technical aspects of liability 
insurance. 
3.1 THE CLAIM TRANSACTION 
It should be apparent by now that many problems stem from the extended period of 
time over which liability claims develop. In fact, the progress of a liability claim can 
be broken down into a number of stages, as follows: 
1 an initial act of negligence, or the commission of some other legal wrong; 
2 some form of injury, loss or damage resulting from the act; 
3 manifestation of the injury, loss or damage; 
4 the establishment of a causal link between the damage and the conduct of the 
policyholder; 
5 the claim against the policyholder; 
6 notification of the claim to the insurer; 
7 the final settlement of the claim. 
Some liability claims advance swiftly. For example, in the case of claims arising 
from motor accidents, stages 1,2,3 and 4 usually occur simultaneously, with 5 and 6 
following shortly after. However, in other cases the process can be very much 
prolonged. In fact, there is potential for a time lag, perhaps of many years, between 
each stage, as in the following examples. 
Between stage 1 and 2 
Delay between the original act of negligence and the loss or damage that flows from it 
is common in the case of claims against professional firms, when negligence occurs in 
the provision of advice or professional services, but the advice is not fully 
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implemented for some time. For example, the negligence of an architect in drawing 
up plans for a building is unlikely to cause loss until the structure is complete, perhaps 
many years later. Similarly, the negligence of a lawyer in drafting a defective will is 
unlikely to cause loss until it is executed, often at a much later date. 
Between stage 2 and 3 
The phenomenon of latent injury or damage is well known and requires little 
explanation here. Suffice it to say that latency periods can be very long indeed. For 
gradually developing diseases a latency period of 40 years is not uncommon. ' 00 Very 
slow migration of pollutants from industrial sites to underground water resources can 
generate equally long latency periods in the case of claims for pollution and 
environmental damage. 
Between stage 3 and 4 
A further time lag can occur between the date of manifestation and the date when the 
policyholder becomes aware that the injury is, or may be, his responsibility. For 
example pollution of a town's water supply may be identified long before it is traced 
to a leak in an underground pipe for which the policyholder is responsible. In some 
cases the policyholder may not become aware of the damage until a formal claim for 
compensation is made (see below). 
Between stage 4 and 5 
Of course, legal systems typically allow victims of wrongful acts fairly generous time 
periods in which to commence their actions. For example, under English law the 
basic limitation period for personal injury is three years and for property damage six 
years. 10 1 
100 
101 
The average latency period, from date of first exposure to diagnosis, is 35 years for asbestosis 
and 40 years for silicosis. 
The law in this area is currently under review by the Law Commission. 
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Between stage 5 and 6 
Although liability insurance policies, like insurance contracts generally, require 
prompt notification of claims or incidents that may give rise to them, late notification 
is extremely common. For example, in the case of work-place accidents, it is 
common for employers to continue paying the wage or salary of injured employees in 
the hope that no claim for damages will be made, and to tell their insurers of the 
accident only when the employee initiates proceedings. In this case (employers' 
liability) the law prevents the insurer from denying liability on the grounds of such 
late notification, 102 in other cases insurers may be reluctant to take the point for 
commercial reasons. 
Between stage 6 and 7 
Again, it hardly needs stating that liability claims, particularly for personal injury, take 
a long time to settle. For a serious injury the settlement period is typically between 
three and seven years in the UK. Of course, this is owing to the slowness of legal 
processes and to the fact that damages cannot be finally determined until the medical 
condition of the victim has stabilised and his or her future needs have been clearly 
established. 
Whilst delay at any stage of the claim transaction can create difficulties, the most 
problematic long-tail claims arise in cases where the injury, loss or damage lies 
hidden for some time, or occurs gradually. Sometimes these two characteristics 
- 
latency and gradual onset 
- 
may be combined. As already stated, the most extreme 
examples of protracted liability claims are those for diseases that are contracted 
gradually, where the whole process may span 40 years or more, and gradual pollution, 
where, in one recent case, the time span was over 100 years. 1 03 The classes of 
insurance most likely to be affected are employers' liability and workers' 
102 
103 
Regulation 2(1)(a), Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Regulations 1998 (S. I. 1998 
No. 2573. ). 
The case involved pollution from a creosote works built by a US railroad company in the late 
nineteenth century. The creosote had been needed to treat the timbers of a bridge that carried 
the railroad over a lake. 
50 
compensation, public (general) and product liability. The time span for claims against 
company directors and professional persons may also be long but, for reasons that are 
discussed later, these fields have proved less problematic, at least for insurers. 
A full analysis of the problems of long-tail claims is beyond the scope of this essay. 
However, they can be summarised briefly according to whether they impact primarily 
upon the injured claimant, the (defendant) policyholder, or the insurer of the latter. 
For the claimant, the greatest problems are associated with the establishing of liability 
and the gaining of access to insurance funds. To begin with, the defendant may no 
longer exist by the time the damage manifests itself or injury is diagnosed because, for 
example, the employing firm has gone out of business. Alternatively, it may simply 
be impossible to trace the identity of the wrongdoer. If the defendant can be found 
liability is often difficult to establish because witnesses cannot be traced and records 
have disappeared. Even if this barrier can be overcome and a judgement is secured, it 
may turn out to be worthless if the defendant is insolvent and had inadequate 
insurance, or no insurance, at the time of the exposure. If coverage does exist, the law 
may allow a direct claim against the insurers concerned. However, even then the 
identity of the insurers on risk at the relevant time (which depends on the design of 
the policy, see Section 3.1 below) may be difficult to establish. Again, several 
insurers may have been on risk during the period of exposure, and each may dispute 
its liability. Various techniques have been developed to deal with these problems, 
including legal mechanisms to facilitate direct claims against insurers, guarantee 
funds to provide a safety net when insurance fails and market agreements to secure 
co-operation by insurers. However, these devices have proved, at best, to be 
ponderous and expensive to operate and, at worst, simply ineffective. '04 Long-tail 
claims create similar problems for policyholders. Insured firms face the prospect of 
104 The principal mechanism for bringing direct claims under English law, the Third Parties 
(Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 is narrow in scope (applying only in cases of insolvency) 
and extremely ponderous in its operation. See How Secure is the System? pp. 122-125 for a 
critique. However, the 1930 Act is under review and insurers have also recently agreed to a 
code of conduct intended to make it easier for victims of industrial illness to identify the 
insurer that was on risk at the relevant time. Under the new (Association of British Insurers') 
code insurers must provide a central contact for inquiries, conduct a full search of their 
records, and respond to requests for information within 28 days. If a search is unsuccessful the 
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becoming embroiled in litigation that, for reasons given above, is likely to be 
complex, prolonged and expensive. Inadequate records may make it equally difficult 
for the policyholder to trace the insurer(s) that were on risk at the relevant time. 
Again, coverage limits may be inadequate and there may be gaps in the insurance 
programme. 
The complexities outlined above mean that long-tail claims are likely to be expensive 
and difficult to handle for insurers also. However, for insurers there are even more 
serious problems. Quite simply, the longer the time period between the underwriting 
of an insurance risk and the payment of claims associated with it, the more difficult it 
becomes to insure that risk efficiently. Pricing and reserving become extremely 
difficult, because the time span over which claims develop makes it difficult to assess 
their ultimate cost. Existing loss data used to calculate the `risk' (or `pure') premium 
is likely to be unreliable, because it may relate to circumstances that obtained many 
years ago rather than to those of the present day. At the same time, assumptions that 
must be made when adjusting the risk premium, such as those concerning future 
inflation levels, interest rates, investment yields, and expense levels are far more 
likely to prove wrong when they relate to the distant rather than the immediate 
future. 105 Then, crucially, there is the `development risk' 
- 
the possibility that there 
will be shifts in the underlying probabilities upon which premiums are based. For 
example, advances in scientific knowledge or unforeseeable changes in the law can 
easily make claims more frequent or more expensive to settle. Scientific 
developments in the medical field, such as in the understanding of the aetiology of 
disease, have often led to a surge in claims, 106 and the legal environment has 
sometimes proved unstable or even hostile, at least from the perspective of insurers. 
The latter issue 
- 
the relationship between liability insurance and the law 
- 
is 
105 
106 
case must be referred to the ABI, which will contact all other EL insurers, which must in turn 
respond within a further 28 days. Under the code insurers must maintain records for 60 years. 
Of course, levels of reserves for outstanding claims will be much higher for liability business 
generally than for other classes. In the UK liability claims reserves typically stand at about 
375% of annual premium income. This means that considerable investment income can be 
generated on liability business, allowing insurers with an underwriting margin of between 
minus 10% and minus 20% (depending on investment yields) to break even. However, delays 
in claim settlement are not beneficial to insurers because, in recent years, the rise in the cost of 
court awards for personal injury has usually outstripped the investment yield on insurers' 
technical funds. 
See note 81 and accompanying text. 
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considered in more detail in Part 5. Again, social trends may result in a greater 
propensity on the part of accident victims to sue. This phenomenon, loosely 
described as the `compensation culture' is also explored later, in Part 6. 
Finally, we should note the extreme moral hazard that can arise with long-tail risks. 
In some cases the damage in question may have been deliberately created by parties 
who calculated that they could make a tidy profit from the activity that caused the loss 
and then render themselves judgement-proof before the harm was discovered. This 
`hit and run' phenomenon has been styled `looting' by Akerlof and Romer, who 
analysed the use of strategic bankruptcy as a means of appropriating rents in the 
context of the US savings and loan crisis. 107 Mason and Swanson108 suggest that this 
phenomenon is one of the primary causes of long-tail risks and provide a number of 
examples. In particular, they discuss the problems associated with toxic waste 
disposal sites in the US and elsewhere, where absence of effective regulation 
encouraged the establishment of firms for the single purpose of providing landfill 
sites for the disposal of problematic waste. As the authors note: 
`These firms often existed with few assets other than the land on which the 
disposal occurred. After years of dumping, and before detection of any leaks, 
the firm would then dissolve its corporation and disappear, leaving others to 
incur the deferred costliness of its operation. 
... 
This is the essence of looting: 
operation of a firm in a context in which it is possible to incur benefits today 
while postponing the associated costliness until the future, with dissolution 
and liquidation occurring in the interim. The necessary conditions for looting 
are therefore a) the availability of unlimited liability; b) the capacity to create 
deferred costliness; and c) the structure that renders liquidation the optimal 
strategy to pursue. ' 109 
Of course, there is no reason why such a firm would want to have liability insurance 
in its post-operational phase, but it is very likely to have such cover when still a going 
concern. If the insurance is written on a causation' 10 or occurrence basis"' then, of 
course, the insurer concerned may well be liable to meet the loss, despite the 
107 
108 
109 
110 
Akerlof, G. A. & Romer, P. M. (1993) `Looting: the economic underworld of bankruptcy for 
profit', Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 2,1-60. 
Swanson, T. & Mason, R. `Long-tail risks and endogenous liabilities: regulating looting' The 
Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 23 (no. 87 April 1998), 182-195. 
Op cit note 108 at 183. 
See Section 3.2.1.1 below. 
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policyholder's liquidation, because a direct action against the insurer will be available 
in most jurisdictions. The insurer's only hope will be to establish that the damage 
was not `accidental' but, as we shall see shortly (in Section 3.3.2 below), this may be 
very difficult. There is a further problem, not identified by Mason and Swanson. 
Even if an insurer, by careful underwriting, manages to avoid opportunistic `looting' 
clients and covers reputable firms only it might still have to pay for losses caused by 
the former. This obligation could arise under a regime of joint and several liability 
such as that of the US `Superfund' legislation. Under such a regime any extant firm 
can be called upon to pay for the whole of a loss, even though its own contribution to 
the damage was trivial compared with that of firms which are now defunct, 
unidentifiable or otherwise judgement-proof. It is easy to imagine how `looting' 
behaviour could produce long-tail claims outside the field of environmental liability. 
For example, `looters' could generate both employers' liability and product liability 
claims by skimping on safety precautions that would prevent the onset of gradually- 
developing diseases in their employees or latent harm to users of their products. It is 
difficult to see how private liability insurance can operate effectively when such 
perverse incentives exist. 112 
Since long-tail risks can create problems for every party involved in the claim 
transaction 
- 
claimant, policyholder and insurer 
- 
there is a need for insurance 
products that balance the interests of the parties and work in a way that is reasonably 
fair to all. Essentially, equilibrium must be maintained between the need for security 
on the part of the policyholder and the claimant, and the need for a reasonable degree 
of certainty on the part of the insurer. Claimants and policyholders must have the 
security that derives from sufficiently broad coverage combined with a guarantee that 
insurance funds will always be available, at whatever date compensation becomes due 
and indemnity is needed. On the other hand, insurers must be able to price their 
products with an accuracy that is sufficient to guarantee a reasonable, steady return on 
III 
112 
See Section 3.2.1.2 below. 
With respect, the recommendations of Swanson and Mason are not appealing. They suggest 
that `looting' behaviour might be controlled by a combination of mandatory liability insurance 
with a life extending 10-20 years beyond the event of liquidation as a condition of limited 
liability status with the residual amount of endogenous liquidation to be managed by the state. 
This would effectively deny insurers the use of `claims-made' contracts for the very risks 
where (in the opinion the insurance industry) they are most essential. 
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the capital that supports their business. Unfortunately, it has proved extremely 
difficult to design liability insurance contracts that reconcile these different needs. 
Problems of insurance contract design are considered next. 
3.2 LIABILITY INSURANCE CONTRACT DESIGN 
3.2.1 Policy triggers 
The most crucial element in a liability insurance contract is the policy `trigger' 
- 
the 
thing that must happen in the period of insurance if the policy is to respond. Very 
different effects are achieved according to whether the trigger point is placed towards 
the beginning of the period over which the claim develops, towards the end, or 
somewhere in the middle. Although there are many variations there are, in essence, 
three basic types of policy trigger: causation (or acts committed), occurrence and 
claims made. The first ('causation') has been described as a `past tense' trigger, since 
losses tend to fall on old policies and the last ('claims-made') as a `present tense' 
trigger, since claims fall on current insurances. `Occurrence' basis liability insurance 
falls between the two. Generally, there has been a tendency for insurers to move the 
trigger point forward in time as liability insurance has developed as a class. Each 
form of trigger is considered in turn. 
3.2.1.1 `Causation' or 'acts committed' triggers 
In this case the insurer agrees to indemnify the policyholder in respect of 
compensation that he is required to pay for injury, loss or damage caused in the period 
of insurance. Liability to meet a claim thus falls upon the insurer that was on risk 
when the original negligent act, error or omission giving rise to the injury or loss took 
place (i. e. stage 1 in the claim transaction as set out above). 
In the UK this trigger is associated with employers' liability business in particular. 
Because the trigger point is set at the beginning of the time scale and, hence, furthest 
in time from the payment of the claim, the arrangement creates maximum uncertainty 
for the insurer, sometimes creating prospective liabilities that are virtually 
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unquantifiable. From the point of view of the policyholder and claimant it provides 
adequate security in some respects, but not in others. There is security in one sense, 
because, once in place, the cover never ends. Provided insurance was in force at the 
time (or over the period) when the injury was caused it will always be in force, no 
matter when a claim is made. On the other hand, the need to claim on policies issued 
many years ago may bring its own problems because, as explained earlier, that cover 
may be inadequate, incomplete or untraceable. Furthermore, in the case of claims in 
respect of damage or injury that was gradual in its onset (and not merely latent) there 
may be many potential defendants (e. g. firms that had employed a victim of industrial 
disease) backed by several different insurers, leading to even greater complications. 
3.2.1.2 `Occurrence' triggers 
In this case, liability to meet the claim falls upon the insurer that was on risk when the 
accident, loss, damage or injury occurs or when it becomes manifest, depending on 
the precise wording and its interpretation. This could be stage 2,3 or 4, or indeed all 
of them. 
Occurrence type wordings have been used for many lines of liability business 
including motor, general and product liability. A major weakness lies in the fact that 
these wordings do not work well if the loss, damage or injury occurs gradually (e. g. 
gradually developing diseases, gradual pollution or gradual financial loss). In this 
case it will be difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint exactly when the loss occurred. 
As a result a single loss may spread over several periods of insurance113 leading to 
`stacking' of policy limits114 and complex disputes where more than one insurer is 
involved. Broadly speaking, occurrence policies are subject to the same limitations as 
causation policies, described above. Indeed, where the damage is caused and 
sustained contemporaneously, gradually or otherwise, there is no difference between 
the two. Only where the cause of the damage and its being sustained are divorced in 
113 
114 
i. e. under the ` triple trigger' or `continuous trigger' theory endorsed by courts in the US. 
i. e. where an insurer limits coverage to, say, £10 million for any one period of insurance and 
the loss `occurs' over 10 years, making the insurers liable for up to £100 million. Since the 
loss spreads out `horizontally' reinsurers providing cover on an excess of loss basis may 
benefit, because big losses are less likely to penetrate layers of reinsurance cover. 
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time is there a distinction: ' 15 in this case an `occurrence' wording moves the trigger 
forward in time. Like causation-based contracts, occurrence policies do not offer full 
security for the insured, because claims may still fall on very old policies. Indeed, 
there is an added risk, because if the loss, injury or damage occurs after the policy has 
been cancelled there will be no cover at all, even though the negligent act that led to 
the damage happened when the insurers were on risk. ' 16 
For insurers the potential uncertainties are much the same as with causation-based 
contract and so require no further discussion here. As we have seen, the effect of an 
occurrence wording generally is to move the policy trigger forward in time, thus 
shortening the `tail' of late claims and reducing uncertainty. However, whilst 
prospective liability will be reduced retrospective liability may be introduced at the 
same time, because insurers may become liable to meet claims for damage that 
occurred in the period of insurance but was caused earlier, prior to the date when the 
risk was assumed. Thus, when writing insurance on an occurrence basis the 
underwriter must look back in time as well as forward into the future in order to 
measure the risk. In fact, it is arguable that looking back (to what may have 
happened) is easier than looking forward (to what might happen yet), particularly 
when the underwriter can put some of the burden of investigation on the insured via 
the law on disclosure. This point is pursued in the next section, where we deal with 
claims-made wordings. Finally, we should remind ourselves that the casual 
introduction of loose occurrence-type wordings, and the failure of insurers to foresee 
the adverse construction that the courts might put upon them, were major factors in 
introducing long-tail claims into liability insurance portfolios and in the ensuing 
problems at Lloyd's and elsewhere. 
115 
116 
For example, the case suggested earlier, where negligent design work by an architect leads to 
the construction of a building that fails many years later. 
See Psychiatric Illness p. 21 for a discussion of this problem. 
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3.2.1.3 `Claims made' triggers 117 
As the name suggests, claims-made contracts are those whereby the insurer agrees to 
indemnify the policyholder in circumstances where the claim itself, rather than the 
negligence or damage that led to it, arises in the period of insurance. Generally, the 
insurer that is required to pay is the one on risk when the claim of the third party (the 
victim) is made against the insured (stage 5), although in some markets it is the claim 
for indemnity by the insured for indemnity under his policy (stage 6) that triggers 
coverage. 118 
This trigger has been used for professional indemnity insurance for many years and, 
more recently, for legal expenses insurance, directors' and officers' liability 
insurance, environmental impairment liability insurance and some other classes. For 
insurers, claims-made wordings appear to provide a good solution to the problems of 
latent and gradually occurring losses, because there is no prospective liability beyond 
the period of insurance under a claims-made policy in its purest form. When the 
period of insurance expires all cover ceases, unless the policy is renewed. Assuming 
that the policy runs for one year only, insurers are able to re-price the contract 
annually and re-assess the other terms of cover at the same time. Certainly, there is 
potential for retrospective liability, as explained above; and, even if there is a 
retrospective date fixed at the inception of the contract (i. e. a provision whereby the 
insurer accepts no liability for any loss caused before the date when the policy was 
opened) this retrospective liability will build from year to year as the policy is 
repeatedly renewed. Nevertheless, most underwriters would agree that looking back 
is easier than looking forward 
- 
that it is easier to carry out a careful audit of a firm's 
past activities than to predict the future effect of its current activities and, at the same 
time, assess the legal climate within which those activities might be judged. In any 
case, as suggested earlier, underwriters can reduce the burden of investigating the past 
by requiring the insured to disclose material facts relating to past activities. On the 
117 For good general discussions of claims-made policies see Spier, J. (1998) `Long tail (liability) 
risks and claims made policies, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 23 (No. 87, April 
1998), 152-168 and Schoorens, G. & Van Schoubroeck, C (1998) `Insuring the uninsurable? 
The appeal of the circumstances clause', The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 23 (No. 
87, April 1998), 169-177. 
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other hand, for obvious reasons, they cannot require the insured to predict the future: 
that burden remains firmly with the underwriters. Taking all things together, we can 
conclude that claims-made wordings create maximum certainty for the insurer. It is 
not surprising that some underwriters write liability insurance only on this basis, 
effectively restricting themselves to modern lines of business, such as professional 
indemnity and directors' and officers' liability, where the claims-made basis is 
accepted market practice. 119 
Unfortunately, the inevitable corollary of maximum certainty for the insurer is 
reduced security for the policyholder. In particular, if problems from the past begin to 
emerge, there is a risk that the insurer will impose excessively harsh terms at the 
renewal of a claims-made policy or, in an extreme case, refuse to renew at all. In this 
case the insured may find it very difficult to secure substitute cover. In practice this 
problem is alleviated in two ways. First, insurers always agree to indemnify 
policyholders, not only in respect of claims made against them during the period of 
insurance, but also for claims arising from incidents, events or occurrences notified in 
the period of insurance which subsequently give rise to a claim, even if the policy has 
been cancelled by the time the claim actually arrives. Second, insurers normally give 
the insured an `extended reporting period' (ERP) of up to a year combined with the 
right to buy cover for a longer period (up to six years) at an agreed price if the policy 
is cancelled. However, these extensions operate only for claims arising from events 
which took place when the insurers were originally on risk: there is no cover for 
claims arising from any wrongful act after cancellation. It is this 
- 
the less than 
perfect security granted to the insured by a claims made policy 
- 
that has led courts 
and legislatures in at least three European countries to cast doubt upon their validity at 
various times. 120 Of course, there are some compensating benefits for the insured 
118 
119 
120 
E. g. Spain, in the context of professional indemnity insurance. 
For example the underwriter R. E. Brown, a well-known figure in the London market. 
The issue has been resolved in a reasonably satisfactory way in two of these countries 
(Belgium and Spain) but there are continuing difficulties in France, where some major French 
insurers have pulled out of the professional indemnity insurance market, making it difficult for 
professions such as medicine to obtain suitable cover. The root of the problem is the tendency 
of the French judiciary to modify and reinterpret liability insurance contracts, which began in 
1990 when the Cour de Cassation demanded the substitution of an `occurrence' trigger in the 
interpretation of a claims-made policy. French insurers and their major clients want greater 
freedom to negotiate the terms of liability insurances, meanwhile many of the latter are turning 
to London for cover. 
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under a claims-made policy. There is the opportunity to review the adequacy of an 
insurance programme from year to year and increase (or reduce) cover as required. 
Again, since claims are made against the current insurer, there is little risk of the 
insurer being untraceable or no longer in business when the claim comes in. 
All in all, it can be seen that no policy trigger provides a perfect solution to long-tail 
risks, or even a solution that is likely to satisfy all parties involved. On balance, the 
claim-made trigger provides the optimum arrangement for insurers, and it is not 
surprising that underwriters have sought to extend its use in recent years. However, 
their success in this regard has been limited. During the exceptionally hard insurance 
market that prevailed following the 1984-86 liability insurance crisis in the US 
claims-made wordings were used more extensively for some lines (e. g. product 
liability) but little further progress has been made. Most significantly, attempts to 
apply this form of cover to employers' liability insurance in the UK have foundered in 
the face of legal and technical difficulties. These are discussed in more detail in 
Section 4.4. 
3.2.2 Exclusion of non-accidental losses 
There is a further major problem in the design of liability insurance contracts, in this 
case associated with the exclusion of `non-accidental' losses. Fundamental principles 
of insurance require that insurers should pay only for losses that are accidental, or 
`fortuitous'. Failure to observe this principle creates extreme moral hazard, because 
any incentive on the part of the insured to take care will be greatly weakened if 
insurers are prepared to pay for losses without regard to how the policyholder 
behaves. Insurers attempt deal with this issue by including appropriate restrictions in 
their policies. One such restriction, common in UK liability policies, is a stipulation 
to the effect that the insurer will provide an indemnity only in respect of injury, loss or 
damage that is `accidental'. An alternative provision, more common in the US, 
denies coverage where the liability of the insured is in respect of injury, loss or 
damage that was `expected or intended' by him. When the harm for which the 
insured is responsible arises in connection with an accident, that is, a sudden event 
such as an explosion, fire, fall or injury involving machinery, these provisions can 
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usually be interpreted with little difficulty. In this case attention generally focuses on 
the incident in question, the claimant's actions immediately prior to the accident and 
the policyholder's own behaviour in relation to it: were the actions of the policyholder 
merely careless (in which case the policy will respond) or were they reckless or 
actually calculated to cause harm (in which case cover will usually be denied)? 121 
However, where the injury, loss or damage has occurred or accumulated gradually the 
interpretation of such policy provisions is likely to be much more difficult, because in 
this case there is no accident or sudden event to provide a focus. Instead it will be 
necessary to consider the general behaviour of the insured over a long period of time 
and, in particular, what the insured knew during this period. Claims for gradual 
pollution and environmental damage, discussed already in the context of `looting', 
provide good examples. Quite often the insured is aware that pollutants are being 
released in the course of his business activities. If, following the slow migration or 
accumulation of toxins, a claim is made against him the availability of coverage will 
inevitably hinge on whether the insured expected this to happen. Of course, the 
insured will always deny that he anticipated this result, leaving the insurers to adduce 
evidence that he did. Because of the time scale involved and the abstract nature of 
what must be proved, disputes of this kind are notoriously complex, often focusing on 
whether or not a particular state of mind can be inferred from the insured's behaviour, 
or that of his servants. They are, to adopt the American lawyer's jargon `fact 
intensive', generating mounds of evidence and of course, massive expense. ' 22 
It will be apparent from the foregoing that liability insurance has developed in such a 
way as to generate technical problems of the most intractable kind, mainly associated 
with the long time period over which liability claims develop, and the difficulty of 
designing contracts that operate in a satisfactory way under such circumstances. 
However, there are further difficulties and further sources of instability. These arise 
121 
122 
Of course, there is a large body of case law on this topic. The classic English decision is Gray 
v. Barr [1971] 2 QB 554. See, generally, Birds, J. & Hird, N. J. (2001) Modern insurance 
law, 5d' Edition, pp. 218-220 and 239-244 and Clarke, M. A. (1997) The law of insurance 
contracts, 3'd edition, pp. 443-453. 
To cite just one bizarre example, in the prolonged litigation surrounding the alleged pollution 
by the Shell Oil Company of the US Rocky Mountains a huge amount of evidence 
accumulated in connection with the `dead duck defence' 
-a submission that the employment 
by Shell of personnel to collect and dispose of wildfowl killed by the toxins they had produced 
was sufficient evidence that the pollution was `expected or intended' by the insured. 
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from the effects that the provision of liability insurance might have on human 
behaviour 
- 
and not just that of the policyholder, but also the behaviour of other 
parties who can influence the volume and cost of claims. These other parties include 
the claimant himself and the lawmakers who determine the rights of claimants. Here 
we are concerned with behavioural aspects of liability insurance, moral hazard, and an 
associated issue: the relationship between liability insurance and the law. As we shall 
see, behavioural issues and moral hazard take on extra dimensions in the case of 
liability insurance. The second problem, the potentially destabilising effect of an 
uncertain legal environment, is also unique to this class. 
62 
4 MORAL HAZARD AND BEHAVIOURAL ASPECTS OF LIABILITY 
INSURANCE 
This part of the essay considers moral hazard and wider behavioural aspects of 
liability insurance. We then move on, in Part 5, to a connected topic: the relationship 
between liability insurance and the law 
- 
especially tort law. Moral hazard is 
important, because it is a further potential source of instability in the tort/liability 
insurance system. However, before we explore the concepts associated with the term 
6 moral hazard' we must consider its definition. 
What is meant by moral hazard? In fact, on this point, there is a major difference 
between the understanding of academic insurance economists and that of insurance 
practitioners. Economists define moral hazard (in the context of insurance) as a 
phenomenon whereby the obtaining of insurance tends to alter an individual's 
incentives to prevent loss or to take specific actions; for example, to take care. As a 
result, changes occur in the probability and magnitude of losses underlying the 
calculations of insurers. Alternatively, and more simply, it is the risk that the 
availability of insurance will promote opportunistic behaviour in the insured. It is 
essentially an incentive problem, arising from asymmetric information of agents and 
the difficulty that insurers have in discriminating between the actions of the insured 
on the one hand, and exogenous uncertainty on the other. Because the insurer cannot 
precisely observe and control the insured's behaviour it is impossible to reach a 
Pareto-optimal risk allocation. Only a `second-best' solution is possible, representing 
a compromise between the conflicting goals of risk spreading and providing 
appropriate incentives to the insured. Apart from the difficulties which moral hazard 
creates for insurers, economists are also concerned with its wider effects on society 
and the misallocation of resources that may result. '23 
123 For alternative definitions and general discussions of the topic see Arrow, K. J. (1970) 
`Insurance, risk and resource allocation' Essays in the theory of risk bearing, pp. 134-144; 
Eison, R. (1981) `Information and observability 
- 
some notes on the economics of moral 
hazard and insurance, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 21 (October 1981) pp. 21- 
33 and Stiglitz, J. E. (1983) `Risk, incentives and insurance: the pure theory of moral hazard', 
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 8 (No. 26, January 1983), 4-33. 
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In what (for want of a better expression) we may call the `practitioner literature' moral 
hazard carries a meaning that is much broader and much vaguer. Practitioners tend to 
distinguish between `physical hazard' on the one hand and `moral hazard' on the 
other. The former, roughly speaking, relates to aspects of insurance risks that are not 
affected by the vagaries of human behaviour and the latter to those that are. 124 Thus, 
practitioners deem moral hazard to be present if a policyholder is innately accident- 
prone, congenitally careless, cussed by nature or, for that matter, criminally inclined 
from birth. Economists, on the other hand, would not talk readily of moral hazard 
here, because the granting of insurance would make little difference to the behaviour 
of such individuals. Again, insurers take little interest in social effects, arising from 
the misallocation of resources, that might result from moral hazard; they are 
concerned almost exclusively with its potential effect on the profitability of their 
accounts 
- 
which is understandable. Finally, insurers are less concerned with the 
general tendency of insurance to promote opportunistic behaviour than with 
identifying, in advance, the individuals who are most likely to succumb to temptation. 
Thus insurers look for indicia of moral hazard ('red flags') and talk, for example, of 
the moral hazard associated with certain occupational groups and even some social 
classes. 125 
The `practitioner' approach is intellectually unsound, not just because the distinction 
it makes between `physical' and `moral' hazard is often unworkable126 but because it 
124 
125 
126 
For example: `Moral hazards are those conditions that increase or decrease the probability, 
frequency or severity of loss because of the attitude and character of either an insured person 
or some other person' (Litton, R. A. (1988) Moral Hazard and insurance fraud, Chartered 
Insurance Institute, p. 3; `Moral hazard is an expression of the influence of human activity and 
its impact on insurance, either by its presence or its absence' (Alport, A. E. B. (1988) Risk and 
behaviour: some notes towards a definition of moral hazard, Chartered Insurance Institute, p. 
79. Webster's dictionary more or less follows the `practitioner' definition: `The possibility of 
loss to an insurer arising from the character, habits or attitudes of the insured. ' 
"When I started work 25 years ago 
... 
for motor underwriters the expression `moral hazard' 
had the status of technical terminology. I soon came to understand that to them it was the 
generic term for people whose occupations indicated, they believed, characters which could 
not be trusted to play fair, take eight hours sleep a night and never make insurance claims 
- 
to 
wit: furriers, turf accountants, journalists, scrap merchants, general dealers, market traders, 
publicans and anyone vaguely connected with showbiz. Nowadays a good deal of what the 
general public 
- 
including furriers, turf accountants etc. understand as moral hazard has 
surfaced in Lloyd's, hitherto the institutional embodiment of moral rectitude, so the term has 
rather fallen into disuse in insurance circles. " 
-a motor underwriter's view quoted by Litton (op cit note 124 p. 71) who characterised the statement as `cynical'. 
For example, should one classify the temptations of drink to which publicans and bar staff are 
constantly exposed as moral or physical hazards? 
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also tends to confuse the results of moral hazard, such as dishonest claiming or 
carelessness, with indicators of a propensity to behave improperly, such as the 
following of a particular occupation or a bad claims record. However, the 
economists' approach, though more rigorous, is itself not entirely satisfactory. This is 
because the `economics' literature focuses, almost exclusively, on the incentives that 
the possession of insurance might generate in the insured. Little account is taken of 
incentives generated in other persons whose behaviour has a bearing on the outcome 
of the insurance contract and on the risk. There is a key difference between first party 
insurance and liability insurance in this respect. 127 In the case of the former the 
insured and the claimant are one and the same but, in the case of the latter, they are 
not. With liability insurance the claimant is not the insured but a third party who has 
fallen victim to the insured's negligence. Nevertheless, the fact that the wrongdoer 
has liability insurance may affect the claimant's behaviour quite strongly. This may, 
in turn, affect the outcome of the insurance contract and the extent of the risk assumed 
by the insurer. 128 Again, the extent and magnitude of the risks that liability insurers 
assume depend to a great extent on the legal environment in which insurance operates 
and, specifically, on the rules of tort law. Parliament and the judiciary develop these 
rules, and the behaviour of their members may, in turn, be influenced by the 
availability of liability insurance in general or its existence in a particular case. 
Finally, it is possible that the peculiar nature of liability insurance might influence the 
actions of insurance personnel, including brokers and underwriters, leading to 
opportunistic, or at least imprudent, behaviour on their part too. 
In order to encompass this wider perspective `moral hazard' is simply defined, for the 
purpose of this discussion, as the risk, or possibility, that the existence or availability 
of (liability) insurance will cause one or more of the parties involved in the insurance 
transaction to modify their behaviour. It is also assumed that the change in behaviour 
will have undesirable outcomes for insurers, or for society generally, or for both. 
127 
128 
There is an (almost) complete absence of literature on moral hazard in the context of liability 
insurance. Exceptions include a working paper by Hugh Richardson (2000) `Why is there 
liability and liability insurance' and an article by Cummins and Tennyson (see note 163). 
The third party may even be able to enforce the contract in his own name. This is possible in 
England under the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act 1930 and, more generally, in the 
case of third party motor insurance. In some jurisdictions (e. g. France) an action directe is 
possible under all liability insurance contracts. 
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4.1 FORMS OF MORAL HAZARD 
For the purpose of the discussion, we will divide moral hazard into four forms, which 
are described as `policyholder hazard', `claimant hazard', `underwriting hazard' and 
`jurisprudential hazard'. 
Policyholder hazard refers to the possibility that the policyholder, knowing that he is 
insured, will change his behaviour in a way that produces undesirable outcomes: in 
particular, he may become more careless. This is moral hazard in the classic 
(economists') sense, and is the form that led early commentators to question the 
legality of liability insurance and attempt to suppress it on grounds of public policy. 
Claimant hazard concerns the effect that the existence of liability insurance might 
have on actual or potential claimants, i. e. third parties. For example, they may be 
encouraged to target those who are insured in preference to those who are not, to 
collude with policyholders in order to tap insurance funds, or to launch unmeritorious 
suits in the hope that insurers will pay rather than risk incurring heavy defence costs. 
This is similar to moral hazard in the classic sense, but not exactly the same, because 
the position of the claimant is not exactly analogous to the insured under a first party 
insurance. ' 29 
Underwriting hazard is the risk that, in the case of some liability exposures, such as 
long-tail risks, underwriters may be encouraged to lower their normal standards. This 
might not be viewed as moral hazard in the classic sense, because imprudent 
underwriting does not directly affect the probability or magnitude of loss. '30 
However, it is suggested that the perverse incentives that liability insurance can 
129 
130 
In fact, the sharp distinction between first party insurance and third party insurance can 
sometimes become blurred. For example, when liability is strict, policy conditions are tightly 
controlled by law and insurance is compulsory, liability insurance looks very much like first 
party insurance purchased by accident causers for the benefit of victims. Some motor and 
workers' compensation regimes have this ambiguous quality. 
On the other hand, it could do so; because an imprudent underwriter may draw cover too 
widely, encouraging careless behavior on the part of the insured. 
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generate for underwriters might have a similarly destabilising affect on insurance 
portfolios. 
Jurisprudential hazard concerns the extent to which lawmakers, including the courts 
and the legislature in the UK, might be influenced in the application, modification or 
expansion of liability rules by the existence of liability insurance in a particular case, 
or by the general availability of such insurance. Arguably, this could give rise to 
moral hazard in the classic sense, because the shape and reach of (tort) law may not be 
entirely exogenous to any particular insurance contract or to the practices of insurers 
generally. Furthermore, the existence of insurance might promote decidedly 
opportunistic behaviour. For example, a judge might find that imposing liability on 
an insured, as opposed to an uninsured, wrongdoer increases his own utility. 131 
Again, persons who influence Parliamentary processes might choose to avoid public 
opprobrium, and so advance their own careers, by favouring legislation that generates 
funds for compensation through the mechanisms of private liability insurance rather 
than (say) through unpalatable direct taxation, even when the latter would be more 
efficient. 132 There has been little study of moral hazard in political processes, but this 
does mean that it does not exist. Of course, at this point we begin to touch upon a 
much wider issue 
- 
the general relationship between liability insurance and the law. 
Because of its broad scope, this topic is addressed in a separate section of the essay 
(Part 5), as mentioned above. 
It will become clear from our discussion that moral hazard, in the sense that we have 
defined it, arises in a particularly acute form in the case of liability insurance and 
takes on dimensions that are absent in most other types of insurance. The various 
forms of moral hazard described above are now examined, each in turn. 
131 
132 
See, for example, the remarks of the judge in the case discussed in note 184. Lord Denning 
also comes to mind in this context. 
The 'Superfund' legislation comes to mind here. Targeting anonymous European (re)insurers 
to pay for clean-ups is unlikely to be politically contentious in the US. Targeting US business 
would be a different matter. See also Section 5.2, p. 100. 
67 
4.2 POLICYHOLDER HAZARD 
There are two aspects of this form of moral hazard to discuss. The first concerns the 
implications of liability insurance for public policy. Is this form of insurance 
- 
`insurance against carelessness' 
- 
likely to provoke behaviour that is so at odds with 
the requirements of public order that it should be banned by law? The second 
concerns the implications for insurers. If the law does allow this form of insurance, 
how can insurers reconcile the nature of the risk 
- 
`insurance against carelessness' 
- 
with the obvious need to encourage care on the part of their clients? These questions 
are closely connected. However, to the extent that they can be separated, the issue of 
legality and public policy is examined first. 
As we have already seen, the development of liability insurance in the early years was 
impeded by concern over the effect that such insurance might have on the behaviour 
of persons who obtained it. It was feared that policyholders, secured by insurance 
against claims for compensation, might become careless, and the lives and property of 
others would then be put at risk. In fact, the general practice of insurance had been 
condemned on a similar basis long before underwriters first assumed liability risks. 
For example, almost from the beginning marine insurance was criticised on the 
grounds that its availability encouraged enterprises that were excessively risky, 
reduced the incentive to construct strong and safe vessels, produced careless 
navigation and even encouraged masters to scuttle their ships. All of this put the lives 
of sailors at risk. 133 However, with liability insurance the argument carried extra 
133 For example, Samuel Pepys writes of marine insurance fraud in his Diary for 30 November/I 
December 1663, having attended the trial of a ship's master for this offence at the London 
Guildhall. A little later, the temptations of insurance were condemned in the (anonymous) 
broadsheet of 1700 The case ofAssurances as they now Stand: and the Evil Consequences 
thereof to the Nation, the general flavour of which is given by the following: `... there has 
been very great Abuses put on the Assurer, by Old and Decayed Ships, sent for Africa, and 
other Parts, where the Worms eat them, where having made great Assurances on the Ships 
here, they have detained them in Ports on purpose, so long til their bottoms have been eaten 
up, or at least so as not fit to go to sea 
... 
'. In 1834 James Basinghall of Kirkaldy condemned 
the practice of marine insurance in another tract, The Pernicious effects of Sea Insurance 
where, amongst other things, he exploits the perennial myth that insurers have an interest in 
more, rather than fewer, accidents and claims: `... it is a received maxim in Marine Insurance, 
that `high risks and high premiums, are preferable to low risks and low premiums, ' and every 
effort is used to keep up premiums. The loss of human life attendant on speculation, never 
enters for a moment into consideration. ' Even at the end of the nineteenth century, similar 
voices were heard. For example, at this time one Captain Fround, secretary of the 
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force, because careless injury to others was the very risk that was insured. At the 
same time, and in a more abstract sense, insurance against the consequence of 
`wrongful' acts was seen as morally offensive, because it blunted the deterrent and 
retributive effect of the law. Thus, Tunc observes that: `At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, liability insurance would have been unthinkable. It would have 
been considered as immoral. ' 134 Tune may be wrong in one sense, because, at least 
among marine insurers, liability insurance was not only contemplated but, in all 
probability, actually practised before the nineteenth century began. 135 However, Tunc 
is certainly right in that the legality of such insurance was an issue from the start. In 
the earliest legal reference to liability insurance traced by the author, Delanoy v. 
Robson136 (1814) the court considered a motion to move the venue of a `running 
down' action from London to Durham where, it must be assumed, the incident had 
occurred. The Solicitor-General (Shepherd) objected on grounds that it would be 
impossible to find an impartial jury there. He noted that: 
`... in the County of Durham were numerous societies of persons, who insured 
each other's vessels, 137 not only against sea risks, but also against all sums 
which the owners might be obliged to pay for damages done by their vessels: 
and that the Defendant's ship was insured by them, and the Plaintiff could 
scarcely have there a jury, which would not be interested to prevent his 
recovering. ' 
Sergeant Best, for the Defendant, contended that this liability `was not an insurable 
risk, therefore the jury could have no interest'. 
The reporter's account of the court ruling is brief but very interesting: 
Per Curiam. It would be an illegal insurance to insure against what might be 
the consequences of the wrongful acts of the assured. But the peculiar 
character of these persons answers the Plaintiffs objection. They are assureds 
134 
135 
136 
137 
Shipmasters' society of London, argued: `A good deal of the recklessness and apathy shown 
by shipowners and speculators is to be accounted for by the possibility of insuring in full 
against loss of ship, cargo and even unsecured freight. Indeed, unlimited insurance has 
unquestionably done much toward cheapening life upon the ocean. ' 
Tunc, A., 1974 `Introduction', in International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Chapter 1 
of Vol. 11 (Torts). The Hague: Mouton. 
See Delanoy v. Robson, note 136 and accompanying text. 
(1814) 5 Taunt. 605. 
See note 14 for details of the `clubs' in the northern ports. 
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as well as assurers, and are as much interested to extend this principle of loss, 
as to restrain it. Here is not enough interest in this case, to prevent our sending 
it to the venue to which the Defendant is entitled otherwise to remove it. 
This tells us much about attitudes to insurance prevailing at the time and, indeed, 
which prevail today. First, the court recognises that liability insurance might 
technically be illegal whilst acknowledging, coolly, that the practice exists. In fact, a 
wide gap between legal theory and practical application has always existed in 
insurance law. 138 Second, the court recognises the mutual character of the insurance 
under discussion 
- 
the parties concerned are `assureds as well as assurers'. The court 
acknowledges that in this case there are not, in reality, separate categories of victim, 
wrongdoer, and insurer but, at various times, they are all one and the same. For the 
parties concerned the commercial need for risk spreading, by whatever form of 
insurance, then takes precedence over the need for deterrence and retribution, making 
the issue of legality largely redundant. This is only a few steps away from a very 
modern view, espoused by the `Yale lawyers', "' whereby liability rules (in effect, 
those of tort law) become little more than a means of providing insurance to victims. 
Under this construct, the legality of liability insurance can hardly be questioned, 
because it is the very basis upon which tort liabilities are founded. This theory is 
considered in the next section. 
As we have already seen, moral hazard of the sort now under discussion was raised as 
a basis to challenge the legality of liability insurance throughout the nineteenth 
century. Indeed, even in the twentieth century, the arguments were sometimes 
repeated. 140 However, these objections are now rarely heard, being heavily 
138 
139 
140 
For example, the statutory requirement for insurable interest, introduced for marine business in 
1745, has never been fully observed by insurers. Insurers simply introduced PPI ('Policy 
Proof of Interest') contracts to circumvent the statute, and continue to do so. The practical 
importance of modern insurance law is also much reduced as a consequence of agreements 
amongst insurers which extend, modify or reduce strict legal rights. Generally, the law has 
condoned these market practices and, indeed, the Government itself has frequently become a 
party to the agreements concerned. See Lewis, R. K. `Insurers' agreements not to enforce 
strict legal rights: bargaining with government and in the shadow of the law' (1985) 48 M. L. R. 
275. 
The phrase is borrowed from Jane Stapleton. See `Tort, Insurance and Ideology' (1995) 58 
M. L. R. 820,833. 
See Tunc op cit note 134 pp. 50-52 and Shavell op cit note 5 p. 166. Both note, amongst other 
things, that there was a complete ban on liability coverage in the former Soviet Union. 
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outweighed by opposing views in favour of liability insurance. The positive, 
countervailing arguments are many and various. 
First, it is commonly observed that the need for liability insurance as a means of 
guaranteeing compensation to victims of tortious injuries should, as a matter of 
policy, take precedence over the need to deter wrongdoing through tort liability. This 
argument looks particularly strong where mass injuries are concerned, such as those 
that occur on the road: indeed, it has led to the almost universal adoption by 
governments of compulsory third party motor insurance schemes. Challenging this 
proposition, some commentators suggest that, whilst a pattern of mass injuries and 
(potentially) insolvent injurers points to the need for risk-spreading though insurance, 
it does not necessarily indicate a need for liability insurance. They maintain that 
private first party insurance (or social insurance for that matter) can provide an 
adequate, and possibly cheaper, substitute. 14 1 The arguments become complex at this 
point, because the relative simplicity and efficiency of first party insurance hinges on 
the limited range of losses that are generally covered by such insurance and the 
absence, in most cases, of the need for legal adjudication on questions of either fault 
or quantum. Thus, in particular, first-party insurances generally do not cover non- 
economic losses, such as the pain and suffering of an accident victim. Critics use this 
point, in turn, to mount a further broad attack on liability insurance and tort liability 
itself. They argue that the tort/liability insurance system, in purporting to provide 
`full' compensation, including non-economic losses, restricts personal autonomy. It 
does this by making victims pay for insurance of losses that they would not choose to 
insure themselves, given the option 
- 
payment, of course, being extracted by 
businesses that pass on their liability insurance premiums to consumers through 
higher charges for goods and services. However, whether victims actually choose not 
to insure these risks is a moot point. Certainly, cover is not generally available in the 
market, and this absence may result from a lack of demand. However, it may be that 
the risk is simply too difficult to insure, so the market has never been tested. 
Provision of `full' compensation (including non-economic losses) along the lines of 
the tort system could be duplicated by first party insurance, but not without loading 
that first-party insurance with most, if not all, the costs of the tort system. This is 
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because reference to tort principles and, quite frequently, legal adjudication, would be 
necessary to quantify the `full' compensation to which the first-party insured would be 
entitled. And why should insurers wish to market a product with such potential for 
conflict with its own policyholders? The potential for conflict over the quantum of 
compensation always exists in liability insurance, but in this case the insured and 
insurer are, on most occasions, at least on the same side! For these reasons, it is 
submitted that first party insurers cannot, in practice, offer products that mimic the 
sophisticated compensation principles of tort law. 142 Hence, in practice if not in 
theory, first party insurance cannot provide an exact substitute for liability 
insurance. 143 In the end, society must decide how much in the way of resources it 
wishes devote to accident victims (such as road casualties), how it should be 
distributed, and what weight should be given to questions of causation and fault. In 
the field of road accident compensation the variations are legion, with fault and no- 
fault schemes, and various combinations of first party, third party and social 
insurance. Compulsory liability insurance is certainly not the only choice of 
insurance system and it may not be the best, but it is a perfectly rational one, at least 
where the provision of `full' compensation for at least some victims is seen as a 
priority. 144 
In fact, it is likely that the adoption in most countries of compulsory third party motor 
insurance has, in itself, dampened concerns over moral hazard and helped to promote 
a more general acceptance of liability insurance. Few people see anything wrong in 
insuring their own personal liability for road accidents and, by extension, are unlikely 
to question the application of liability insurance elsewhere. However, we should 
141 
142 
143 
144 
See for example Shavell op cit note 5 at 166. 
In fact, the French insurance association (FFSA) has recently devised a new policy 'Garantie 
des Accidents de la Vie' (GAV) which is intended to cover any accident, domestic or 
otherwise, which is not work or road-related. Eight million French people suffer domestic 
accidents each year and 400,000 remain handicapped. Over 80% of injuries are self-inflicted, 
ruling out recovery from a third party. The new policy purports to provide 'full' compensation 
with payments calculated according to principles of tort law, as though a third party were 
responsible. 
Once again, we observe the phenomenon of insurers providing coverage, through liability 
insurance, of risks that are uninsurable under first-party insurance. 
In any event, where liability is strict (as it is for motor accidents in most countries), third party 
cover is compulsory and restrictive policy conditions are limited by law, the gap between third 
party and first party insurance begins to disappear, liability insurance becoming almost 
equivalent to first party insurance bought for the benefit of the victim. 
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point out that compensation regimes for road accidents are, in effect, `closed' systems 
in which most participants are both potential causers of accidents and potential 
victims of them. Potential injurers and the potentially injured are not separate classes 
but, broadly speaking, members of a single body of road users, with a common 
interest in avoiding accidents. A collision that causes injury to a third party is almost 
as likely to injure the wrongdoer himself, so, regardless of whether the third party risk 
is insured, the potential wrongdoer has every incentive to be careful, particularly when 
there is no coverage for the wrongdoer's own injuries. At the same time, the risks of 
vehicle use are such that a very small mistake by a driver can result in catastrophic 
injuries and huge personal liability. 145 No driver, however skilled, can be entirely 
confident of removing this risk simply by taking care. Thus, the nature of the risk, 
and its essential mutuality, is such that few would challenge the use of liability 
insurance on the basis that it might reduce safety standards on the roads, or on broader 
moral grounds. 146 However, the same mutuality does not exist in other fields of 
accident compensation where liability insurance is used, such as industrial injuries or 
product liability. Here, potential injurers and the potentially injured are members of 
separate groups, with interests that do not necessarily coincide so closely. 147 
However, this distinction between third party motor insurance and other liability risks 
is not immediately obvious, and it is submitted that an almost universal acceptance of 
liability insurance in the context of road accidents has hastened its acceptance 
elsewhere. 
145 
146 
147 
See, for example, the freak circumstances of the recent Selby rail crash, note 271. 
Arguably, the abandonment of a system of tort-based liability backed by compulsory third 
party insurance in favour of true no fault-scheme, where all road accident victims are 
compensated (by first party insurance or otherwise) might lower safety standards, since 
careless drivers who injured themselves as well as others would be `rewarded' with 
compensation. There is evidence of this happening in Quebec. 
Mutuality of interest may exist in a different sense. For example, in the field of product 
liability it is conventionally pointed out that cost of injuries resulting from defective products 
is passed on to consumers, liability insurance costs being reflected in the price of the goods 
they buy. Theoretically, this mechanism internalises accident costs and helps to produce 
optimum levels of product safety, in which we all have an interest. Stapleton, (op cit note 139 
at 837) in the course of attacking arguments for the abolition of tort liability for non-economic 
loss, suggests that some victims of defective products stand outside the circle. She cites Mrs 
Donoghue 
- 
the injured non-buyer 
- 
as an example of a person whose interests differ from 
general community of consumers. However, this assumes that the Mrs Donoghues of this 
world never buy a round of drinks! 
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In a second line of defence, proponents accept that liability insurance may slightly 
dilute the deterrent effect of tort law, but argue that this dilution is unlikely to have a 
very marked effect on policyholders' behaviour. They say it is unlikely to do so 
simply because other, more powerful, deterrents will always remain in place. These 
include the sanctions of the criminal law which, unlike tort damages, often strike 
directors, managers and employees of insured firms, and not just the corporate 
enterprises themselves. They also include quantifiable accident costs that are not 
recoverable from liability insurers. Often these uninsured costs will far outweigh 
those that are insured. 148 Some costs to which accidents give rise, such as harm to 
personal reputation or business image, may be difficult to quantify but powerful 
nevertheless in their deterrent effect. 149 
Third, it is argued that, in any case, the deterrent effect of tort law need not be blunted 
substantially by the purchase of liability insurance because the terms of the insurance 
contract, and the law relating to liability insurance, can together preserve the incentive 
to take care. Thus, either by the general law, or the terms of contract, cover can be 
restricted to `ordinary' negligence. Deliberate wrongdoing and, perhaps, reckless 
conduct can be excluded. Equally, the pricing structure of liability insurance can be 
used to penalise both risky activities and careless behaviour that leads to injuries, thus 
preserving deterrence. 
Public concern and the interests of insurers coincide exactly at this point. Everything 
hinges on the effective application of standard underwriting techniques to liability 
insurance. Is liability insurance any different from other classes in this respect? Here 
it must be acknowledged that at least some of the standard mechanisms used to 
mitigate moral hazard in insurance are less easy to apply in the case of liability lines. 
For example, for at least some classes of liability business, a requirement to share the 
148 
149 
For example, the UK Health and Safety Executive has suggested that for a firm paying 
employers' liability insurance premiums of £1 million (and, inevitably, recovering claim 
payments of rather less than this figure in most cases), the true cost of the risk is likely to be in 
the range of £8 million to £36 million (Health and Safety Executive (1994), The Cost to the 
British Economy of Work Accidents and Work Related Ill Health). 
For example, the threat of litigation and potential stigma of a finding in negligence can still 
have a powerful deterrent effect on the employer, even when the employers' liability risk is 
fully insured. This point has been made forcibly by Owen Tudor, former Legal Services 
Officer for the UK Trades Union Congress (TUC), in conversations with the author. 
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risk by means of a policy excess or deductible cannot easily be imposed on the 
insured, ' 50 and nor can some restrictive terms and conditions. ' 51 Again, restricting 
cover to what we have described as `ordinary' negligence may not be as easy as it 
sounds. As we have already seen in Section 3.2.2, it can sometimes be very difficult 
to design an insurance contract that effectively excludes losses that result from 
recklessness or deliberate wrongdoing. Furthermore, insurers may find that they are 
required to pay even when recklessness can be proved, especially when liability 
insurance is compulsory. 152 Generally, there is clash of different policy goals in this 
area 
-a tension between a desire not to `reward' wrongdoing and the need to ensure 
that innocent injured victims receive insurance money, however egregious the wrong 
may be. The result is a rather uneasy compromise between the rights to compensation 
of accident victims and the rights of insurers to protect the integrity of their 
underwriting systems and maintain equity amongst members of their risk 
communities. 153 Furthermore, there is worrying lack of consistency in some key areas 
of accident and insurance law, as the author has demonstrated elsewhere. 154 
Again, can liability insurers, with the same ease as other insurers, segregate the risk 
pool, observe the behaviour of their policyholders and charge accurate differential 
premiums either ex post or ex ante? The ability of liability insurers to do this 
150 
151 
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154 
Particularly in the case of compulsory lines of liability insurance where, in order to protect the 
third party from the risk of policyholder insolvency, the use of deductibles may be forbidden 
by law. For example, the regulations governing employers' liability insurance in the UK do just this 
- 
although an agreement whereby the insured pays the third party and claims 
reimbursement from the policyholder is not outlawed and can be used in place of a deductible. 
See Employers' Liability (Compulsory Insurance) Regulations 1998 (S. I. 1998 No. 2573. ). 
The regulations governing employers' liability insurance (note 150 above) and various 
provisions in the Road Traffic Act 1988 limit the use of restrictive policy conditions in 
employers' liability insurance and motor insurance respectively. See How Secure is the 
System? pp. 118-122. 
For some forms of liability insurance reckless conduct by the insured will debar coverage. 
Recklessness will amount either to a breach of the standard `reasonable precautions' condition 
or allow the insurers to refuse indemnity on more general grounds of public policy 
- 
see Gray 
v. Barr, note 121 above. However, it has been suggested that in the case of third party motor 
insurance, and possibly employers' liability insurance, 
- 
the compulsory lines 
- 
only deliberate 
criminal conduct could possibly prevent an insured from enforcing a claim in respect of 
personal injury. See Birds, op cit note 121. 
For example, some areas (such as the use of trade warranties in employers' liability insurance) 
are governed by rather vague `understandings' between the Government and the insurance 
industry. 
For example, is not obvious why the statutory regimes for motor and employers' liability insurance allow insurers to rely on restrictive policy conditions in some cases but not others. 
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effectively has often been called into question and, whilst the author believes that 
critics often underestimate the sophistication of liability insurance underwriting, 155 it 
must be conceded that some risks, and especially long-tail exposures, present severe 
problems. For example, a key difficulty lies in the fact that experience rating is 
impractical for some liability risks. This technique 
- 
pricing a risk on the basis of its 
own loss history 
- 
is without question the most efficient method for insurers, the 
fairest for policyholders and the most beneficial in controlling moral hazard. 
However, long time delays in some liability claims mean that current loss experience 
may not accurately reflect the present state of the risk, making the device 
ineffective. 156 Furthermore, as we have seen, there is the possibility that some risks 
may be the product of deliberate `looting' behaviour, evincing moral hazard in its 
most extreme form. 
In summary, it can be stated that the aspect of moral hazard explored in this section, 
described as `policyholder hazard', is no longer a ground upon which the basic 
rationale of liability insurance can be challenged successfully. The value and social 
function of liability insurance, though still questioned from time to time, is firmly 
established. However, there is still a need for insurers to exercise vigilance and to 
ensure that the standard insurance techniques for combating moral hazard are 
deployed effectively. As we have seen, for some risks, including employers' and 
environmental liability, there may be severe problems in achieving this end. 
4.3 CLAIMANT HAZARD 
The claimant is, of course, the `third party' in the familiar liability insurance triangle. 
To what extent does the existence of liability insurance condition the behaviour of 
actual or potential claimants 
- 
i. e. accident victims? Are such victims likely to target 
those who are insured in preference to those who are not, collude with policyholders 
to tap insurance funds, fake injuries, or launch speculative suits in the hope that 
155 
156 
See, generally, How Secure is the System?, which explores inconsistencies between the 
statutory regimes for motor and employers' liability insurance. 
See Managerial Liability pp. 24-25 and Parsons, C. (2000) `Directors and officers' liability 
insurance: a target or a shield? ' The Company Lawyer, Vol. 21, No. 3 p. 84. 
See The Cure p. 37. 
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insurers will settle rather than risk heavy defence costs? The first question looks quite 
easy to answer. Common sense suggests that a rational accident victim is unlikely to 
pursue a case against a defendant who has no means to pay. In fact, very few tort 
actions are brought against persons who are uninsured. The Pearson Committee 
estimated that 88% of tort personal injury claims, representing 94 % of total value, 
were against defendants who were backed by insurance, with most of the balance 
against self-insurers. 157 More recent figures from the US suggest that liability 
insurers make an almost identical 93.5% of tort liability payments. 158 However, this 
in itself proves nothing. However unlikely, the prevalence of liability insurance 
amongst tort defendants might simply reflect the fact that potential causers of 
accidents (such as manufacturers of consumer goods, employers in the UK and 
motorists generally) are more inclined to buy liability insurance than persons who 
engage in more innocuous activities. In fact, the existence of compulsory liability 
insurance in some of the main spheres of tort liability makes these `chicken and egg' 
discussions redundant in many contexts. In the case of compulsory schemes, liability 
insurance (or a surrogate in the form of a guarantee fund) is a given fact, so accident 
victims are unable to choose between insured and uninsured defendants and the latter 
generally have no choice but to insure. For this reason, those areas where liability 
insurance is not compulsory provide more fruitful fields of exploration. `Managerial' 
liability provides a good example. Here there is quite abundant evidence that the 
development of a relatively new class of insurance, directors' and officers' liability 
insurance (D&O), has prompted claims that otherwise would not be made. This is 
evidenced by the phenomenon of D&O `strike suits', especially in the US. These are 
cases where plaintiffs (often law firms) buy small parcels of shares in failing 
companies with a view to tapping D&O insurance funds through speculative attacks 
on the failing firms' directors. The assumption they make is that insurers will pay 
rather than risk losing even more money through the heavy costs of defence. In this 
case D&O insurance coverage is clearly the key asset of the failing firm that attracts 
such speculators to buy a few shares and proceed against its management. In the 
absence of D&O insurance such a purchase would be completely irrational, except 
157 Report of the Royal Commission on civil liability and compensation for personal injury 
(Pearson Commission) 1978, Cmnd. 7054-I1 vol. 2 para. 509. 
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perhaps by bona fide managers of recovery funds. 1 59 Of course, what attracts 
claimants is not liability insurance per se but the money it represents. This is what 
Clarke describes as the `magnetic effect' of money, ' 60 or the `deep pocket' by another 
name. 161 
We should also remember that some of the most relentless pursuers of insured 
tortfeasors are insurance companies themselves, proceeding by way of subrogation. 
In such cases the real (though not the nominal) plaintiff is typically a property insurer 
seeking to recover its outlay in respect of a first party claim or another liability insurer 
seeking contribution. For reasons that are obvious, insurers do not, as a rule, throw 
good money after bad by pursuing uninsured torfeasors. The one decision that is 
commonly cited as evidence that insurers do pursue uninsured defendants, the 
notorious Lister case, turns out, on closer examination to show nothing of the sort, 
only that the plaintiff insurers were mistaken in their belief that the defendant was in 
fact insured. 162 
Of course, it is not in the least surprising that accident victims should favour insured 
wrongdoers. This hardly qualifies as moral hazard, even from the perspective of the 
insurer, since it is entirely predictable by the underwriters concerned. However, 
deliberate fraud by accident `victims', and positive collusion between such victims 
and liability insurance policyholders is a different matter. Although moral hazard of 
this type (claims fraud) is generally associated with first-party insurance, there is 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
See Shavell op cit note 5, p. 166 citing O'Connell et al (1994) `Blending reform of tort 
liability and health insurance: a necessary mix', Cornell Law Review, 79 pp. 1303-1338. 
A good contemporary example is found in the US `vulture funds' that have bought into bonds 
issued by Barings Bank. In this case the target is Baring's auditors, Coopers and Lybrand 
(now part of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC)) and their professional indemnity insurers, the 
former having failed to pick up Nick Leeson's `rogue trading'. These funds were instrumental 
in the recent narrow voting down of a £84 million offer to settle, forcing a £1 billion court 
action to proceed. 
Clarke, M. Policies and perceptions of insurance (1997) p. 273. 
Of course, money appeals to lawyers also. Assuming that all are equally attracted by it, the 
most able are likely to get the job of probing the deepest pockets. More insurance may thus 
lead to better arguments that insurers should pay, requiring insurers to employ equally 
sophisticated and expensive defence counsel. 
Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage[ 1957] AC 555. See How Secure is the System? note 
83 pp. 130-131 for discussion of the insurance background. 
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evidence that it exists at a high level in liability insurance also. 163 For example, the 
non-existent trip or slip and the dubious back injury are now common currency for 
liability claims handlers. Furthermore, employers' liability insurers frequently deal 
with claims for injuries that are genuine, but which occurred well outside the sphere 
of work. Again, liability claims in respect of intentional, self-inflicted, injuries are 
not unknown. 164 Liability insurers are very attractive targets for fraudulent schemes 
of this sort because the payoff from a successful claim typically includes not only 
compensation for reported economic losses but for pain and suffering also. '65 
Furthermore, a third party claim allows the perpetrator to defraud an insurance 
company without having, himself, to buy any insurance at all! Also common are 
collusive claims: that is, cases where the policyholder accepts responsibility for 
damage to the property of another, often a friend or colleague, in order to fund the 
latter's loss through his own liability insurance and, perhaps, share the proceeds. 
Again, liability insurance is particularly vulnerable to claims fraud of this sort. It may 
well be easier to accomplish and more profitable than fraud against a first party 
insurer because, quite apart from the availability of pain and suffering awards in 
injury cases mentioned above, third party cover is often wider. For example, the need 
to secure accident victims against the potential insolvency of the insured means that 
liability insurance policies are rarely subject to an excess or deductible 
-a standard 
device to control moral hazard in first party insurance. 166 Again, liability policies 
generally provide cover on a complete `all risks' basis: loss or damage of any sort is 
insured, provided the policyholder is (or appears to be) legally responsible for it. 
Unlike many first party policies, there are typically no restrictions as to the perils that 
cause the loss or the location where the loss occurs. 167 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
See, for example, Cummins, D. J. & Tennyson, S. (1996) `Moral hazard in insurance 
claiming: evidence from automobile insurance' Journal of Risk and Uncertainty Vol. 12, Part 
1 and also, generally, Zalma, B. (1996) Liability claims fraud investigations, Thomas 
Investigative Publications. 
The author has personal experience of fraudulent liability claims for self-inflicted injuries 
amongst textile workers in the North of England, some of which are too gruesome to describe. 
Cummins and Tennyson (1996) conclude that the incentive for bodily injury liability fraud 
stems primarily from the possibility of receiving pain and suffering awards. See `Moral 
hazard in insurance claiming: evidence from automobile insurance' Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty Vol. 12 pp. 29-50. 
Although liability insurance claim payments are potentially subject to reduction on account of 
contributory negligence 
-a restriction that does not apply to first party insurance. 
To take a simple example, first party insurance on personal possessions or business property is 
often restricted to losses that occur in the home or place of business whereas, in the case of 
79 
Sometimes liability insurers have created moral hazard and invited collusive claims 
through ineptitude, or at least lack of forethought, in policy design. D&O insurance 
provides a good example. Here it is customary to include as insured persons not only 
individual directors and managers but the corporate entity itself, on the grounds that 
the latter may be obliged to indemnify the former in some circumstances and third 
party suits may be brought against either or both. The possibility of collusive internal 
liability claims was not fully considered until, in the early 1980s, a number of US 
banks that had lost money through incautious lending sought to recoup their losses by 
dismissing, and then suing on grounds of negligence or breach of contract, employees 
who authorised the loans in question. As a result, trading losses that no first party 
insurer would regard as remotely insurable became the subject of D&O liability 
claims. These actions gave rise to much litigation and resulted in the introduction by 
D&O insurers of `assured versus assured' exclusions in an attempt to eliminate the 
problem. However, the enforcement of these exclusions has proved problematic and, 
at the present time, they have become relaxed, despite the potential for reintroducing 
collusive claims. 168 
Some consequences of the `claimant hazard' explored in this section, such as the 
potential for claims fraud, are not unique to liability business. However, it should be 
clear from the foregoing that liability insurance has a unique potential for influencing 
the behaviour of a persons who are not party to the insurance contract, and that this 
generates problems that are greater in dimension and complexity than those found in 
other insurance classes. 
4.4 UNDERWRITING HAZARD 
One would imagine that the peculiar hazards of liability insurance, described above, 
would produce extra caution on the part of liability underwriters. However, this has 
168 
liability insurance, the place where the damage occurs is usually irrelevant to coverage. 
Again, first party insurance often covers only specified perils (e. g. fire, theft etc. ) whereas 
liability insurers do not usually impose restrictions of this sort. 
Especially in markets such as Germany, where the two-tier board structure makes assured 
versus assured exclusions unworkable. See Managerial Liability p 12. 
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not always been the case. Indeed, it is arguable that liability insurance, particularly in 
its long-tail guise, generates perverse incentives for underwriters that have no parallel 
in other forms of insurance or, at the very least, creates traps and temptations that do 
not exist in other classes. For one thing, the long time span over which liability 
claims develop means that the incautious underwriter may not be faced immediately 
with the full consequences of his actions. Current losses can be blamed on a previous 
generation of underwriters and, by the time the full claims cost of his own book of 
business is known, perhaps forty years hence, the guilty underwriter of today may be 
living in comfortable retirement, if not deceased 
- 
perhaps a further potential source 
of the `looting' phenomenon explored in Section 3.1. A property insurance 
underwriter, by contrast, is rather more like Doctor Johnson's condemned man: he 
will find that the possibility of a rapid claims build-up (if not the prospect of being 
hanged in a fortnight) 169 will concentrate the mind wonderfully. Of course, it is not 
suggested that the incautious liability underwriter can always, in the ordinary course 
of his business, put off the day of reckoning for so long. However, experience has 
proved that underwriters can be tempted all too easily by large chunks of liability 
insurance premium into accepting what are essentially unquantifiable risks. 170 Again, 
even when notifications do begin to trickle in, the underwriter may be easily 
persuaded that actual claims will not materialise, or they can be legally challenged, or 
that they are merely freak occurrences. By contrast, there is nothing so concrete, 
immediate and indisputable as a large fire. Perhaps, in the final analysis, the 
phenomenon of liability underwriters continuing to put loss-making liability business 
on their books can only be explained as a manifestation of classic gambling 
behaviour: the temptation to plunge when on a losing streak in the hope of recouping 
past losses. 
169 
170 
`Depend upon it, sir, when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates the 
mind wonderfully. ' Boswell (1791) A life of Samuel Johnson. 
This has led, from time to time, to frenzies of `cash flow underwriting' or `writing for 
premium', which might be regarded as no more than a name for grabbing the money and 
hoping for the best. It is based, in theory, on the assumption that any shortfall in the premium 
collected can be made good by a rich harvest of investment income that ripens during the long 
period of time over which claims develop, and their settlement is delayed. However, a 
strategy based on generation of investment income can easily come unstuck if investment 
yields drop, or fail to match the rise in damages awards, or liability increases as a result of 
legal change 
- 
all of which have happened in recent years. At the very least, this strategy adds 
extra layers of risk over and above the insurance risks that underwriters assume. 
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As we have seen in connection with the debacle surrounding their Umbrella 
policies, 171 Lloyd's has certainly not been immune from this ostrich-style 
underwriting. 172 However, there is another dimension to the Lloyd's near-disaster. 
This is the role of the broker which, of course, extends beyond Lloyd's to the whole 
of the London market and is not confined to liability insurance. The London market 
relies on brokers, not only to bring in business but also, in many cases, to design the 
products that are to be `manufactured' by the underwriters. We see this in the case of 
many forms of liability insurance, which have often been products of broker 
innovation. Examples include D&O insurance and the `Umbrella' liability policies 
discussed in Section 2.3. The broker's role is to sell his product, not only to the client 
insured but also to the underwriter. Thus, the underwriter has to price a product that 
is not only designed by another (the broker) but which varies in its production costs 
according to the characteristics of a person or business (the insured) that is selected 
and proposed by that other. The London market insurance underwriter is in the hands 
of the intermediary to an extent that is found in no other industry. In fact, the broker 
has every incentive to understate the extent of the risk that he presents, because his 
primary duty is to his client insured. 173 As a result, underwriters, and not just 
policyholders, can become victims of mis-selling. Of course, if a broker oversteps the 
mark and conceals the truth, or misrepresents facts relating to the risk, then he can be 
called to account and held legally responsible for his wrongdoing. But what 
protection does this accountability give to the underwriter? The answer is very little, 
because the London insurance market stands behind the broker as well. Certainly, if 
the latter is negligent he may be liable in damages, either to his client insured (if his 
negligence is attributable to the latter and a claim is lost), or to the insurers (if the 
negligence is attributable to the broker alone). However, it makes little difference in 
either case because, of course, the broker is insured. Thus, the mechanism of liability 
insurance (professional indemnity insurance in this case) will simply propel the loss 
back into the very market that the broker has offended, if not back to the very same 
171 
172 
See Section 2.3. 
The plaintiffs in the Jaffray litigation (Society of Lloyd's v. Jaffray [1999] 1 Com All ER 354, 
QBD and (No. 2) 2 Comm All ER 181, QBD) argued that Lloyd's underwriters had 
succumbed to a form of moral hazard going beyond ostrich-like obtuseness. They alleged 
positive fraud, saying that Names had been recruited in the knowledge that long-tail liability 
claims were on the way, and concealed this fact from the individuals concerned 
- 
the so-called 
`recruit to dilute' policy. The plaintiffs lost in the High Court, but there may be an appeal. 
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underwriters. Obviously, the protection that the broker receives comes at a cost, in 
the form of the professional indemnity insurance premiums that are paid. However, 
the burden of assessing and pricing this risk rests, again, on the underwriter. In 
essence, the underwriter is required to price not only the potential negligence of the 
insured, but also that of the intermediary who introduces him. The entrepreneurial 
approach to insurance that we find in the broker-driven London market is, of course, 
part of its strength, but only when entrepreneurship combines with cool-headed 
underwriting, scientific rigour in the assessment of risk, and an eye for the long term. 
Sadly, where liability insurance is concerned 
- 
where short-termism is doubly 
dangerous 
- 
this rigour has often been lacking. ' 74 
The inherent problems of the liability insurance market have been demonstrated 
already. However, the nature of liability insurance can also make it very difficult for 
insurers to extract themselves from difficulties once they arise, or to modify the 
arrangements that gave rise to the problem in the first place. Employers' liability 
insurance provides a good example. It is universally recognised that benefits to 
insurers, and probably to policyholders and claimants, would accrue if the `causation' 
basis on which this business is written were changed to the modem `claims-made' 
basis. However, abandonment of the old basis, unsatisfactory though it is, would put 
the major employers' liability insurers at a disadvantage. On switching to a new 
system they would still be left with a legacy of long-tail business that would take 
many years to run off. This would make it difficult for them to compete with new 
insurers who entered the market without the same burden of liability under old 
contracts. Major employers' liability insurers are thus locked into an unsatisfactory 
system. This curious bind may help to explain why there has never been sufficient 
will to switch to a claims-made basis, even thought he ABI has investigated the 
possibility on more than one occasion in recent years. Clearly, existing insurers have 
173 
174 
And, of course, because the broker is a distribution channel and not a risk carrier. 
Albert (op cit note 58 pp. 87-8), writing in 1990 noted `... Lloyd's is currently (and 
notoriously) in the throes of a crisis stemming largely from the Names' loss of confidence in 
their agents, too many of whom are apparently underwriting huge, ill-judged risks. Again we 
see the effects of the `fame and finance' syndrome: brokers were only too happy, in the short 
term, to sign any deal, no matter how speculative, in order to take whopping commissions and 
enhance their visibility in the market. Unfortunately for their investors, the long term is about 
to catch up with the high rollers. Lloyd's, like America, faces a bleak day of reckoning in the 
not-too-distant future. ' 
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the most to lose from such a change and, since they have the most influence in the 
market, no change has taken place. 1 75 Furthermore, the need to run off old risks 
means that liability insurers cannot simply `cut and run' 
- 
in the sense of cutting their 
losses and making a clean and speedy exit from the market. This may partly explain 
why many liability insurers persist in writing a class of business that is acknowledged 
to be highly unsatisfactory in business terms. This general issue 
- 
the rationale for 
writing liability business in the present state of the market 
- 
is discussed in the final 
part of this essay. 
4.5 JURISPRUDENTIAL HAZARD 
Finally, we turn to what has been styled jurisprudential hazard. Here we are 
concerned with the extent to which lawmakers, including the judiciary and Parliament 
in the UK, are likely to be influenced in the application, modification or expansion of 
liability rules by the existence of liability insurance, either in a particular case, or by 
the general availability of such insurance. We have already raised the question of 
moral hazard in legal and political processes; the possibility that judges, or our 
Parliamentary representatives, might adopt policies that tap insurance funds in order 
to avoid the public censure that alternative, and more efficient, solutions might 
generate. One does not wish to impugn the integrity of our lawmakers. However, 
when they face difficult fund-raising problems, liability insurance must often present 
them with an appealing and convenient line of least resistance. 176 
In any event, if, for whatever reason, the existence of insurance affects judicial or 
legislative policy in ways that are unpredictable, liability insurance portfolios will 
become subject to an extra layer of uncertainty that is unique in insurance generally. 
Besides all the other risks that insurers face, including the primary `insurance risk' of 
accidents, investment and other financial risks, there will be potential for a shift in the 
175 
176 
See The Cure pp. 38-42. 
The possible `privatisation' of the Industrial Injuries Scheme, which has been on the agenda 
for some time now, may be a case in point. It is doubtful whether a privately-insured 
alternative could operate as economically as the IIS, which has an expense ratio of only 11%, 
but this has not deterred those who wish to relieve the Government of its burden. See The 
Cure pp. 16-17. 
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underlying probabilities upon which insurance premiums are based. This shift, the 
product of legal uncertainty, would be very difficult for underwriters accommodate. 
In fact, this whole issue can best be addressed by examining the wider relationship 
between liability insurance and the law. How does liability insurance affect the extent 
and shape of liability rules, and how should it affect them? This is considered in the 
next part of the essay. 
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5 LIABILITY INSURANCE AND THE LAW 
The main subject matter of this part of the essay is the relationship between liability 
insurance and tort law. It considers, especially, the extent to which the former 
influences the latter, and the extent to which it should properly do so. The boundaries 
of the discussion can be marked out by reference to two extreme views. 
The first view holds that liability insurance has, and should have, very little to do with 
the shape and reach of the law. Deterrence and retribution are seen as the prime 
functions of tort law and the provision of compensation as secondary. According to 
this perspective, the content of liability rules should be governed largely, if not 
wholly, by ideological considerations that involve moral and political judgements. 
Insurance can have little part to play in the formation of such judgements. It is merely 
a commercial practice, deriving from the fact of tort liability, that moulds itself, like 
plasticine, to the contours of the law without affecting its shape. 
The second view, at the opposite pole, places insurance and insurability at the heart of 
the tort system. Or, rather, it views tort merely as a mechanism within insurance 
systems. The function of these insurance systems is to provide people with 
compensation in a way that is effective and consistent with certain other criteria, such 
as minimisation, or optimisation, of accident levels. The driving force is economic 
efficiency. Under this construction, tort law becomes little more than a mechanism 
for providing people with insurance, or distributing compensation through insurance. 
Accordingly, it is tort law that should be moulded to comply with the shape and 
structure of best insurance practice. For example, it should be structured so as to 
impose liability on `the best insurer' 
- 
the party that is able to secure insurance in the 
most efficient and economical way. It should also operate in a way that is consistent 
with insurance principles and should not, for example, force people to `buy insurance' 
against risks that, given a free choice, they would not choose to insure against. 
According to this second interpretation the basis of tort law is itself primarily 
economic, and its aim is the optimum allocation of resources. Moral and political 
judgements become of secondary importance. Stapleton points out that acceptance of 
the latter propositions 
- 
of what she calls the `realities of insurance' argument - must 
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lead inexorably to a call for the retrenchment of tort liability. 177 For example, 
consistency with sound insurance principles requires that tort defendants should not 
have to pay damages for non-economic loss, such as pain and suffering, on the basis 
that people generally do not choose to buy first party insurance for such losses -a 
point that has been touched upon already. 178 
Few commentators accept, without reservation, either of the arguments set out above. 
For most, the truth about the relationship between insurance and tort law lies 
somewhere in between. They see many linkages between tort law and insurance 
practice, but only limited influence of the latter on the former. In this context a useful 
distinction can be made between the development of the law by courts and judges, 
where evidence of the influence of insurance is somewhat ambiguous, and 
development via legislation, where the influence of insurance and insurers is rather 
more clear. The author explores the subject on the basis of this distinction. However, 
we should also note that `tort' is not a single, coherent body of rules governed by 
universal principles. 179 It is something of a rag-bag, as a study of its history shows. 
Since tort law lacks uniformity any search for the `true relationship' between tort and 
insurance is almost bound to fail, because the relationship will inevitably vary in 
different branches of tort law and in different fields of application. In some areas, 
such as work-place risk, the `realities of insurance' are very plain to see. For 
example, in many countries, though not the UK, insurance has not just influenced tort 
law but actually displaced it. Thus, in countries such as Germany the tort liability of 
the employer has been abolished180 in favour or an exclusive remedy workers' 
compensation insurance system. Here, `insurance' has not just moulded tort liability 
but unceremoniously dumped it! 181 In other areas, such as product liability, the traces 
177 
178 
179 
180 
181 
Op cit note 139 at 820. 
See Section 4.2. 
Hence the preference of many writers for the appellation (law of) `torts', not `tort'. 
In fact, the tort liability of the employer has not been entirely extinguished: employees can still 
sue, for example, in cases of intent. 
Of course, tort can always bite back. Exclusive remedy workers' compensation systems tend 
to encourage product liability claims by injured workers and, worldwide, employers' liability 
appears to be in the ascendant once more: see European Perspective pp. 221-223. 
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of insurance influence are present but rather more faint, ' 82 and in others, such as the 
deliberate torts, they are virtually non-existent. 
As suggested above, we can best explore the subject by making a distinction between 
the influence of insurance in the courts and the influence of insurance on legislation, 
even though there will be some occasions when the two are not easily separated. 
5.1 LIABILITY INSURANCE AND THE COURTS 
Beginning with the courts, a number of connected questions must be addressed. First, 
will the knowledge that a particular (alleged) tortfeasor has liability insurance, or is 
very likely to have such insurance, increase the possibility that a court will find 
against him or award a higher amount in damages - and should it do so? Second, has 
the general availability, or otherwise, of liability insurance had an impact on judicial 
policy that has significantly affected the shape and structure of tort law? Again, 
should it have such an impact? Third, do the courts pay any attention to the efficiency 
of insurance arrangements by, for example, promoting legal structures that are likely 
to exploit or encourage one sort of insurance rather than another? 
As far as the first question is concerned the answer should be in the negative, because 
a court (at least in the UK) is required, in theory, to ignore the existence of insurance 
when determining liability and fixing damages in any particular case. 183 In fact, this 
rule has not always have been followed to the letter and the extent to which judges 
have deviated from it has generated some debate. 184 Stapleton, in a wide-ranging 
182 
183 
184 
Some commentators see the influence of liability insurance in s. 402A of the (US) Second 
Restatement of Torts and in the 1985 European Directive on Product Liability. 
Viscount Simond's pronouncement that when a court determines people's duties 'the fact that 
one of them is insured is to be disregarded' (Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co. Lid 
[1957] AC 555,576-7) is often cited as the locus classicus of this doctrine. 
For example, Clarke notes the case, which came before a Crown Court judge in 1994, of an 82 
year old man who had shot and injured a young intruder who persistently broke into his 
allotment shed. The judge awarded damages to the young victim and, to counter public 
outrage and press criticism, noted (apparently with some amusement) that the old man was 
insured. As Clarke notes: 'What he (the judge) did not know, it seems, is that judges are not 
supposed to know this sort of thing. That is theory; in practice, they often do. ' Clarke, M. 
Policies and perceptions of insurance (1997) p. 284. One might add that the judge was on 
dangerous ground here. A more perceptive press and public would not have been mollified by 
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review of judicial responses to the existence, or otherwise, of liability insurance, ' 85 
argues strongly that courts in the UK, with very few exceptions, have generally 
ignored the insurance factor. The exceptions she cites 
- 
cases where the courts have 
taken insurance considerations into account in determining liability 
- 
are nearly all 
drawn from the Denning era, and include many judgements of Lord Denning himself, 
whom many would regard as a maverick. However, it cannot be said that insurance 
considerations have had no effect whatever on decisions in particular cases. The 
number of exceptions quoted by Stapleton is uncomfortably high - perhaps too high 
to prove the rule 
- 
and other writers, particularly in jurisdictions outside the UK, have 
identified many more. 186 Furthermore, in some jurisdictions the right of a court to 
take insurance into account in particular cases is explicitly recognised. For example, 
in Sweden and the Netherlands courts have the power to consider the economic 
circumstances of the parties when fixing damages, but no mitigation is permitted if 
the defendant is covered by liability insurance. 187 Nevertheless, the actual existence 
of liability insurance in a particular case clearly cannot have more than a very 
marginal influence on its outcome. As Stapleton observes: `... it would seem 
morally incoherent for the liability insurance factor to have any independent force, for 
it would mean that there would be cases, for example, in which the fact that tipped the 
balance in favour of the defendant being held liable would simply be that he had or 
could have had liability insurance cover, while an equally culpable but uninsured or 
uninsurable actor would escape. ' This point can be illustrated by reference to 
deliberately inflicted injuries. These are, of course, actionable in tort but generally 
uninsurable as liability risks. It would indeed by curious if the law allowed negligent 
(or indeed non-negligent) drivers to be sued in tort for the injuries they inflicted but 
not murderers or perpetrators of a deliberate assault. It could be argued that, in 
practice, the `insurance factor' does prevent the latter being sued in most cases. But it 
185 
186 
187 
the judge's explanation, since they would have realised that the damages that he awarded were 
coming out of their own insurance premiums, and not the old man's pocket. 
Op cit note 139. 
See, for example, Gill, M., `The expansion of liability and the role of insurance 
- 
who's the 
chicken' International Journal of Insurance Law (1999) Part 1, pp. 27-40 for a general 
discussion of the topic. 
See Pfennigstorf, W. with Gifford, D. G. A Comparative Study of Liability Law and 
Compensation Schemes in Ten Countries and the United States (1991) Insurance Research 
Council, pp. 64-5. 
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does not do so in all cases, '88 and it would be an affront to society if the right to sue 
was removed by the absence of insurance, even though the value of that right may be 
largely symbolic. 
Moving on to the second question 
- 
the general effect of insurance considerations on 
judicial and legislative policy 
- 
there is no doubt that the general availability, or 
otherwise, of insurance has played at least some part in shaping the law. Stapleton 
suggests that the influence has been very limited and, in support of her argument, 
looks at some key areas where insurance is generally regarded to have been an 
influential factor. One such area is pure economic loss where, with relatively few 
exceptions, English tort law does not impose liability on the defendant. The classic 
example is the `disruption of utilities' case (e. g. interruption of business through the 
negligent severing of a supply cable by a defendant contractor). Here the law permits 
recovery only by those parties who have suffered physical damage: those who suffer 
economic loss only are denied a claim, under English law at least. ' 89 This rule can be 
readily explained by reference to the near impossibility of insuring the risk of such 
pure economic losses as a liability exposure, because of the potential for accumulation 
of risk, together with the reasonable possibility of the injured party protecting himself 
via first-party insurance, 190 or simply retaining the risk. Stapleton, however, prefers 
to explain the rule on the grounds of indeterminacy of liability, saying that the rule 
exists simply because it is `unfair' to impose liability on defendants who cannot 
quantify the risk in advance. With respect, it can be argued that tort liability is 
frequently indeterminate to a greater or lesser degree and, for that matter, is frequently 
`unfair' for other reasons, for example when liability is strict. In the cases under 
discussion the key and unique factor is the potential for multiplication of claims. 
Surely, it is `unfair' to impose liability here only because insurance is not available to 
cover such losses. We do not regard it as `unfair' that a motorist should be required 
to pay £9.4 million damages191 to a disabled victim with exceptionally high earning 
capacity or as much as £100 million for a train crash that he has caused through 
188 
189 
190 
191 
For example, the case of Peter Sutcliffe the ` Yorkshire Ripper'. 
But not in some other jurisdictions, including Italy and the Netherlands. 
Business interruption policies can be extended to include the risk of disruption of utilities. 
A record sum recently awarded to a Dutch student who was disabled in a motor accident in the 
UK and which was, of course, met by the tortfeasor's motor insurers. 
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momentary inattention. 192 However, we would almost certainly do so if insurance 
were not available to cover the risk. 
Of course, pure economic loss is an area where, at one time, the law appeared to be 
undergoing rapid development, along with a general expansion in the duty of care in 
negligence. In support of Stapleton, we can note that there is little evidence that this 
was driven by the `realities of insurance'. 193 For example, the high water mark of this 
expansion was reached in 1982 with Junior Books, 194 which appeared to impose 
liability for pure economic loss in tort well outside the boundaries of the established 
Hedley Byrne rule. The decision imposed liability upon a firm of contractors that 
would not have been covered by their liability insurance at the time, since cover for 
pure economic loss was never provided under public (general) and product liability 
insurances. 195 In fact, following decisions such as this, a market for what became 
known as `financial loss cover' did develop in the UK in response, but in this case 
insurance was clearly a resultant egg rather than a productive chicken. Furthermore, it 
is unlikely that the subsequent retrenchment of the law in the so-called `retreat from 
Anns' was greatly influenced by insurance unavailability for, by this time, capacity for 
financial loss cover had been built in the market. 196 
Another area, examined by Stapleton and various other writers, is vicarious liability. 
This doctrine has sometimes been explained by reference to insurance and, in 
particular, the relative efficiency of different insurance arrangements. Thus, in the 
domain where vicarious liability is most prominent, the employer is seen a `better 
insurer' than the employee in respect of whose tort he becomes vicariously liable. 
The former is better placed to arrange insurance and better able to distribute the cost 
of accidents amongst clients and consumers, by incorporating insurance costs in the 
price of goods and services. Stapleton attacks this thesis by pointing out that the 
`insurance' rationalisation of vicarious liability does not explain why the principle is 
192 
193 
194 
195 
The bill for the recent Selby train crash, apparently caused by a motorist who fell asleep at the 
wheel, is likely to be in this region. See note 271 for a further discussion of this case. 
See also Clarke op cit note 160, page 277. 
Junior Books Co. v. The Veitchi Co [1983] AC 520. 
Of course, cover has always been available for professional firms, under professional 
indemnity (PI) policies. 
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restricted largely to torts committed in the course of employment and does not extend 
to other relationships, such as parents of children and occupiers of land. However, 
there is an insurance rationalisation here, at least for the lack of vicarious liability in 
the parent-child relationship. The absence of vicarious liability does not in fact force 
children 
- 
`inefficient insurers' 
- 
to buy liability cover because liability for children's 
torts can be easily met by insurance arranged and paid for by the parent. Thus, private 
liability insurance, generally part of a home insurance package, always extends to 
children and other members of the insured's family who live at home. There is no 
need for vicarious liability to achieve the desired effect of placing the risk with the 
parent 
- 
the `better insurer' 
- 
because maternal or paternal love will secure this: few 
parents would attempt to exclude children from their policies in order to get cheaper 
cover. On the other hand, employers tend to be rather less protective where their 
employees are concerned: not all firms would want to buy liability insurance for their 
staff if vicarious liability did not compel them to do so. In any case, children are at 
best a fairly marginal case. There is a much larger category that is readily explicable 
in terms of insurance and insurability 
- 
that of principal and contractor. Here, subject 
to a few exceptions, the law does not hold the former liable for the torts of the latter. 
This absence of vicarious liability is difficult to justify on moral or ideological 
grounds. Theories based on an assumption that a lower degree of control is exercised 
in the principal/contractor relationship than in the employer/employee relationship 
hardly stand up in the light of modern working relationships. Nowadays a principal 
often has a far greater degree of control over his (nominally independent) contractor 
than an employer has over his (nominally dependent) employees. However, absence 
of vicarious liability is eminently explicable in terms of insurance. Imposing 
vicarious liability on the principal would often require him to effect a special 
insurance whenever he engaged a contractor to do some work. The risks associated 
with each particular contract would have to be assessed and underwritten separately, 
but would often be outside the principal's own sphere of knowledge. Furthermore, in 
most cases the risks associated with the contracted work would be entirely different 
from those of the principal's own regular occupation or business, and could not be 
predicted when insurance for the latter was first effected. Thus, for example, an 
196 It must be conceded that these so-called ` financial loss' covers were, and remain, rather 
narrow, with high deductibles and a variety of exclusions. 
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ordinary householder would have to arrange cover individually in respect of the 
builders who constructed a small extension for him, the tree surgeon who lopped his 
trees, and so forth. It would not be possible to write all possible risks of this sort into 
the householder's own home insurance, because the range and variety of services that 
might be provided to him is simply too great. In any case, imposing vicarious liability 
on the principal would not relieve the builder of the need to insure liability risks, 
because he would still require cover for accidents not connected with any particular 
contract, such as those that might happen in or about his own premises. Vicarious 
liability would thus lead to needless duplication of insurance and militate against 
precise risk assessment. Clearly, it is much more efficient for all risks associated with 
his activities to be carried by the builder or the tree surgeon himself. These risks can 
be insured under one continuing liability insurance contract, covering one type of 
work or activity, underwritten only once and on the basis of information well within 
the contractor's own knowledge. In short, the contractor is a `better insurer' than the 
principal by a country mile. 197 
It must be conceded at this point that attempts to frame the law in such a way as to 
place the risk of loss on the most `efficient' insurer can often be fraught with 
difficulty, and judges who proceed on this basis might soon find themselves in very 
deep water. Common and fairly basic assumptions about insurance efficiency often 
turn out to be less straightforward than might first appear. For example, it is often 
suggested that the law should favour first party over third party insurance (because it 
is thought to be cheaper and more efficient), should seek to avoid multiplication and 
duplication of insurance and should spread losses over as few insurers as possible. 
However, many complexities arise when one attempts to apply these apparently 
197 Of course, principal and contractor are often in a position to bargain, allowing the parties to 
allocate risks as they please, regardless of whether vicarious liability is imposed by the 
Common Law. However, the bargaining position of the principal, such as the householder 
mentioned above, may be weak, or he may simply lack information about the risks involved, in 
which case vicarious liability could put him in an extremely vulnerable position. It is also 
worth noting that insurance considerations often lead contracting parties to exclude tort 
liability altogether and to substitute first party insurance for liability insurance as a risk 
spreading mechanism. Thus, it is common for building contracts to stipulate that neither party 
shall be liable to the other for any damage to the contract works; e. g. buildings under 
construction, materials on site etc. Instead, the parties insure this property in joint names 
under a material damage insurance (fire and `perils' or contractors 6 all risks'). 
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simple precepts. This can be seen in the case of bailees, such as warehouse keepers 
who have temporary charge of goods belonging to a number of clients. A rule of law 
that exempted the bailee from liability and placed the risk on the owners of the bailed 
goods might be simultaneously attacked on the grounds that it encouraged 
multiplication of first party insurances and defended on the basis it that removed the 
need for the bailee to secure liability insurance. However, neither argument is strong, 
because the owners of the goods would probably buy first party insurance in any case 
(to cover losses that occur when the goods are in their own hands) and the bailor 
would probably secure liability insurance in any event (to cover liability to persons 
other than customers). Equally, placing the risk wholly or partly on the warehouse 
keeper would probably make no difference to the number and types of insurance 
required. 198 Arguments on the relative efficiency of alternative insurance 
arrangements in terms of their transaction costs are likely to be equally inconclusive. 
Would a large loss be more cheaply spread over a number of first party insurers (those 
of the bailees) or a single liability insurer (that of the bailor)? Comparing transaction 
costs is very difficult and, as Clarke suggests when discussing this problem in the 
context of carriage by sea, the argument between relative efficiency of first party and 
third-party insurance in this regard is far from having been resolved. 199 
In fact, conclusions about the proper shape and scope of legal rules based on the 
relative efficiency of first party and liability insurance are often questionable, because 
these two forms of insurance are essentially different in nature and function. They are 
rarely simply alternatives. 
200 To add to these difficulties, there is a yet another 
complication: however rules of law are framed, the commercial practice of insurers 
may change their effect or even render them irrelevant. For example, in 1877 an 
English court was asked to rule on a case201 involving merchants (Rodocanachi) who 
had deposited grain which was their property at a granary owned by wharfingers 
199 
199 
200 
201 
In fact, it is quite likely that the bailee and each of the bailors will have both first party and 
liability insurance. 
Op cit note 160 page 292. 
Liability insurance cover is narrower in one sense, in that it responds only to damage for 
which the insured is legally responsible, but often wider in another, since the physical means 
by which the damage is caused is usually unrestricted. See also Stapleton op cit note 139 at p. 
831. 
North British and Mercantile Insurance Co. v. London, Liverpool and Globe Insurance Co. 
(1877) 5 Ch. D. 569 the `King and Queen Granaries' case. 
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(Barnett). The wharfingers, as bailees, had insured the grain, for which they were 
strictly liable by custom of trade. The owners too had insured. The wharfingers' 
insurers paid a claim following damage to the grain by fire and sought to recover a 
contribution from the owners' insurers. Recovery was denied on the grounds that the 
interests insured by the two policies (that of a bailee and that of an owner) were 
different. The wharfingers, as bailees, were liable in law for the loss and their 
insurers were required to bear it in full. The law as it appears from the case, strict 
liability on the part of bailees supported by a denial of contribution rights to their 
insurers, looks quite sound in terms of `insurance efficiency'. However, all is not as it 
seems because, following the case, fire insurers agreed amongst themselves to simply 
ignore the decision and allow contribution between insurers in any event, thus 
spreading losses of this sort between two, or perhaps amongst many, insurance 
offices. 202 Agreements of this sort, whereby insurers nullify rules of law or change 
their practical effect, are extremely common. Thus, for example, tort law would 
generally require the driver of a car to fully compensate the owner of a lamp standard 
with which he negligently collides 
- 
on the basis that fault is unlikely to lie with the 
owner of lamp-post. However, insurers have agreed amongst themselves that in cases 
such as this one-quarter of the cost should be spread amongst the providers of street 
furniture, whose property insurers will generally meet that portion of the loss. Again, 
if motorists A and B collide, injuring C, tort law allocates C's compensation to A and 
B according to their respective degree of fault, whereas the motor insurers will simply 
divide the cost fifty-fifty, unless it is very large. Yet again, if A borrows B's car and 
negligently injures C, the law requires the motor insurers of A and B to share the cost, 
assuming that each covers A's liability, whereas insurers themselves have decided 
that B's insurers alone should pay in such a case. 203 
The simple point here is that legal rules that are framed with a view to bringing about 
a particular pattern of insurance, loss allocation and risk spreading may not always 
achieve the effect intended, because insurers have considerable power to dictate 
patterns that they regard as efficient. Of course, both insurers and their clients have a 
strong interest in `efficient' insurance. So, provided the decisions taken by insurers in 
202 
203 
Via an agreement between members of the Fire Offices Committee. 
See Lewis, op cit note 138 for a discussion of some other agreements of this type. 
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exercise of this power reflect commercial needs and commercial reality - and not 
merely self-interest - all should be well. 
5.2 LIABILITY INSURANCE AND LEGISLATION 
As suggested earlier, the influence of insurance in the framing of legislation is rather 
more important, or at least more obvious, than its influence in the courts. Of course, 
Parliament, Government ministries and reforming bodies such as the Law 
Commission are far better placed to take a considered, strategic view of insurance 
matters than the courts, where issues of law arise at random, time is limited and 
knowledge of insurance is often hazy. In turn, the insurance industry is quite well 
placed to influence Parliament, through representative bodies such as the Association 
of British Insurers and through individual members with insurance interests, in the 
framing of legislation that might impact upon insurance markets. 204 Evidence of the 
lobbying power of the insurance industry is seen clearly in the shape of the regulatory 
framework within which it operates. Here, the Government has often been persuaded 
to accept self-regulation in lieu of statutory control and, in some cases, to grant 
exemption from general legislation that would otherwise apply. 
205 Again, 
Government ministers, the Law Commission and various other bodies regularly 
consult the insurance industry about the effect of their proposals on the cost and 
availability of insurance. As a result, statutory liability is often limited to a figure that 
reflects the availability of liability insurance cover. 206 This pattern is repeated outside 
the UK where, for example, the Dutch civil code specifically provides for the 
imposition, by regulation, of limits on recoverable damages reflecting the limited 
availability of insurance coverage. The influence of insurance is also seen in some 
legislation of a much more general kind. A notable example is the Unfair Contract 
204 
205 
206 
See Clarke op cit note 160 at p. 281. He notes that in the Register of Members' Interests for 
1997 one member in ten declared financial links with the insurance industry. 
Including, of course, the controversial exemption of insurance contracts from the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977. 
Clarke (op cit note 160 at pp. 281-282) notes that the Hague Rules on the carriage of goods by 
sea provide a clear example of the influence of insurance. Where legislation relates directly to 
insurance the influence of the industry, and its practices, are even more obvious, as one would 
expect. Thus, for example, the very low minimum figure set in 1998 for compulsory 
employers' liability insurance (£5 million in respect of any one occurrence) was a concession 
to the (re)insurance industry's concerns following the massive accumulation of claims arising 
from the Piper Alpha disaster: see How Secure is the System pp. 115-17 for a discussion. 
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Terms Act 1977, by virtue of which the ability of contracting parties to protect 
themselves by insurance is a factor which the court must take into account in 
considering the `reasonableness' of contract terms purporting to restrict or shift 
liability. 207 
Legislation of the sort discussed so far does not mark any expansion in liability law 
and should not give rise to any concern on the part of insurers. However, the 
availability of insurance has on occasion influenced Parliament in its decisions to 
amplify tort liability. For example, it has been suggested that the Law Reform 
(Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, by virtue of which negligence on the part of the 
claimant ceased to be a complete defence, secured the necessary support in Parliament 
partly as a consequence of the spread in use of liability insurance. 208 Even more 
obviously, the Law Reform (Husband and Wife) Act 1962, which abolished the 
Common Law rule that prevented one spouse suing another in tort, was clearly 
posited on the fact that the negligent spouse would be able to recover from a motor or 
household (liability) insurer in most cases. Under the Act the court may stay the 
action where no substantial benefit would accrue to either party, a power clearly 
meant to cover situations where no liability insurance exists. 
In summary, it seems likely that the availability of insurance, or its potential 
availability, has encouraged the expansion of liability rules, via the courts and 
Parliament, to a limited degree. However, whether this should properly be regarded 
as a form of `moral hazard' for insurers, and hence a cause of concern for them, is a 
different question. Insurance markets can deal with the expansion of liability rules, 
and rising claims, provided that change is progressive and incremental rather than 
sudden and radical, and provided that new rules are imposed prospectively rather than 
retrospectively. Even then, there will always be an element of uncertainty about the 
law in any particular field, but this can be accommodated too, provided the degree of 
uncertainty is not too high. 209 In fact, evidence suggests that changes in the 
207 
208 
209 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 s. 11(4). 
Clarke, op cit note 160 page 283. 
See, generally, Faure, M and Hatlief, T (1998) `Remedies for expanding liability', 18 OJLS. 
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substantive rules of tort law, though potentially problematic, are of less concern to 
liability insurers than current trends in damages. 210 
In any event, the content of liability rules is only one of many factors that determine 
the level of liability insurance claims. For example, it has been estimated that the 
incidence of product liability claims in the US is around fifty times higher than in 
Europe generally: 211 clearly, this massive disparity cannot be explained by reference 
to differences in the tort liability regimes of these two territories. Much of it is 
attributable to other matters, including the limited extent of social insurance provision 
in the US, differences in court structures and procedures for the administration of 
justice and broader cultural and social factors. Studies that focus narrowly on the 
internal working of the tort/liability insurance system by, for example, attempting to 
correlate trends in the expansion or contraction of tort liability with the availability of 
private liability insurance, can certainly be very interesting. 212 However, there is a 
risk that they will draw our attention away from the bigger picture and lead us to 
ignore significant external factors, such as those mentioned above, that may bring 
about an expansion or contraction in the tort/liability insurance system as a whole. In 
particular, it is evident that the tort/liability insurance component of an accident 
compensation regime (e. g. for work injuries) is likely to expand if public provision of 
benefits, through social insurance or otherwise, should contract for any reason. The 
reverse is also true: resort to tort remedies and private insurance will diminish if 
public provision of accident compensation benefits expands. Thus, some of the most 
radical changes in tort law have been brought about by legislation that was not aimed 
primarily at tort reform for its own sake, but at substituting state social security 
payments or benefits provided by semi-public social insurers. In cases such as this 
changes in tort law are a by-product of the whole process, not its raison d'etre. The 
state workers' compensation programmes that are found world-wide provide the best 
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See the results of the author's survey of liability insurers, Section 6.1.1.4. 
Atiyah suggests that the level of claims may be as much as 350 times higher, based on figures 
from the 1970s on the number of product suits filed in the US and UK (Atiyah, P. (1987) `Tort 
law and the alternatives: some Anglo-American comparisons', 198 Duke LJ 1002,1013. 
For example, Davies argues that expansion and contraction in the duty of care in negligence 
has been shaped by the availability of liability insurance, which increased from around 1880 
onwards and contracted after 1984 (Davies, M. (1989) `The end of the affair: duty of care and 
liability insurance' (1989) 9 Legal Studies 67. See also the comments of Stapleton op cit note 
139 on this topic at pp. 827-828. 
98 
illustrations of this phenomenon, along with some more radical schemes, such as 
those that include road traffic injuries, and the celebrated New Zealand accident 
compensation scheme, which virtually abolishes tort liability for personal injury. 
Certainly, considerations as to the availability, cost and efficiency of private insurance 
have played a part in the design and subsequent reform of these systems, but it cannot 
be said these have been the only factors. There are other issues at play and, in 
particular, political considerations as to the proper role of the state in the management 
of a nation's affairs. Broadly speaking, confidence in the ability of the government to 
plan and manage a nation's economy has normally been matched and accompanied by 
confidence in the state's ability to provide for the victims of misfortune through social 
security and other public programmes. This has led, in many cases, to a suppression 
of tort liability and a reduced role for liability insurance. Conversely, scepticism 
about state intervention in economic affairs and increased confidence in market 
mechanism has generally resulted in less ambitious social security schemes, greater 
reluctance to restrict tort liability, more reliance by accident victims on private 
remedies and an amplified role for liability insurance. For, example, the current 
expansion in employers' (tort) liability world wide is more readily attributable to the 
ascendancy of economic liberalism than anything else. It certainly does not flow from 
an increased availability of employers' liability insurance, since insurers now have 
little appetite for this risk. In the light of all this, a study of the relationship between 
the prominence of tort/liability insurance and the political complexion of the 
government in power at any given time might prove more fruitful than one which 
focuses purely on links between tort and insurance. 213 
In the final part of this essay the relationship between social insurance and private 
insurance, and current government attitudes to both, are considered in more detail. 
Other external factors, including public perceptions on accident compensation, are 
also considered. Nevertheless, we can conclude at this stage that there is a need for 
governments and legislators to take full cognisance of insurance considerations in 
213 There is certainly a strong correlation here, with right-wing liberal regimes placing far greater 
reliance on tort remedies and liability insurance than socialist states, where tort is often 
suppressed and liability insurance undeveloped, or even banned, as in the old Soviet Union. 
However, there are also exceptions and anomalies, including the suppression of the injured 
employee's tort remedy in the otherwise tort-litigious US. 
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reforming and developing the law, whatever drives that reform. If they do not, there 
is an even greater risk that legal expansion will be uncontrolled and unpredictable, 
insurance markets will be destabilised and disruption of economic activity will result. 
Finally, we should remember that much new law is now laid down at international 
level, through international treaties or supra-national organisations such as the EU. 
This complicates matters further, because international law that is intended to create 
uniformity sometimes fails to do so, and may differ substantially in its effects from 
one territory to another. For example, new health and safety law enacted at European 
level, intended to harmonise European work-place safety standards, has a much more 
dramatic impact on liability insurance claims in the UK than in Germany. 214 of 
course, insurance is an international business too and, in planning legal reform, a 
government may have less regard for the sensitivities of foreign insurers than those of 
its own domestic insurance industry. For example, the US federal Government might 
have been less ready to enact the `Superfund' legislation if a greater portion of the 
resulting liability insurance claims had rested with domestic insurers and fewer had 
flowed across the Atlantic to Lloyd's and the London market. Governments usually 
see the point of not destroying their own insurance industry, but may show less 
compunction when bankrupting that of another. 
214 Because regulations implementing EU health and safety directives generate civil liability in 
the UK, but not in Germany, where employers are effectively immune from tort claims by 
employees. See International perspective pp. 219-221 and also Parsons, C. `Liability rules, 
compensation systems and safety at work in Europe' Geneva Association, Etudes et Dossiers, 
No. 248, December 2001 pp. 30-33. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
Having traced the evolution of liability insurance up to the present day and explored 
some contemporary problems, what predictions can we make about the future 
development of this class of insurance and of the market that provides it? How will 
developments in tort law and social security systems impact upon liability insurance 
markets and vice versa? And what factors will shape accident compensation systems 
generally and the market for liability insurance in particular? In this concluding part 
of the essay we analyse trends that might provide some answers to these questions. 
To provide a framework for discussion we will examine briefly the stance and 
perceptions of the major stakeholders in accident compensation systems - insurers, 
the government, the public, and the lawmakers. 
6.1 INSURER PERCEPTIONS 
We begin by considering how liability insurers presently view their own function. It 
is interesting to note that academic research into the role of liability insurance has 
rarely, if ever, made use of this rather obvious source of data - the opinions of 
liability risk carriers themselves. 215 To remedy this omission, the author recently 
conducted a survey of UK insurers with a view to establishing their fundamental 
views on liability insurance. The results of the survey provide a point of departure for 
this section. 
6.1.1 The insurer survey 
A questionnaire 216 was sent to all UK insurers that write liability insurance 
business, 217 101 in number at the time of the survey. The insurers ranged from the 
largest UK liability insurer, Royal and SunAlliance Group, with a 1999 gross written 
liability insurance premium of £371 million to marginal participants, some of which 
215 
216 
For example, much academic ink has been spilled over the 1984-86 US `liability insurance 
crisis' in an effort to discover why liability insurers shut up shop for some risks and raised 
rates sky-high for others. Nobody (as far as the author is aware) seems to have taken the rather 
obvious step of asking insurers why they behaved in the way they did. 
See Appendix I for a copy of the questionnaire and analysis of the responses. 
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wrote less than £100,000 in liability business in the same year. The response rate was 
reasonable, replies being received from 52% of the insurers surveyed, including all 
the major oces. 218 The object of the survey was relatively simple. Its aim was to 
establish how insurers view the various types of liability insurance in business terms 
and to identify what they regard as the major problems for the class as a whole. The 
conclusions are briefly summarised below. A more detailed analysis is contained in 
Appendix I. 
6.1.1.1 Liability insurance is unpopular with insurers 
It has always been known, or at least suspected, that insurers do not favour liability 
insurance. What is surprising is the vehemence with which respondents reinforced 
this thesis. When asked to comment on the general attractiveness of liability 
insurance in business terms, only 14% of respondents regarded liability insurance as 
`attractive' in its own right and none regarded it as `very attractive'. The majority 
(53%) regarded liability business as `unattractive', 14% rated in `very unattractive' 
and the remaining 19% rated liability insurance as `average' in terms of its appeal. 
No major insurer featured in the small group that described liability business as 
`attractive', with the exception of one office specialising in directors' and officers' 
(D&O) liability insurance and associated lines. 219 We should also emphasise that all 
the respondent companies were active underwriters of liability insurance to some 
degree 
- 
if the survey had included all general insurers, including those that choose 
not to write liability business at all, this negative stance would surely have been even 
more marked. 
6.1.1.2 Liability insurance is accommodation business 
The answers to a connected question 
- 
why do insurers write liability business 
- 
drew 
a predicable response, 35 % of respondents writing liability business only in order to 
217 
218 
219 
Excluding Lloyd's. 
As noted above, the survey included quite a large number of marginal players from whom, 
perhaps understandably, the response rate was rather lower. 
Chubb Insurance (Europe). 
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support other business and 45% writing it mainly in order to so. The point here is that 
insurers are often asked to quote for the whole of a client's insurance business, 
particularly for small and medium size risks, where `package' policies are issued or, at 
least, brokers feel that the involvement of several insurers is not worthwhile. Thus, 
insurers are often obliged to quote for liability insurance if they are to get any business 
at all from the source in question. In the case of larger exposures the risk is usually 
divided amongst a number of primary insurers. However, the power of large 
international insurance brokers is such that insurers may still be obliged to take a 
portion of the liability business if they are to gain a slice of that which is more 
attractive. 220 A small number of respondents (10%) stated that they wrote liability 
insurance because they viewed it as attractive in its own right, but none of the major 
offices expressed this opinion. Furthermore, most respondents among this 10% 
qualified their view by noting that only certain lines were attractive, such as D&O and 
general liability. A few offices (10%) gave other reasons for running a liability 
account, the most common being the company's history, in the course of which 
liability insurance had traditionally featured as a core business. 
6.1.1.3 Employers' liability and long-tail lines are least attractive 
Not surprisingly, the survey revealed that the least favoured lines of liability business 
are those most likely to generate late claims. Employers' liability insurance, 
traditionally written on a causation basis, 221 proved to be especially undesirable. Of 
the offices writing employers' liability business, 67% regarded EL as the least 
attractive class and 100% as either the least or second least attractive. Environmental 
Impairment Liability (EIL), a relatively recent and highly specialised line with 
potential for long-tail claims, 222 found no favour with any of the few offices that write 
it, most of which (80%) regarded EIL as even less attractive than employers' liability. 
Relatively speaking, the most appealing class was public (general) liability, regarded 
by 79% of respondents as the most attractive line and by 100% as either the most 
220 
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See Parsons, C. `Consolidation and strategy in the insurance broking sector', Journal of 
European Financial Services, (forthcoming) for a discussion of the current balance of power 
between insurance companies and insurance brokers. 
And, in all probability, necessarily so. `Occurrence' or `claims made' basis EL insurance 
might be illegal 
- 
see The Cure p. 39. 
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attractive or second most attractive. The recent claims experience of the major 
insurers for employers' liability and public liability, summarised in Section 6.1.1.5 
below, lends substance to these opinions. Public liability is, of course, largely short- 
tail business, with the vast majority of claims arising from accidents rather than 
gradual processes. 223 
Insurers were also relatively optimistic about modern lines that are written on a 
claims-made basis, such as directors' and officers' (D&O) liability insurance and, to a 
lesser extent, professional indemnity (PI) insurance. Compared with the number that 
offer employers' liability and public liability insurance, relatively few offices write 
these classes224 but, of those that do, 40% regarded D&O as the most attractive class 
and 28% cited PI as the most attractive. 
Generally, the message is clear. Business that generates late-reported claims is 
generally unattractive to underwriters and employers' liability, with all its inherent 
difficulties, is deeply unattractive, indeed, almost on the margins of insurability. By 
contrast, modern lines of liability business where there is an established practice of 
writing on a claims-made basis, which allows more accurate pricing, are seen as 
reasonably viable. 
6.1.1.4 Major problems 
The survey suggests that the greatest current concern for liability insurers is the 
upward trend in damages for personal injury: 33% of respondents regarded this as 
their main problem and 81% as either the most serious or second most serious 
222 
223 
224 
For this reason EIL is nearly always written on a claims-made basis. 
Most risks with a potential for generating long-tail claims are excluded from public liability 
policies. The only real exception is product liability, which is generally included within this 
class: late claims can arise in connection with some products, most notably pharmaceuticals. 
However, changes in the law relating to liability for psychiatric illness, proposed by the Law 
Commission, could introduce long-tail claims into motor and general liability accounts. See, 
generally, Psychiatric Illness. 
Employers' liability insurance is, of course, compulsory for virtually all businesses and public 
liability, though not compulsory, is essential in practice. Insurers that wish to offer `package' 
insurances for small and medium-sized businesses must therefore write both lines. By 
contrast, relatively few small firms wish to buy D&O insurance and PI cover is required only 
in cases where professional advice or treatment is given for a (separate) fee. 
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difficulty. Long-tail claims were seen as almost equally problematic, being regarded 
as the most serious problem by 42% of respondents and either the most serious, or 
second most serious, by 66% of respondents. The uncertainty of liability rules was 
seen as a rather less pressing concern: only 6% of respondents ranked this as their 
major concern and only 24% as either the most, or second most serious, problem. A 
few respondents identified volatility of liability business as a serious problem. 
Several respondents volunteered the `compensation culture' as a specific difficulty. A 
similar number identified as serious problems inadequate pricing by liability insurers 
in the past, and the difficulty of sustaining adequate insurance rates in a market where 
the naYvety of new entrants led them to under-price the risk. 
6.1.1.5 The market is highly concentrated, and very unprofitable 
In 1999, the latest year for which results are available, 49% of all UK liability 
insurance business was written by just five offices225 and 66% by the top ten. The 
demise of the Independent Insurance Group, third on the list with a 9% share, will 
probably increase this concentration further, since most of Independent's business is 
likely to be absorbed by the large offices, with a very big share going to the market 
leader, RSA. In the case of employers' liability insurance this concentration is greater 
still. 226 
Liability insurance is generally unprofitable. Losses doubled in 1998 with the market 
reporting a collective underwriting loss of nearly £400 million, representing 21% of 
net written premium. There was some improvement in 1999, but an overall claims 
ratio of 84% and an underwriting ratio of 119.4% still represents a trading loss of 
about 5%, allowing for investment income of around 15%. In recent years employers' 
liability has been especially problematic, a 1994 report by Smith New Court 
suggesting that, even allowing for investment income, no major insurer had made any 
profit on this line of business since 1987. Recent results confirm this pattern, most 
major EL insurers reporting claims ratios well in excess of 100%, as shown in the 
225 
226 
Royal and SunAlliance (13%), CGNU (12%), Independent (9%), New Hampshire (UK) 9%, 
(Zurich) Eagle Star 6%. 
Over 50% of EL risks are written by the three top offices and about 70% by the top six. 
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table below. These will translate into huge losses once expenses (about 35% of 
premium income) are added. It is also apparent from the table that the results for 
employers' liability insurance are far worse than those for the other major line, 
general (public) liability insurance. 
Major liability insurers' UK claims experience 1999 
Source: Insurance Intelligence Unit and FSA annual returns 
Company Category Gross earned Claims ratio % 
premiums £ mn. 
Eagle Star (Zurich) Employers' liability 114 115.3 
General liability 26 83.4 
CGNU Employers' liability 111 108.4 
General liability 151 92.2 
Royal and Employers' liability 97 95.7 
SunAlliance General liability 155 83.4 
Iron Trades (QBE) Employers' liability 57 87.7 
General liability 14 81.2 
Independent Employers' liability 46 61.2 * 
General liability 55 35.8 * 
AXA UK Employers' liability 20 116.3 
General liability 70 61.1 
* In the light of Independent's subsequent collapse, these figures are literally incredible. 
It is clear from the points made in this section, and all that has been said previously on 
the subject, that liability insurance cannot work efficiently unless the insurance 
contract is constructed in a way that enables insurers to price the risk with reasonable 
accuracy. For long-tail risks causation-based contracts create levels of uncertainty 
which are intolerable for insurers and which threaten the viability of the whole system 
of which liability insurance forms a part. The position with regard to employers' 
liability insurance is particularly dire. The inherent difficulties of this class have been 
touched on by the author at various points in this essay and analysed elsewhere in 
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more detail. 227 Suffice it to say here that the UK system for compensating work 
injuries is inherently unstable and, in the long term, possibly unsustainable. 
Furthermore, it is completely out of line with systems elsewhere in Europe, making 
the prospect of harmonisation at European level very remote indeed. 228 Nor does the 
employers' liability system, which is so unsatisfactory for insurers, even manage to 
provide complete security for injured employees, as the author has demonstrated 
elsewhere. 229 There is even less cause for optimism now that the Independent 
Insurance Group, the only major insurer to report apparently healthy claims ratios for 
liability business, has gone into liquidation, with its past chairman blaming the 
decision to enter the employers' liability insurance market for the company's 
demise. 230 A major factor in the failure of the company to raise the capital necessary 
to survive was the inability of the group's actuarial consultant, Watson Wyatt, to put a 
figure on the firm's losses through its employers' liability account. Elsewhere the 
author has analysed various possible `cures' for the ailments of the liability insurance 
market and for employers' liability in particular. They include a radical proposal, 
based on the systems operating in Belgium, Portugal and Finland, whereby the risk of 
work-related disease would be removed from the private insurance market and 
retained by the state. This proposal is founded on the author's belief that the state is 
likely to be the most efficient provider of compensation for disease that develops 
slowly and progressively. 231 Indeed, it might be argued by analogy that the state is 
likely to be the best provider of compensation for almost any form of injury or 
227 
228 
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231 
See, generally, The Cure. 
See, generally, European Perspective. 
See, generally, How Secure is the System? 
The Times, Friday June 15 2001. 
The core of the argument is that a very long development period makes it impractical to put 
the burden of compensation on the original causers of the disease. First, because problems of 
causation and proof are likely to make the exercise uncertain and prohibitively expensive and, 
second, because the accompanying private liability insurance mechanisms, which are subject 
to a legal requirement for losses to be funded in advance by the insurer, do not work 
efficiently. Furthermore, there is little deterrent or retributive value in `punishing' a corporate 
entity (if it still exists) for acts committed by its agents many years ago. Taking compensation 
for disease out of the tort/liability insurance system and confining it to state would remove 
most of the costs and inefficiencies of the former. Furthermore, the state would not be 
required to pay `full' compensation and would be free to set benefits at levels which were felt 
to be appropriate and which society could afford. The state (unlike the private insurance 
market) would also be free to fund benefits for disease on a `pay as you go' basis, making 
adjustments in tax or levels of contribution from time to time, as necessary. Funding `long- 
tail' disease claims in this way may result in current contributors having to pay for the unsafe 
working practices of previous generations, but solidarity between the generations is no bad 
thing. 
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damage that is latent or occurs gradually, including, perhaps, gradual pollution 
- 
why 
waste resources chasing ghosts of the past through the tort system? Reform of the 
current system, at least for compensating industrial injuries, is presently being 
considered in discussions between the Government and the insurance industry. 
However, there is little sense of urgency and, if the author has read the situation 
correctly, there is little taste for radical reform at Government level. Government 
perceptions of liability insurance are considered next. 
6.2 GOVERNMENT PERCEPTIONS: LIABILITY INSURANCE, SOCIAL 
SECURITY AND GOVERNMENT POLICY 
The diffidence with which insurers regard liability business is not matched by any 
reticence on the part of recent governments in making use of it. On the contrary, there 
is a steady upward trend in the deployment by governments of private liability 
insurance as a means of extending social security systems. 232 In fact, this is part of 
the current world-wide trend of economic liberalisation, supported by increasing 
confidence in market mechanisms to meet human needs. Governments, almost 
everywhere, are anxious to cut welfare spending. Ideology apart, the desire to trim 
ambitious social security schemes has arisen as a result of demographic factors, with 
ageing populations, rising dependency ratios233 and increasing public demand for 
sophisticated and costly health care. With regard to the latter, there is a growing 
disparity between what is feasible in medical terms and what is financially possible 
via the public purse. In Europe, at least, the trend has been reinforced by specific 
political factors, including the need for Member States with generous social security 
systems to cut public spending in order to meet the convergence criteria for Monetary 
Union and to comply with ongoing public spending constraints to which all Members 
States are pledged. In this climate, it is not surprising that governments should look 
more closely at the relationship between social security systems and private insurance 
mechanisms. This has led, on one hand, to increased emphasis on the use of private 
first party insurance to supplement or replace the public funding of pensions and 
232 
233 
Generally, see Cane, P. Atryah's Accidents, Compensation and the Law, Sixth Edition, (1999) 
pp. 199-208. 
See Liedtke, P. M. (2001) `Driving potential pension solutions' Journal of Insurance 
Research and Practice, Vol. 16, Part 2 p. 40. 
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health care and, on the other hand, to greater scrutiny of the relationship between 
public funding of accident costs, tort rights and private liability insurance. The latter 
is our immediate concern. 
In theory, there should be a logical relationship between the `public' and `private' 
elements of an accident compensation system. Thus, where social security benefits 
are generous, we should expect to find that tort liability for accidents has been cut 
back, to leave only a limited role for liability insurance. Conversely, where social 
insurance benefits are modest, we should anticipate liability laws that are much less 
restrictive, giving liability insurance a much more prominent role. However, this 
pattern is by no means universal: some countries restrict civil liability for injury whilst 
offering only modest social security benefits in return, whereas others combine 
generous social security with unlimited liability. Lack of co-ordination has occurred 
because public and private systems have often developed in parallel, without 
influencing each other significantly. However, in the current economic climate states 
are increasingly reluctant to allow accident victims to accumulate social insurance 
benefits and tort compensation recovered from a person, or the liability insurer of a 
person, who caused the accident. 234 Double recovery of this sort is increasingly 
denied, not just to prevent `unjust enrichment' of the victim but to ensure that public 
funds are used in the most economical way. To achieve this, social insurance benefits 
may simply be deducted from the damages payable by the wrongdoer, without any 
recovery by the social insurer; 23 5 in other cases, the victim may be required to choose 
one remedy or the other. 236 Most common of all, however, is a system of reduction 
plus recovery: i. e. a mechanism whereby the damages claim of the victim is 
extinguished or reduced to the extent of the social insurance payments that he has 
received, and where the social insurer is allowed to recover its outlay, either from the 
wrongdoer or his liability insurer. The recovery, which may be total or partial, can 
take various legal forms - e. g. an independent claim or subrogation to the congruent 
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Again, there are exceptions. For example, some states (including Russia and Cyprus) allow 
the accumulation of tort damages and state workers' compensation benefits. 
Deduction without recovery is a logical solution when the both parts of the system 
- 
private 
and public 
- 
are funded from the same source: for example, where employers that are exposed 
to direct tort claims by employees also fund the public worker's compensation system. 
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claim of the accident victim. Of course, there is a need to keep the costs of recovery 
to a minimum, otherwise the economic benefits of subrogation will be lost. This has 
led to extreme rationalisation in Germany, where subrogation usually takes place 
through collective or `wholesale' settlement agreements between social security 
carriers and liability insurers (Teilungsabkommen, or loss-sharing agreements). 237 
In the UK we have certainly seen a tightening of such recoupment schemes in recent 
years. For example, there has been a progressive extension in the powers of the 
Compensation Recovery Unit (CRU) of the Department of Social Security to recover 
from private liability insurers the value of benefits paid to injured employees under 
the state worker's compensation system (the Industrial Injuries Scheme), when an 
employee succeeds in a tort-based claim against his employer. 238 More recently, the 
CRU has been given enhanced powers to recover from motor insurers the costs 
incurred by public hospitals in treating road accident victims. 239 In future, public 
hospitals may be given a right to recover from wrongdoers, or their insurers, the 
treatment costs of accident victims generally, including people injured at work. 240 As 
suggested above, the UK trend of recoupment of accident costs by the Government is 
mirrored in many other counties. For example, in the Netherlands existing rights of 
redress against injurers and their liability insurers have been extended recentl Y241 and 
further expansion is under discussion. 242 Even Sweden, a country committed by 
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For example, `election' between a damages claim against an employer and workers' 
compensation benefits 
- 
the English system until 1948 
- 
still applies in a number of countries. 
However, the worker's compensation carrier is not always a social insurer. 
i. e. agreements whereby the liability insurer pays an agreed standard percentage of any claim 
reported by the social insurance carrier based on an accident in which one of the liability 
insurer's clients was involved. Payments are made regardless of fault or causation unless the 
claim exceeds an agreed ceiling (e. g. DM30,000) in which case there is a full evaluation of the 
facts and the law. There are, apparently, about 1800 individual wholesale agreements in 
Germany: see Pfennigstorf, W. with Gifford, D. G. op cit note 187 pp. 131-139. 
See the Social Security (Recovery of Benefits) Act 1997. The recoupment powers of the CRU 
are very significant, because the tort liability of employers is highly developed in the UK and 
private employers' liability insurance is compulsory. 
See the Road Traffic (NHS Charges) Act 1999, Road Traffic (NHS Charges) Regulations 
1999, SI 1999 No. 785 and Road Traffic (NHS Charges) Reviews and Appeals Regulations 
1999, SI 1999 No. 786. 
See the Law Commission Consultation Paper 144 Damages for Personal Injury: Medical, 
Nursing and Other Expenses. 
For example, a right of recourse has been introduced for the employer who is forced to pay the 
wages of his employee during his absence through illness or injury (Article 6: 107A BW). 
For example, removal of the restriction on rights of redress where the injurer belongs to the 
same family as the victim (which has parallels in France and Germany) or is an employer or 
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tradition to generous and all-embracing social security provision, the discouraging of 
tort actions and limited use of liability insurance, is rethinking its position. At the 
present time the Swedish Government is actively considering, for the first time, the 
granting of subrogation rights to social insurance carriers and other public bodies. 243 
How much further could this process of switching accident costs from public to 
private sector be taken? For example, could agencies such as the police and fire 
brigades, and inspectorates such as the UK Health and Safety Executive, be given 
powers to recover costs from those who cause the accidents that occasion their 
attendance, and from the liability insurers of the latter? Arguably, this would make 
for a more efficient allocation of resources, even though the liability insurer is 
beginning to look like a tax gatherer once we reach this stage. 
Of course, quite apart from strengthening the recovery rights of their social insurers, 
many governments have, at the same time, actually reduced the scope of social 
insurance programmes that are offered by the state. Some countries, such as the 
Netherlands, have adopted quite radical measures in recent years, completely 
dismantling major elements of their social insurance schemes. 244 Although some 
components of state provision, such as the Industrial Injuries Scheme, have been 
identified as a potential candidate for abolition or `privatisation' 245 there has been no 
such radical change in this country. Instead, the UK Government has generally 
adopted a less drastic and, politically, less contentious option: that is, to avoid major 
structural changes and simply prune back existing social security provision gently and 
progressively, on the assumption that the tort system will automatically take up the 
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colleague of a victim-employee. See Faure, M Hatlief, T (2000) `Social security versus tort 
law as instruments to compensate personal injuries: a Dutch Law and Economics perspective', 
working paper, Maastricht University Faculty of Law, pp. 39-40. 
Address by Goran Skögh to the 9t' Joint Seminar between the International Association for the 
Study of Insurance Economics (the Geneva Association) and the European Association of Law 
and Economics (EALE), Copenhagen, April 6 2001. See also Parsons, C. `Subrogation by 
Social Insurance Carriers under European Law: a Comment on Caisse de Pension des 
Employes Prives v. Kordel and Others' International Journal of Insurance Law, April 2000. 
See Faure, & Hatlief op cit note 242, pp. 21-25 for a description or recent changes in the 
Netherlands. 
The possible abolition of the Industrial Injuries Scheme, the main plank of state provision for 
work-place accidents, has been under discussion since 1994. This would almost certainly 
promote an expansion in the fields of tort liability and employers' liability insurance, unless a 
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slack. Cuts in the Industrial Injuries Scheme, most of which took place in the 1980s, 
provide a good example. 
In sum, it is clear that most governments have, at least for the time being, given up 
any attempt to abolish or radically restrict accident litigation and fill the gap with 
public programmes. In many countries it is the latter that are under threat. The 
atmosphere now is very different from that of the 1970s, when the expansion of social 
security looked a real possibility. For example, writing in 1979 on the evolution of 
the tort of negligence, the legal historian Baker noted: 
... 
a recent report has recommended the retention of actions in tort based in 
negligence or strict liability, but that there should be a shift of emphasis 
towards social security, which should be recognised as the principal means of 
compensation for injuries. It is too early to say whether the recommendations 
will be implemented, but it is difficult to resist Professor Millner's 
conclusion24 that the shadow of its decline has fallen upon the concept of 
negligence in the very moment of its triumph. 9247 
Twenty years on, the report in question 
- 
that of the Pearson Commission 
- 
gathers 
dust, and contemporary accounts of the imminent demise of negligence appear much 
exaggerated. Despite a gentle application of the brakes by the English courts during 
the 1980s, tort law runs on. Recent governments, well aware that liability insurance 
must accompany it, seem happy to make a virtue of that necessity. 
This section has explored what may be loosely described as the `privatisation' of 
social security, i. e. its partial replacement by tort law and private insurance. 
Arguably, this trend is being mirrored, and counter-balanced, by the beginnings of 
another movement - the `socialisation' of tort law. By this we mean a growing public 
perception that tort compensation is not a luxury, not a supplement to public provision 
for misfortune available only in exceptional cases and subject to strict preconditions, 
but an automatic corollary of any injury, however slight and however caused. This is 
considered next. 
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privately-insured workers' compensation scheme were introduced to replace the state 
programme. See, generally, The Cure. 
In Millner, M. A. Negligence in modern law, (1967) p. 234. 
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6.3 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS 
6.3.1 Towards a `compensation culture'? 
There is a very large body of literature on the failings of the tort system. Critics focus 
on three main weaknesses. First, the system is alleged to be ineffective, because only 
a tiny proportion of accident victims actually manages to obtain compensation 
through it. 248 Second, there is inefficiency, shown by long delays and very high 
transaction costs. Third, there is inequity: it is argued that the tort system under- 
compensates those who suffer serious injuries and overcompensates those who suffer 
trivial ones, favours some groups of victims unfairly over others249 and operates 
regressively by paying out more to wealthy claimants. 250 In any case, it is argued, the 
tort system depends on concepts of fault that are fundamentally unsound. 
These deficiencies (which are not confined to the UK and Common Law countries), 
together with the relative generosity of EU social security systems, are traditionally 
cited as reasons for the fairly low level of tort claiming in Europe compared, in 
particular, with the US. However, it has been suggested that the relatively slow 
development of accident litigation in Europe is not attributable solely to a 
combination of defective tort regimes and reasonably effective social security 
systems. A general lack of `claims consciousness' -a lack of awareness of tort rights 
and a reluctance to blame others - has often been cited as an additional, independent, 
factor, particularly in the case of some potential claimants, such as victims of 
unsuccessful medical treatment or of occupational disease. 
25' 
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Baker, J. H. (1979) An introduction to English legal history, Second Edition, Butterworth, pp. 
349-350. 
According to the Pearson Commission only about 10.5% of those suffering `reportable' 
injuries at work receive tort compensation. The figure supplied for accident victims generally 
is lower (about 6.5%) and for road traffic victims rather higher (24%). 
For example, those injured at work and on the road over other accident victims, the employed 
over the self-employed and `accident' over `disease' victims. 
Because wealthy victims take more out of the tort system in damages but do not, generally, 
pay more into it by way of liability insurance premiums. 
In relation to occupational disease Wikeley, op cit note 63 at p. 32. 
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Now, in the last few years there has been a marked expansion in tort claiming for 
many types of harm, in the UK and in many other countries. For example, the number 
of disease claims submitted to UK employers' liability insurers has increased quite 
dramatically in recent years252 and the contribution of (tort) employers' liability 
claims to the aggregate of all industrial injuries' compensation has risen from around 
one-third in the 1980s to over one-half at the present time. 253 Again, the rate of 
claiming for clinical negligence has risen sharply, by around 7% each year in the 
1990s. 254 The trend has been just as dramatic in a number of European countries, 
including Spain, Italy255 and, perhaps most notably, the Netherlands. For example, in 
the last-mentioned country (tort) employers' liability claims were uncommon until 
quite recently and claims for diseases, such as those related to asbestos, were very rare 
indeed. Now a mere trickle has developed into a substantial flow. 256 
Some of this rise in tort claiming can be attributed to substantive changes in tort 
law, 257 some to advances in medical science (e. g. those that have led to a greater 
understanding of the aetiology of occupational diseases) and some to cuts in social 
security programmes. 258 However, it has been suggested in many quarters that there 
has also been change in public perceptions. It is argued there is no longer a lack of 
`claims consciousness' on the part of many accident victims, but the beginnings of the 
exact opposite 
-a `compensation culture', meaning a marked readiness to sue, even 
for trivial injuries and even in the absence of real need. 
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The number of disease claims submitted to employers' liability insurers increased by around 
50% between 1986 and 1993, accounting for 56.6% of all claims in 1993. The level of disease 
claims dropped to 41.3% in 1995 but the contribution of disease claims to total employers' 
liability claims cost remained steady at around 25%. Source: ABI Statistics Bulletin, 
December 1996. 
See How Secure is the System? p. 113 and The Cure pp. 17-18. 
See note 267 and accompanying text. 
See International Perspective p. 222. 
See Faure & Hatlief op cit note 242 pp. 25-27. 
For example, in the case of the Netherlands, a general reversal in 1997 of the burden of proof 
concerning the fault of the employer, (art. 7: 658BW); a reversal by the Dutch Supreme Court 
of the burden of proof in the case of causal uncertainty concerning the precise date of exposure 
to asbestos fibres (Cijsouw v. De Schelde, 25 June 1993, [1993] Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, 
686) and a determination by the same court that there can be no reduction of an employer's 
liability on the grounds of contributory negligence unless there is gross negligence on the part 
of the employee, subsequently interpreted as requiring intent or wilful recklessness by him. 
(Dutch Supreme Court 9 January 1987, [1987] NJ 948,27 March 1992, [1992] NJ 496 and 20 
September 1996, [1997] NJ 198. ) 
Especially in the Netherlands, where the cuts have been most dramatic. See Faure & Hatlief 
op cit note 242 pp. 23-25. 
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`Compensation culture', and the harsher alternative `blame culture', are pejorative 
terms, but it does not follow that a general rise in the level of litigation is necessarily a 
bad thing. The optimum level of tort litigation in any society is very unlikely to be 
nil, and there is no proof that the optimum level has been reached in the UK, let alone 
exceeded. However, the point is that a sharp rise in the propensity of accident victims 
to sue is a destabilising factor in an insurance system, because the added uncertainty 
that it brings makes liability insurance pricing and reserving more difficult. This, in 
turn, may result in a loss of confidence on the part of insurance underwriters and also 
on the part of investors in insurance enterprises that write liability business, leading to 
potential insurability in extreme cases. For this reason the issue of a `compensation 
culture' is important for insurers. But, if there are indeed the beginnings of such a 
culture, then what is the cause? 
Faure and Hatlief, who point out that the Dutch Government has now explicitly 
acknowledged the potential problems of a `compensation culture', 
259 suggest that the 
public frame of mind characterised as the `compensation culture' has developed in the 
Netherlands partly as consequence of cuts in social programmes. They argue that 
victims of misfortune have been led to assume that tort compensation, which now fills 
the enlarged gaps in social security programmes, must be available on the same basis 
as the benefits that have been withdrawn. That is, it should be available as of right, 
without special preconditions and, if necessary, available to fulfil basic needs rather 
than as a `luxury' or a supplement to what the state provides. This seems a plausible 
explanation. However, in the view of the author there may be other factors at play. 
These are discussed in the sections that follow. First, it is argued that the very 
concept of an `accident', in the sense of an incident for which no-one is to blame, has 
narrowed. Second, it is argued that a poor understanding of risk has added to the 
propensity to sue and, third, it is suggested that developments in the administration of 
justice, combined with changes in insurance practice, have helped to disguise the true 
hazards and true costs of litigation. 
259 See Faure & Hatlief op cit note 242 p. 28. The Government document they cite is published 
in Handelingen II, 1998/99,26630 nr. 1. 
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6.3.2 The end of accidents? 
On a number of occasions in this essay we have made the point that liability insurance 
emerged in a rather hap-hazard way, as an incidental by-product of accident 
insurance, which was designed to cover the unfortunate effects of sudden and 
unforeseen mishaps. We have seen how it then grew into a class in its own right and 
came, again by a somewhat random process, to cover risks that were traditionally 
regarded as uninsurable. The term `accident insurance' has now become obsolete 
and, in a curious parallel, the scope of the term `accident', has also been much 
reduced. Indeed, the very concept of an accident, and not just the penumbra of its 
meaning, has become attenuated: it seems to be fast disappearing in a world where 
causes are confidently attributed to every mishap and culpable human agents routinely 
sought for almost every cause. Arguably, as a result, `liability' and `fault' are steadily 
supplanting the notion of `accident' as the main public perspective on misfortune. 
In an interesting study on the attitude of society towards accidents, Green260 suggests 
that `accident' and `accidental' first became meaningful concepts towards the end of 
the seventeenth century. At this time, belief in magic and the divine will 
- 
which left 
little room for accident 
- 
was being steadily replaced by a new scientific 
rationalism 
. 
26 1 This new rationalism was able to account for an increasing number of 
phenomena in terms of material causes that could be explained. Expanding 
knowledge of the physical universe was also accompanied by a new-found confidence 
in the ability of man to control his environment. `Accident' was the name given to a 
marginal, but still fairly large, category of misfortunes lying at the edge of this new 
rational universe. An accident was a mishap for which there was, no doubt, some 
rational explanation, but where such explanation temporarily eluded man's grasp. 
The inscrutable nature of these `accidental' events meant that the law was reluctant to 
impose responsibility for them. Legal responsibility was mainly confined to damage 
260 
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Green, J. (1997) Risk and misfortune: the social construction of accidents, UCL Press. 
Even the greatest scientist of this, or perhaps any age, kept a foot in both camps. The writings 
of Isaac Newton (1642-1727) on alchemy, metaphysics and religion far exceed his `scientific' 
works in volume. See, for example, White, M. Isaac Newton: the last sorcerer (1999) Helix 
books. 
116 
or injury that was caused deliberately. 262 However, with the advance of scientific 
knowledge in the nineteenth century the marginal category of accidents diminished in 
scope, more mishaps became attributable to human failings263 and, as a corollary, the 
concept of negligence as a basis of liability developed and broadened. Now, at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, public confidence in the ability of science to 
establish the causes of things and to control events is almost unlimited. Whilst 
scientists themselves often observe that the world becomes ever more mysterious as 
knowledge advances, there is a popular perception that `science' can account for 
everything. It is submitted that, a result, victims of misfortune are now simply less 
willing to accept that circumstances might exist where no human actor is to blame for 
the harm that has befallen them. 
This problem, if it is accepted as such, is compounded by the fact that the public 
generally have a rather poor understanding of the concept of risk: unlike the concept 
of return, which is well understood. Risk is an area where there has been no real 
public debate (something that is long overdue), no structured education for the vast 
majority and no serious attempt to disseminate in a digestible form the wealth of 
information that is available. Very little is done to systematically counterbalance the 
(quite understandable) tendency of much of the media to sensationalise and 
exaggerate what are often quite trivial threats to public health and safety. The odd 
truism has become lodged in public consciousness (e. g. `aircraft provide the safest 
form of transport') but otherwise most people have only a weak grasp of the relative 
dimensions of different risks, the relationship between one risk and another and, in 
particular, the costs involved in eliminating risk. The recent Hatfield rail crash 
provides an illuminating case study. After a crash caused by a broken rail 
- 
an 
accident of a very rare type264 
- 
most of the travelling public accepted as inevitable 
the `need' to virtually shut down large parts of the rail system for several months in 
order to `eliminate' the risk in question. As is well known, the effect of the 
intolerable rail delays that ensued was to decant huge numbers of frustrated travellers 
262 
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264 
With certain exceptions, including actions on the case for negligence and the curious concept 
of deodand, whereby the owner was required to forfeit any instrument that caused death. 
Of course, industrialisation also meant that more and more injuries arose from dangers that 
were clearly man-made. 
There had been only one accident arising from a broken rail in the previous 40 years. 
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onto the roads, where the risk of death or injury is far higher than on even the most 
poorly maintained railway. The rational alternative 
- 
to run trains at normal speed 
while the checking and repair work was done, leaving people to judge for themselves 
the relative risks of rail and road travel 
- 
would certainly have saved many lives. 
However, this solution was not even contemplated by the rail companies or the 
Government. The rail companies feared potential liability265 and both the rail 
companies and the Government feared damaging accusations of callousness. Both 
judged, no doubt correctly, that most of the public would not have accepted or even 
understood such a solution. As a result of all this the risk was not `managed' at all - 
it was simply shifted to thousands of individual unidentified motorists and, in the 
process, augmented. 
Examples of this phenomenon 
- 
poor perception of risk, leading to unrealistic 
demands for its elimination on pain of liability and compensation 
- 
are quite abundant 
in modem society. The UK health service is a case in point. On the one hand there is 
public demand for the deployment of the most advanced forms of medicine wherever 
there is need, often regardless of cost. 266 On the other hand, there is pressure for 
compensation when treatment fails, again regardless of the effects that such 
compensation payments might have on the provision of the very services that are 
desired. Thus, at the time of writing, there is considerable concern about the threat to 
National Health Service posed by outstanding medical negligence claims for which, 
according to some estimates, provisions in the region of £4 billion are now 
required. 267 Furthermore, many commentators believe that fear of legal action has 
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Since they now had ` guilty knowledge' of defective rails. 
Denial of expensive treatment to virtually hopeless cases on grounds of cost is invariably 
greeted by public outrage, usually fomented by the popular press. 
A recent report by the National Audit Office, Handling clinical negligence claims in England, 
HC 403,3 May 2001, suggests that at 31 March 2000 provisions to meet likely settlements for 
up to 23,000 outstanding medical negligence claims were £2.6 billion, double the figure for 
1996-7. In addition, the NAO estimates that a further £1.3 billion will be required to meet 
probable claims arising from incidents that have occurred but not been reported. They also 
report that the rate of claims per thousand finished consultant episodes rose by 72% between 
1990 and 1998. Academic researchers at Nottingham Business School (Fenn, P. T., Diacon, 
S. R., & Gray, A. (2000) `The current cost of medical negligence in NHS hospitals: analysis of 
claims database', British Medical Journal, 320,7249, pp. 1567-1571) described an earlier 
Auditor General's figure of £2.8 billion for outstanding claims as `deeply misleading', 
pointing out that most claimants will receive nothing and that payments to those who are 
successful will spread out over many years. Nevertheless, these authors concede that the rate 
of claims rose sharply during the 1990s, at a rate of about 7% per annum. If one accepts that 
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contributed to a cult of secrecy in the NHS, which serves only to fuel the suspicions of 
patients who suffer `adverse health care events'268 in the course of clinical treatment. 
Of course, this is likely to result in yet more litigation and a further closing of the 
ranks in the medical profession. Perhaps a vicious circle of this sort can only be 
broken if, in exchange for greater candour by the medical profession, the public is 
prepared to shoulder more risk, including that which derives from non-culpable errors 
of judgement. 269 Unfortunately, the prospects for such a trade-off are not very 
encouraging. As we have suggested, poor understanding of risk often leads to an 
unwarranted assumption that it can always be eliminated if proper care is taken, 
coupled with a disregard for the harmful consequences that the high cost of 
eliminating risk in one sphere might generate elsewhere. 
Perhaps, then, the `compensation culture', is not simply the mark of a society that is 
more acquisitive, more Americanised270 and less well supported by the state, but also 
the product of a culture in which there has been little attempt to promote a 
sophisticated understanding of risk. Ironically, popular awareness of the new 
`science' of risk management may actually be reinforcing this pattern at the present 
time, by making the notion of a pure accident appear redundant. We are often 
encouraged to see mishaps as nothing more than failures on the part of human agents 
to `manage' risk. From this perspective, responsibility for even the most freakish 
268 
269 
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medical knowledge and skills will have advanced during this period, and that levels of 
negligent conduct by medical staff are unlikely to have changed very much, this increase 
points, inevitably, to a significant rise in public expectations where medical treatment is 
concerned, or a marked increase in the propensity to claim, or both. 
A term used in the NAO report (op cit note 267) to describe events arising during clinical care 
that cause physical or psychological injury to the patient. 
There is evidence suggesting that compensation is not the only, or even the main, desire of 
those who suffer injury. Studies suggest that an admission of fault, evidence of action to 
prevent occurrence, a proper investigation and an apology are equally or more important to 
accident victims. The validity of these studies might be questioned on the basis that accident 
victims, in order not to appear mercenary, are likely to play down the importance of 
compensation when questioned on the subject. However, it is not unreasonable to conclude 
that greater openness on the part of wrongdoers would reduce to some extent the incidence of 
litigation. See the NAO report, note 267 above, pp. 20-28, Mulachy, (2000) `Mediating 
medical negligence claims: an option for the future', HMSO and Vincent, C., Young, M. and 
Phillips, A. `Why do people sue doctors? A study of patients and relatives taking legal 
action', The Lancet, June 1994. 
Of course, the American culture of blame makes sense, or is at least explicable, in a land 
where the state does little for accident victims. It makes less sense when transplanted to 
Europe, where social security systems are highly developed, despite recent cuts in many 
countries. 
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occurrence, and hence liability, must fall somewhere. It is simply a question of 
identifying the parties who could, and should, have managed the risks in question. 271 
Now `risk management' may be useful as a descriptive label for the activities of those 
who seek to measure risks, prioritise them and provide mechanisms to mitigate the 
effect of financial uncertainty. However, in the view of the author, `risk 
management', is very dubious as a thesis to be taken literally. 272 Of course, insurance 
companies and brokers, facing competition and new threats in their traditional 
domain, 273 are anxious to become the high priests of this new cult. They now purport 
to offer not just insurance but comprehensive programmes of `integrated', `holistic' or 
`total' risk management. There is irony in the fact that in doing so, in proclaiming the 
tractability of risk, insurers might be indirectly promoting the very `compensation 
culture' that they are often so quick to condemn. 
Of course, extravagant demands are often toned down once people see a price label 
and know who is paying. Politicians and commentators might thus do well to 
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The current investigation into the recent Selby rail crash provides a good example. It is 
difficult to conceive of a more freakish occurrence, a single vehicle which left the road a 
considerable distance from the railway having ended up on the line and derailed two trains. 
Nevertheless, every spokesman confidently vowed that investigations would continue until `the 
cause' was found, `lessons would be learned' and `steps would be taken to ensure that it 
cannot happen again. ' At the time of writing a prosecution has been launched against the 
driver concerned, who may have fallen asleep at the wheel and lost control of his vehicle. But 
in what sense can it be said that he `caused' the complex matrix of events that precipitated the 
disaster? Even if the law determines that he did, and criminal responsibility triggers civil 
liability, the case will simply reinforce one of Atiyah's prime `counts' against negligence 
liability 
- 
the fact that a mere peccadillo can lay responsibility for a catastrophe at one's door. 
There is an inherent contradiction in the idea of `managing' risk. Risk connotes uncertainty, 
which can sometimes be reduced, perhaps to certainty, but cannot be `managed' whilst at the 
same time retaining its quality of riskiness. 
General insurance is a low-growth or even a no-growth area. Large commercial clients now 
use their size to justify buying less insurance rather than more. They retain more exposures, 
take bigger deductibles, and increasingly use captives and other corporate vehicles in 
preference to full commercial insurance. In many cases, they are committed to a philosophy of 
sophisticated financial risk management, and look for risk transfer techniques that combine 
traditional insurance risks and traditionally uninsurable risks. They now require not just 
insurance products but a broad range of complementary risk management services. To survive 
in this environment, major insurance firms have had to adapt, diversify and equip themselves 
with new skills. They must now be able to offer clients a whole portfolio of risk-related 
services, which might include environmental, product and workplace safety audits, captive 
management, legal services, advice on corporate governance, employee benefits consulting 
and the assembly of sophisticated Alternative Risk Transfer (ART) structures. However, in 
these new spheres of activity they face much competition from new entrants who already have 
some or all of the necessary competencies. These include accountancy firms, investment 
banks, Internet companies, legal firms and specialist consultants. Many of these firms have 
large pools of talent and formidable specialist skills. Some of them, most notably the 
investment banks, also have ready access to investors. 
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emphasise the links, in some key sectors, between rising compensation demands, 
declining standards of public service and the reduced quality of life that can result 
from vain attempts to produce a sterile, risk-free environment. 274 On the same basis, 
insurers might also attempt to make it clear that compensation has another cost, by 
emphasising the link between the `compensation culture' and the steeply rising 
premiums that are necessary to fund more frequent claims, higher damages and 
increased transaction costs. Unfortunately, compensation costs, translated into 
liability insurance premiums, are usually lost in the general price of goods and 
services produced by firms that insure. It is, perhaps, only in the sphere of motor 
insurance that there is any real opportunity to bring the point home, this being the only 
form of liability insurance that large numbers of ordinary people buy out of their own 
pockets. Perhaps, when motor insurers increase prices they might indicate, at least in 
broad terms, what portion of the increased cost is attributable to third party injury 
claims and what to other factors. Greater transparency of this sort would do no harm 
and might at least help to raise public consciousness as to the economic realities of 
compensation and its inevitable costs. On the other hand, injured claimants cannot be 
expected to view these issues objectively: knowing how much they have paid into the 
pot will hardly encourage the injured to take out less. 
In fact, though insurers frequently complain about the `compensation culture' the 
messages they transmit are often confused. We have suggested already that insurers' 
espousal of the `risk management' concept may contribute to this confusion. The 
stance of the insurance industry in the current debate surrounding insurance schemes 
to support personal injury litigation is equally equivocal. In the author's view, this is 
another area where the actions of the insurance industry have done little to combat the 
`compensation culture' and may actually be reinforcing it. This is considered next. 
274 Witness, for example, the recent highly-publicised attempts of the notoriously risk-averse 
Norwich City Council to fell a magnificent line of chestnut trees, prompted by fear of litigation 
should any child be injured when collecting conkers. 
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6.3.3 `Risk-free' litigation? 
We have suggested that the `compensation culture' may be linked to contemporary 
public perceptions of risk, the (somewhat simplified) popular view being that risk is 
inherently manageable and that it should be borne entirely by those who provide 
goods, services, transport, employment and the like. In other words, that life should 
be `risk free' for ordinary people. This, we have suggested, has led at least some 
accident victims to assume that compensation must be an automatic corollary of any 
injury. However, it does not follow that the causers of accidents should accept the 
same proposition. On the contrary, unwillingness on the part of victims to accept any 
personal responsibility for their injuries is likely to matched by a similar obduracy on 
the part of alleged injurers, by an equal unwillingness to accept blame. It goes 
without saying that liability insurers will often take a similar view so, inevitably, a 
large number of claims will be contested, and some will be litigated. 
Now, of course, dispute resolution is expensive and litigation extremely so. Faced 
with the prospect of losing, and paying heavy legal costs, many rational accident 
victims would simply not take the risk, especially if their injuries were relatively 
trivial and could be borne without personal hardship. Until relatively recently legal 
aid was available in many cases but, of course, this was effectively `privatised' in the 
recent reforms of the civil justice system 
-a further example of the switching of 
accident costs from the `public' to `private' sector explored earlier. This, in turn, 
created opportunities for a new breed of entrepreneur in the claims field: specialist 
accident compensation recovery agencies (unkindly dubbed `claim farmers' by the 
insurance industry), operating on a no-win, no-fee basis. 275 As a result, accident 
victims were encouraged to accept another illusion 
- 
that litigation could be risk free 
and cost free. In fact, the preservation of this illusion depended on insurance, in this 
case legal expenses insurance276 against the possibility of losing and having to pay the 
defendant's own legal costs. However, this illusion was soon shattered for many 
275 
276 
`Claims Direct' being the best known. 
Legal expenses (LE) insurance is not liability insurance but a form of first party pecuniary loss 
insurance. This was confirmed recently in Tarbuck v. Avon Insurance, forthcoming in [2001 ] 
Lloyd's Rep IR where the judge adopted arguments set out by Nick Stanbury in (1996) 92 
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successful claimants. They found that most of the compensation they would have 
otherwise received was absorbed in the insurance premium, which the `claim farmers' 
could not recover from the defendant and were therefore obliged to deduct from their 
clients' own compensation. This might be viewed as a salutary lesson in the 
economics of compensation. However, the matter recently went to law in Gallery v. 
Gray277 where the House of Lords held that, in principle, the legal expenses insurance 
premium should be recoverable. At the time of writing there are still uncertainties as 
to the precise effects of this decision. However, it appears, on the face of it, that the 
illusion of risk-free, cost-free litigation may be preserved. Risk-free and cost-free, of 
course, it is not. The costs will simply be absorbed by insurance markets and passed 
on in the form of higher premiums. In this form the costs are effectively disguised, 
perhaps reducing the chances of a proper debate about the balance that needs to be 
preserved between `access to justice' and the risk of fostering a corrosive and 
economically damaging culture of blame. 
It is very interesting to observe insurers' own reactions to all this. One much- 
advocated solution, essentially a `marketing' response by insurers intended to defeat 
the `claim farmers', is to add legal expenses cover to all personal insurance contracts 
(principally motor and household), so that no injured victim holding such a policy 
need fall into their clutches. This is a dubious proposal, roughly equivalent (from the 
perspective of the insurance industry) of arming both sides in a conflict. The effect 
would be to raise premium levels significantly for the main lines of personal 
insurance. This would lead, in the case of motor insurance, to an increase in the 
number of uninsured drivers (the UK already has far more than any other European 
country except Greece), 278 greater strain on the funds of the Motor Insurers' Bureau 
and, inevitably, yet higher insurance costs for the remainder who do insure. Since 
there is, as yet, no obvious way of distinguishing between those who are likely to 
suffer injury and those who are not and, especially, between the litigious and the non- 
litigious, it would be difficult to charge differential premiums for this risk. As a 
result, the non-litigious would inevitably pay rather more than they should for a cover 
277 
278 
BILA Journal 26. The case established, amongst other things, that the Third Parties (Rights 
Against Insurers) Act 1930 does not extend to legal expenses insurance. 
The Times July 18,2001. 
It is estimated that 1 in 20 UK motorists is uninsured. 
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that was in any case undesired, doubly enhancing what would otherwise be a small 
propensity to sue. Inevitably, the result would be more liability claims and a further 
fostering of the very `compensation culture' that insurers often condemn. It is 
difficult to resist the conclusion that, on this particular issue, the insurance industry is 
left facing in all directions at once. 279 
6.4 THE JUDICIARY AND THE LEGISLATURE 
The relationship between liability insurance and the law has been explored in some 
detail in Part 5, so only a brief comment on the stance of the lawmakers is necessary 
here. In the current climate, described in the previous section, there is certainly some 
pressure on both the judiciary and the legislature to expand liability law and increase 
damages awards, but there are few clear maps to guide the lawmakers. It is easy to 
say that laws should be framed to reflect the moral values, priorities and wishes of 
society at large but, as we have seen above, public opinion on matters of liability and 
compensation can be fickle, contradictory, ill-informed and easily manipulated. 280 
Distrusting public opinion as irrational and subjective, lawmakers might turn to the 
economists, whose analysis of law one would expect to be both reasoned and 
objective. Certainly, there has accumulated since the 1960s a growing body of 
literature on the economic basis of legal rules, including many analyses of tort and 
accident law. The aim of all this literature is to establish a rational basis for legal 
rules, based on the premise that such rules should be structured so as to encourage the 
optimal allocation of resources in society. Typically, this literature acknowledges the 
importance of insurance in the operation of tort law and holds that its rules should be 
structured in such as way that insurance works efficiently. Lawyers and lawmakers 
have gained some valuable insights from the work of these economists but, as yet, 
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See Stanbury, N (2002) `Advance and be recognised: how legal expenses insurance is gaining 
in stature' Journal of Insurance Research and Practice, Vol. 17, Part I for an analysis of 
recent developments and current issues in the field of legal expenses insurance. 
As Lewis observes: `The use of "vox pop" to justify changes in the tort system is fraught with 
danger. The use of simple, basic questions can produce predictable responses. It would be no 
surprise to find that people would award more compensation to those with serious injuries, just 
as they would have "the Government" increase the wages of nurses, double the value of old 
aged pensions, and waive contributions to residential care. Lewis, R. K. (2001) `Pain and 
suffering in the Court of Appeal' Journal of Insurance Research and Practice Vol. 16 pt 2, p. 
21, also (2001) `Increasing the price of pain: damages, the Law Commission and Heil v. 
Rankin, 64 Modern Law Review 100,106. 
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their influence has been limited, at least in Europe. As previously discussed, few 
judges, or lawyers generally, have the training to speak out confidently on matters of 
economics generally or insurance in particular and it is not surprising that they should 
show some diffidence when presented with arguments based on economic or 
insurance principles. 281 In fact, the intricacies of insurance and its commercial 
practices will often make it difficult for courts to make a proper assessment of the 
`insurance factor' in any particular case. Usually the court will have only limited 
expertise and information. On the basis that a little knowledge can be a dangerous 
thing, one might argue for a return to the strict `traditional' approach. This 
emphasises the deterrent and retributive role of tort liability and pays strong homage 
to moral and ideological principles in which insurance and insurability have little or 
no part to play. This tradition is by no means dead. However, it is too late to go back 
now. Insurance has penetrated so many spheres of commercial life and private 
activity that its presence is now impossible to ignore. Every judge knows that 
insurance companies pay all but a fraction of tort claims and, in many cases, that the 
wrongdoer has been compelled to insure. On the whole it must be best that courts 
should acquaint themselves as fully as possible with insurance practice, so that they 
can at least be aware of the complex issues that arise where judgments about 
insurance are concerned and avoid simplistic conclusions about its effects. 
6.5 FINAL REFLECTIONS 
The device of liability insurance has provided the principal focus of this essay. We 
have traced the genesis of liability insurance, examined its development, considered 
the intricate technical problems that it poses and explored the dynamics of the market 
in which it is sold. However, it should be abundantly clear that liability insurance 
cannot be examined in isolation. Perhaps more than any other class of insurance, 
liability insurance must be studied in its wider legal, economic and social context if a 
full understanding is to be gained. This requires an analysis of the relationship 
between liability insurance and tort law and, going beyond that, an appreciation of 
291 There have been exceptions, as Clarke notes, Lord Diplock `strode with confidence into the 
realms of economics' Policies and perceptions of insurance (1997) p. 289. 
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how both relate to other elements within the systems that have evolved to compensate 
victims of misfortune. 
It is clear that in most countries, and certainly in the UK, the various component parts 
of accident compensation systems have developed in a haphazard fashion, without 
much co-ordination, and without one part exercising much influence on another. For 
example, until relatively recently, social insurance schemes have developed with only 
limited regard for private law remedies, and the reverse has also been true. Only in 
the last thirty years have there been serious attempts by scholars, practitioners and 
governments and to look at accident compensation systems as a whole, to analyse the 
linkages between their various elements, and to challenge the logic of their structure. 
At the same time, the dialogue between the main human protagonists, including 
lawyers, government officials and insurance personnel has been quite poor. Most 
have been content to absorb and apply the long-received wisdom of their respective 
professions and to have little communication with those outside their own discipline. 
This has been an impediment to change and a barrier to progress. At the same time, 
popular appreciation of the issues surrounding accident compensation, and its costs, 
appears exceptionally poor. Obviously, one should not expect to find a highly 
sophisticated understanding of such arcane matters amongst members of the general 
public. Nevertheless, given that all compensation comes ultimately from the pockets 
of ordinary people, it is sad to observe signs that a potentially damaging and 
essentially alien US `compensation culture' may be starting to take root in Europe. 
Insurers themselves do not emerge well from our analysis. At the time of writing 
general insurance, as a business, is in the doldrums. Profits are unsatisfactory, 
insurers have a poor image, and the industry is unattractive to investors. Most people 
view life insurance as a far better business, despite all the scandals of mis-selling and 
despite strong competition for personal savings from other financial firms. As we 
have seen, liability insurance has often been a disaster area. However, a large part of 
the blame must be laid at the door of liability insurers themselves. The Lloyd's 
debacle at the end of the 1980s was, to a large extent, the product of narrow vision 
and complacency amongst insurers that spread well beyond Lloyd's and the London 
market. There was a failure to properly analyse the wider environment - the complex 
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and shifting social, political, scientific and legal milieu of liability insurance 
- 
and a 
failure to think strategically, to plan for long-term profit rather than immediate 
premium income. To a large extent, this failure was one of management. As we have 
seen, some of the most unwise (and for insurers, most expensive) excursions into the 
further reaches of liability insurance have been `marketing' responses to perceived 
problems. By this we mean solutions that seek to remedy flagging (or non-existent) 
profits by developing new products and selling them to new customers, in the hope 
that both will prove better than the old ones. Insurance personnel in the sales and 
marketing field (including the broker sector) will always see this 
- 
selling more 
- 
as 
the optimum solution, simply because the reward structure of the insurance industry 
encourages them to do so. As we have seen, liability insurance 
- 
still a relatively new 
field 
- 
offers much scope for marketing initiatives of this sort. Set against the zeal of 
sales and marketing staff is, or should be, the innate conservatism and scepticism of 
the underwriter 
- 
who is, or should be, judged not by sales but the loss ratio on his 
account. It is the task of insurance managers to balance these forces and keep them in 
check, to ensure that neither is allowed to dominate the other. As we have seen, in the 
context of liability insurance the balance has often been lost. All too often 
underwriters have been allowed, and perhaps even encouraged, to accept the 
blandishments of colleagues in the sales function, often with dire consequences. 
Arguably, there has been a further management failure, in this case in training and 
education 
-a failure to ensure that key decisions have been made by qualified persons 
with a comprehensive understanding of their business, rather those who seem, so far, 
to have displayed good luck and good judgement. Lloyd's, for example, has 
traditionally viewed academic degrees and technical diplomas with some suspicion, 
favouring 'experience 282 over knowledge, family connections, the dilettante and the 
gentleman amateur. As a result, until relatively recently, the active underwriter of a 
Lloyd's syndicate provided a rare example of a person who could speculate with vast 
sums of investors' money not only largely free of regulatory control, but also 
unburdened by qualifications. 283 The insularity of the British insurance market has 
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In the context of insurance, `experience' has been memorably defined as `knowledge gained 
too late'. 
This has recently changed, and evidence of some study is now required, in the form of an 
Associateship diploma of the Chartered Insurance Institute (ACII) at least. Horses and stable 
doors come to mind. Moreover, professional insurance qualifications remain worryingly 
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been another damaging factor. It may seem strange to use this term in connection 
with a business that has, in the past, exported its products with some success but, 
unfortunately, the trade in ideas has been all one way. British insurers have typically 
shown a massive indifference to foreign (and especially European Continental) 
practice, regarding insurance, quite wrongly, as a British fiefdom and British practices 
as innately superior. However, ten years on from Albert's analysis, it is the British 
`Maritime' model that looks vulnerable and the more conservative `Alpine' approach 
that seems more likely to endure. 284 
At present, and as a consequence of the process of evolution described in this essay, 
parts of the liability insurance market are fragile, and subject to forces that still make 
for potential instability. Employers' liability has been identified as a key example, 
together with certain other risks. 285 These are, perhaps, areas where the device of 
liability insurance has been over-extended, its limits in terms of usefulness and 
efficiency have been exceeded, and where some retrenchment may be necessary. 
Should they wish to do so, insurers can drive the agenda here: for example, the state 
can compel businesses to buy employers' liability insurance, but it cannot force 
insurers to sell it, and cannot provide an exact substitute. This is one area where 
insurers have it in their power to force tort reform. In the view of the author, they 
should do so. Whether or not this happens, liability insurance will still have a 
substantial role to play, and all stakeholders in accident compensation systems will 
retain an interest in a sound, healthy and competitive insurance market. However, if 
this is to be achieved there are a number of weaknesses that need to be addressed. 
Where insurers themselves are concerned there is a need is for a wider vision, a better 
grasp of the environment in which this form of insurance operates, better 
management, greater realism and less passivity. There is also a need for insurers to 
communicate more effectively with those outside the industry. As we have seen, 
there is a substantial mismatch between insurers' own diffident views on liability 
insurance, and the perceptions of other stakeholders, which tend to be over-optimistic. 
Most of the latter would also benefit from a better understanding of the mechanisms 
284 
285 
narrow in their scope, focusing on UK practice, technical detail and `product knowledge'. The 
broader environment of insurance business is still neglected. 
See note 58 and accompanying text. 
Including environmental risks. 
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of liability insurance, an appreciation of the peculiar problems it generates and of the 
limitations of the technique 
- 
of what can be achieved efficiently through liability 
insurance, and what cannot. 
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APPENDIX I 
QUESTIONNAIRE ON LIABILITY INSURANCE 
(All information supplied will be treated in strict confidence and no insurance 
company will be identified by name in any publication based on this research) 
NAME OF COMPANY 
.................................................................. 
1 Which lines of liability insurance does your company write and, of these, 
which are regarded as the most attractive in business terms? 
(for the liability classes that your company writes please enter 1 against the most 
attractive class, 2 against the second most attractive, etc. ) 
Employers' liability Q 
Public/product liability Q 
Environmental Impairment Liability Q 
Professional Indemnity Q 
D&O liability Q 
Other (please specify) 
............................................. 
Q 
2 What other lines of general insurance does your company write? 
(please tick as appropriate) 
Property/B1 Q 
Motor Q 
Personal lines Q 
Other (please specify) 
.................................................. 
. 
None Q 
3 In business terms, how does your company regard liability insurance 
generally? 
(please tick one) 
Very attractive 
Attractive 
Average 
Not attractive 
Very unattractive 
El 
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4 For what reasons does your company write liability business? 
(please tick as appropriate) 
Because it is attractive in its own right Q 
Mainly to support other business Q 
Only to support other business Q 
Other reasons (please specify) 
...................... ...... 
Q 
.................................................................................... 
.................................................................................... 
5 What do you regard as the main problems for liability insurers? 
(please rank in order of importance, i. e. 1 for the most important problem, 2 for the 
second most important, etc. ) 
Long-tail claims (e. g. disease, pollution) Q 
Uncertainty of liability rules Q 
Damages trends Q 
Volatility of liability business Q 
Other (please specify 
................................ ................. 
Q 
.................................................................................... 
.................................................................................... 
.................................................................................... 
6 Do you have any further comments to expand on the points above? 
...................................................................................................... 
...................................................................................................... 
...................................................................................................... 
...................................................................................................... 
...................................................................................................... 
...................................................................................................... 
...................................................................................................... 
Name and position in company 
................................. 
....... ..................... 
...................................................................................................... 
Thank you for your help. Please return the questionnaire (SAE provided) to Chris 
Parsons, City University Business School, Frobisher Crescent, Barbican Centre, 
London EC2Y 8HB. 
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SURVEY OF LIABILITY INSURERS: ANALYSIS 
How insurers regard liability insurance in business terms 
Very attractive 
Attractive 
Average 
Unattractive 
Very unattractive 
0% 
14% 
19% 
53% 
14% 
13 Very attractive 
Q Attractive 
Q Average 
  Unattractive 
  Very unattractive 
Reasons for writing liability business 
Because it is attractive in its own right 10% 
Mainly to support other business 45% 
Only to support other business 35% 
Historical or other reasons 10% 
Q Because it is attractive in its own right 
O Mainly to support other business 
® Only to support other business 
  Historical or other reasons 
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Relative attractiveness of different lines of liability business 
Class of insurance (see key) EL PL EIL PI D&O 
Number of respondents writing this line 36 40 10 14 10 
Ranked 1 (most attractive) 
- 
79% 
- 
28% 40% 
Ranked 2 
- 
21% 
- 
44% 
- 
Ranked 3 
- - - 
28% 60% 
Ranked 4 33% 
- 
20% 
- - 
Ranked 5 (least attractive) 67% 
- 
80% 
- - 
Key EL 
PL 
EIL 
PI 
D&O 
Employers' Liability 
Public/General Liability (normally includes product liability) 
Environmental Impairment Liability (covers gradual pollution) 
Professional Indemnity 
Directors' and Officers' liability 
The main problems for liability insurers 
Number of Problem Problem Problem Problem 
offices that ranked 1 ranked 2 ranked 3 ranked 4 
acknowledge (most serious) (least serious) 
the problem 
Damages 46 33% 48% 19% 
- 
trends 
Long tail 46 42% 24% 17% 17% 
Risks 
Legal 40 11% 23% 33% 33% 
uncertainty 
Volatility 37 18% 6% 29% 47% 
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